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Life is full of uncertainty. For many of the decisions we take, we ignore the exact 
consequences of choosing one way or the other. For example, when we face a red 
traffic light we often do not know how dangerous the crossing is, and whether the 
police might be watching. When we decide to buy a house, we do not know whether 
we will get along well with our neighbors, and how the market for that house will be 
in case we want to resell it. When we consider giving money to a charity, we cannot 
be sure they really spend the money as they claim, and whether those proposed 
measures actually help the people in need. 
 
In this uncertain world, norms help us take decisions by providing guidance. Norms 
may have different sources. They can be institutionally enacted by a legislator, 
common behavioral patterns within a social group, and individually held moral 
standards. We may for instance choose not to run a red light, simply because doing so 
is illegal; totally irrespective of the specific situation at a particular crossing. We may 
decide to buy a house because most of our friends and colleagues own houses. And 
we may give money to a charity simply because we believe that something needs to 
be done. 
 
In four independent Chapters, I examine how norms guide our behavior in an 
uncertain world. Methodologically, I apply the toolbox of experimental economics to 
research questions that are on the interface between economics and law (especially 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), sociology (especially Chapter 3), and social psychology 
(especially Chapter 4).  
 
The first Chapter looks into the market for copyrights. Imagine the following 
situation: An author has written a script for a movie and a producer is considering 
buying a license in order to make a film. At the time when they have to strike a deal, 
neither of the two parties knows to how much box office success this script might be 
able to contribute. The reason is that the distribution of box office revenues is highly 
skewed. Few movies make a lot of money. The vast majority of movies barely 
recover the production costs. So far, there are no reliable methods for predicting box 
office success accurately. In such a situation it is difficult for either party to determine 
its reservation price, and even more complicated to agree to a mutually acceptable 
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deal. The German legislator thinks that this requires regulation and stipulates that the 
seller of the copyright may ex post claim additional remuneration in case that the 
license fee agreed upon ex ante is grossly disproportionate to the proceeds from the 
work.  
 
This so-called “bestseller paragraph” seems odd in at least two respects: First, it is 
unbalanced as it does not grant the buyer the right of an ex-post discount in case the 
ex-ante licence fee was disproportionately high. Second, it interferes with a 
voluntarily agreed, mutually beneficial contract. Together with Christoph Engel, I 
examine to what extent the provision restores fairness, as claimed in the legislative 
materials, and how it affects the number of deals closed as well as the average prices 
in the market.  
 
We design an experimental game that captures the main features of copyright 
markets: A seller and a buyer negotiate a price for a commodity whose value is 
uncertain. Only after they have agreed on a purchase price, nature determines the 
commodity’s true value. Both parties then have the opportunity to costly express their 
discontent to one another. One treatment pictures the market without and another with 
the essence of the German provision. In the provision treatment, buyer and seller can 
renegotiate the price after the draw of nature. In case they do not agree, a third 
person, the so-called umpire, determines the purchase price. 
 
Under standard textbook assumptions the equilibrium of the game is not touched by 
the presence of the bestseller paragraph. Under behavioural assumptions we expect 
lower market prices but no effect on the number of deals closed. We further expect 
ex-post discontent to be distributed differently but not reduced on aggregate. The 
experimental results show that the provision leads to lower market prices and a higher 
number of deals closed. Apparently thus, the provision enhances ex-ante fairness in 
the sense that lower priced deals become more acceptable to sellers. It also increases 
ex-post fairness since buyers express less discontent while seller express as little as in 
the baseline. 
 
Whilst the first Chapter is concerned with codified law, Chapter 2 shifts the focus to 
customary law. In most countries of the world, customary law is a recognised source 
of law. It is created by the behaviour and the will of those supposed to abide by it. 
Classic illustrations are international law, lex mercatoria, trade practice, and codes of 
conduct. These domains are characterized by substantial uncertainty concerning the 
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behaviour of the other players and whether a certain practice can already be regarded 
as sufficiently established to have binding character.  
 
Together with Christoph Engel, I use a lab experiment to test the main claims made in 
the legal debate over customary law. Rational choice theorists claim that what looks 
like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond 
consent assumes the force of law. 
 
The experimental paradigm is a standard public goods game with and without 
sanctioning opportunities. We vary the extent to which participants are made aware of 
the binding force of custom and whether we elicit their normative expectations or not. 
Our experimental results suggest that the critics of customary law use an overly 
narrow and thus inappropriate conception of normativity. Norms do not only direct 
behaviour if norm violation is against the addressee’s self-interest. On the other hand, 
the duty to abide by the law in force is not the exclusive motivating force either. 
Norms matter because they provide guidance. Most actors are most of the time 
willing to follow the norms prevailing in their context, or at least to be not too far off 
the mark, and most actors expect other actors to be thus guided. This leads to 
considerably higher contributions to the public good. 
 
Based on these findings, we propose a new conceptualisation of customary law: 
Custom guides behavior as normative expectations and behavioral patterns coevolve. 
Customary law capitalizes on this more general social mechanism. If it is not backed 
up by sanctions, customary law is not more effective than mere custom in realigning 
individual action and social welfare. Sanctions and custom are substitutes if the 
emerging rule is not perceived to be grounded in law, and complements otherwise. 
 
Chapter 3 leaves the domain of legal norms and shifts the focus to social norms. 
Social norms are crucial when individuals need to cooperate in order to achieve a 
better social outcome. Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday 
situations. For example, when it comes to protecting the environment, defending 
one’s country, generating new knowledge, joining a political party, extending the 
infrastructure, or exploiting the opposite market side, agents face a social dilemma. 
Jointly they are best off if everyone contributes her fair share. But individually, free-
riding on others’ efforts yields the highest payoff.  
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Together with Christoph Engel and Sebastian Kube, I propose a very simple and 
light-handed mechanism for managing cooperativeness and test its effectiveness by 
using laboratory experiments. Our mechanism is based on an observation that has 
previously been made in public-goods experiments, namely that (initial) group 
composition and initial cooperation rates significantly affect the future development 
of cooperation rates in a particular group. A likely reason for this behavioral pattern is 
provided by the influential concept of reciprocity and conditional cooperation. If 
persons are sensitive to the behavior of other group members, those groups who 
cooperate little in the beginning will become even less cooperative over time, while 
groups with substantial cooperation in the beginning are able to sustain cooperation 
over time. This suggests that outsiders might moderate cooperation by controlling 
experiences. Our mechanism is even less invasive in that it is confined to the first 
impressions subjects happen to make. More precisely, the idea is to “manipulate” 
initial beliefs by providing participants with selective information about 
(un)cooperative behavior in other, unrelated, groups. We thus suggest to the 
participants a possible norm to follow.  
 
The experimental paradigm is a public goods game with decentralized sanctions and 
counter-punishment opportunities. We choose this rich environment because it 
mimics several potentially important features available in natural environments. 
Moreover, it is sufficiently complex, so that conflicting behavioral norms might 
emerge – which allows us to test the effect of both favorable and unfavorable first 
impressions.  
 
In the baseline, subjects play the game for 10 periods without any exogenous 
interventions. In two treatments, prior to making their first contribution decision in 
the game, we provide subjects with selected data from the baseline. Specifically, we 
show them graphs of the development of mean contributions over time from selected 
cooperative (resp. uncooperative) groups. The information that we give is 
unfavorable for cooperation in one treatment and favorable in the other. 
 
Our experimental results show that contributions are considerably sensitive to such 
selective information. In fact, the selective information from unrelated groups appears 
to set a standard as to what type of behavior is expected to be normal. First 
impressions participants happen to make predict subsequent behavior. Our results, 
however, suggest an asymmetry in the strength of the reaction – which might pose a 
limit on the effectiveness of the mechanism in natural settings. People are particularly 
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sensitive to negative impressions as optimistic beliefs about others’ behavior are 
much more fragile than pessimistic ones. These findings strongly suggest that 
people’s behavior is indeed conditional on initial expectations of how others are 
likely to behave, and that these expectations are open to purposeful intervention. 
 
In most everyday situations we know which norm applies and adapt our behavior 
automatically and unconsciously. But often, we face new situations and are uncertain 
what the right behavior is. We find guidance in norms. Absent legal norms, there are 
two distinct sources from which to deduce a norm. The first source is external. People 
watch how others behave and deduce the norm from what most people do. I call this a 
norm of conformity. Chapter 3 illustrates the (detrimental) effect of conformity in a 
social dilemma. On the other hand, the source of a norm can also be internal. People 
look at their own moral standards and deduce the norm from what they personally 
believe to be morally right. I call this a norm of morality. Chapter 2 hints at the 
beneficial effect of morality in a social dilemma. Conformity requires information 
about others’ behavior. Morality requires self-reflection about one’s own moral 
standards. This is the rationale for the two experimental treatments. Chapter 4 studies 
the effect of these two distinct normative sources on people’s social preferences. 
 
While the idea of self-reflection is rather strange to modern economics, it is not new 
to the discipline. In fact, it can be traced back to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, who in turn was inspired by the religious concept of conscience. More 
recently, the concept of identity utility has provided a rationale for explaining 
preference changes due to shifts of the relevant norms; be it unconsciously or via 
conscious self-reflection. This contrasts sharply with the predominant notion in 
modern economics that preferences are inherent and stable traits of the individual. 
Notably, the literature on social preferences acknowledges that different people might 
have different preferences for distributive justice but it does not allow the same 
people to vary their preferences from one situation to another as a result of a change 
in the relevant norms.  
 
The experimental paradigm used in Chapter 4 is a modified dictator game (MDG). 
The MDG asks participants for their preferences in a 2x2 world: you are either richer 
or poorer than the other player, and you can either create income for the other player 
or destroy it. A MDG in a university lab is clearly not an everyday situation. It thus 
seems plausible to assume that participants have doubts about the normatively 
appropriate behavior, which is exactly where normative guidance becomes relevant. 
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In the experimental treatments, subjects are guided externally, by giving them 
information about representative behavior of previous participants, and internally, by 
asking them to make a moral judgment prior to their incentivized choice.  
 
The experimental results suggest that whereas information has virtually no effect, 
self-reflection changes social preferences substantially. Information does have, 
however, a strong effect on people’s moral judgments. Interestingly, since people 
differ with respect to their normative goals (social welfare vs. equality), self-
reflection leads to more heterogeneity of preferences as subjects home-grown 
normative concerns are reinforced. 
 
Chapter 4 is single-authored. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 have been written together with co-
authors. My personal contributions to the co-authored Chapters are summarized in 
Table I. 
 
Table I: Personal contribution to co-authored Chapters 
 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Idea Minor Minor Proportional 
Experimental Design Proportional Proportional Proportional 
Hypotheses Leading Proportional Proportional 
Literature Review Minor Minor Proportional 
Data Collection Leading Leading Leading 
Data Analysis Leading Proportional Leading 







Fairness Ex Ante & Ex Post: 










The market for copyrights is characterised by a highly skewed distribution of profits: very 
few movies, books and songs generate huge profits, whereas the great bulk barely manages to 
recover production cost. At the moment when the owner of intellectual property grants a 
licence (“ex ante”), neither party knows the true value of the traded commodity. A seemingly 
odd provision from German copyright law, the so-called “bestseller paragraph”, stipulates 
that the seller of a licence has a legally enforceable right to a bonus in case the work (“ex 
post”) turns out a blockbuster. We experimentally explore the effect of the provision on 
market prices, on the number of deals struck and on perceived fairness. Our results show that 
the provision leads to lower prices for copyrights. More copyrights trade. The buyers express 
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I. Introduction 
Choosing the price of a copyright is difficult. The distribution of success is highly 
skewed in the media industries and success is highly unpredictable. 
 
Take the example of the movie industry. In 2008, the most successful movie, The 
Dark Knight, in total gross earnings made more than $ 1 billion worldwide at the box 
office, whereas the least successful release from a studio, called $ 9.99, just made 
$ 800.
1
 In stylised facts: 20 % of the films earn approximately 80 % of the revenue 
(De Vany and Walls 1996; Jedidi and Krider 1998:394; Collins, Hand et al. 2002). 
The majority of movies even generate real losses (De Vany and Walls 1999:298 
provide an illustrative scatterplot). 
 
The dynamics of film success have been explained by herding and information 
cascades (De Vany and Walls 1996). However, with the information available ex 
ante, it is extremely difficult to predict success. Even using regression coefficients 
from the past, and exploiting all the information available ex ante, gross 
mispredictions are frequent. For instance, the movie 3 ninjas actually made $ 
308,000, while the regression would have predicted more than $ 10 million. By 
contrast, for There’s Something About Mary, the regression predicted less than $ 2 





Imagine that an author has written a script for a movie and there is a producer who 
considers buying a license in order to make a film. At the time when the producer has 
to decide how much to pay, neither of the two knows how much this script might be 
worth. How can either party determine its reservation price, let alone agree on a 
mutually acceptable deal? 
                                               
1 Source: http://www.boxofficemojo.com Worldwide gross box office revenues of the 450 most 
successful movies in 2008. Less successful movies than $ 9.99 will possibly not have even made it to 
this database. 
2 These two examples illustrate the general problem with these models. The best fitting regression 
model using predictors from the past to explain US revenue has a (non-adjusted) R2 of only .446. Even 
for the past, more than half of the variance remains unexplained. The model predicts an average 
revenue of 2.5 Mio $, but the 95% confidence interval runs from a negative revenue of 89.6 Mio $ to a 
positive revenue of 94.5 Mio $ (Simonoff and Sparrow 2000:Table 1). 
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In principle, there is an easy way out. Instead of agreeing on a fixed price, the parties 
could write a success-contingent contract that gives the artist a defined share of the 
final profit; in the industry, these are called royalty deals. While such deals are indeed 
very common with stars, they are less frequent with ordinary artists (Chisholm 1993; 
De Vany 2004:245). In fact, such a success-contingent arrangement would meet 
neither side’s interests. Producers want to be the exclusive residual claimants and do 
not want to cut into their managerial freedom. Artists usually have nothing but their 
human capital for a living and, like ordinary workers, many do not want to bear 
market risks.  
 
The German legislature explicitly reacted to this situation. It starts from the 
observation that, in this legal order, “buyout” contracts are widespread. In such 
contracts, the author sells the right to commercially exploit her creative work in any 
possible way and using any imaginable technology, against a fixed upfront fee.
3
 The 
German legislature thinks that this situation calls for regulation and stipulates: 
  
“If the owner of a copyright has granted a licence such that the fee, in the light of 
the entire relationship between the parties, is grossly disproportionate with 
regard to the proceeds from the work, the buyer is obliged to agree, upon the 
author’s request, to a change in the contract such that the seller receives an 
additional remuneration, reflecting what is her appropriate share under the given 
circumstances.” 4 
 
This legal provision seems odd in at least two respects: First, the provision is 
unbalanced in the sense that it does not grant the buyer the right of an ex-post 
discount in case the initial price was disproportionately high. Second and more 
fundamentally, why should the legislature interfere at all in a situation where two 




                                               
3 BT Drs. 14/8058, 1; BT Drs. 14/6433, 9/10/11.  
4 §32a I 1 UrhG4 (German Copyright Law), our translation. § 32a III 1 UrhG states that the right is not 
waivable. For an overview of jurisprudence see (Wandtke and Bullinger 2009:§ 32a UrhG).  
5 California has a rule in the same spirit, yet using a different regulatory technique. Under Sec. 986 
Cal. Civ. Code, whenever a work of fine art is sold, the artist has a non-waivable statutory right to at 
least 5 % of the selling price. This provision not only applies if a gallery sells the work, but also if it is 
sold in an auction or directly by the previous private owner. 
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In the legislative materials, this provision is introduced as a means to “restore 
fairness” between the parties
6
 in case, given the success on the market, “ex post” the 
remuneration agreed upon “ex ante” seems inappropriately low.
7
 So far, however, 
there have been no attempts to analyse the effect of the provision empirically. This 
paper proposes an experimental approach to tackle the following two questions: (1) 
To what extent does the provision “restore fairness”? (2) How does the provision 
affect the market for copyrights in terms of (a) number of deals closed and (b) 
average purchase prices? 
 
Our experimental results show that, upon introducing the provision, more deals are 
struck, even though offer prices are lower. In addition, the provision leads to a 
reduction of perceived ex-post unfairness for buyers, but not for sellers. The latter is 
remarkable given that the experimental umpires, meant to represent the judiciary, 
apply a fairness norm that clearly benefits sellers. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the design of the experiment 
and in section III we develop our predictions. In section IV we report the 
experimental results. Section V concludes. 
II. Experimental Design 
In stylized fashion our two treatments reflect the interaction on copyright markets 
without (baseline B) and with the essence of the German provision (treatment 
provision P).  
A. Baseline (B) treatment 
Two roles are randomly assigned to participants: they are either buyers or sellers.
8
 
This role stays fixed over the entire treatment. The design of the baseline is best 
illustrated in the flow chart of Fig.1.  
 
                                               
6 BT Drs. 14/8058, 19. 
7 BT Drs. 14/8058, 16. 
8 The bargaining situation is framed neutrally as one of buying and selling a commodity (following 





Figure 1: Design of (B) Baseline 
Note: The experimental currency is Taler. At the end of the experiment, Taler are converted into Euro at a rate of 
1000 Taler = 1 €. 
 
The baseline consists of 8 rounds with a maximum of 4 stages per round: (1) offer 
stage, (2) acceptance stage, (3) random draw, (4) punishment stage. After each round, 
buyers and sellers are rematched. We implement a perfect stranger protocol, i.e. a 
given seller never meets the same buyer twice and vice-versa. Both the matching 
protocol and the number of rounds are common knowledge to all participants. 
 
At the beginning of each round, both players receive an endowment of m=500 Taler, 
which is the currency used in the experiment. In stage 1, the buyer has the 
opportunity to make an offer p in order to purchase commodity C. At this point, 
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neither the seller nor the buyer know the true value v of C. They only know that with 
probability 25.  the commodity is worth vhi=1700 Taler, while with the 
complementary probability 75.1   it is only worth vlo=100 Taler. As Figure 2 




Figure 2: Distribution of earnings  
Note: Panel A depicts the worldwide gross box office revenues of the 450 most successful movies in 2008, 
according to boxofficemojo.com. Panel B illustrates the distribution of earnings in the experiment: In 1 out 
of 4 cases the commodity is worth 1700 Taler, and in 3 out of 4 cases the commodity is worth 100 Taler. 
 
If the seller rejects the offer p in stage 2, the round is over. In this case there are no 
gains from trade. Both players just keep their respective endowments of 500 Taler. If 
the seller accepts, the offer price is immediately transferred from buyer to seller. In 
stage 3, a random device determines the value of the commodity. In stage 4, both 
players learn the outcome of the random draw that determines whether the contract is 
a financial success and have the authority to reduce their counterpart’s earnings. The 
punishment technology is linear (following Fehr and Gächter 2002), and the fine-to-
fee ratio is 3, i.e. one Taler spent by the buyer (seller) on punishment reduces the 
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seller’s (buyer’s) income by 3 Talers. After stage 4, the round is over and the next 
round starts. In the instructions, punishment is neutrally labelled “point allotment”. 
 
In brief, the parties play an ultimatum game, with the twist that the true value of the 
commodity is unknown to both the proposer (buyer) and responder (seller). 
Ultimatum bargaining captures the essence of the situation how the German 
legislature perceived it, and to which it intended to react by the “bestseller 





In the ultimatum game, if the responder rejects an offer, this can be interpreted as 
punishment (Güth 1995). This might explain why, to the best of our knowledge, no 
ultimatum game with an explicit punishment stage has been tested. Yet to understand 
the effect of the provision, it is crucial to have a measure for ex-post feelings of 
(un)fairness (i.e. after the actual value of the commodity has been revealed), in 
addition to the ex-ante indicator of fairness concerns, i.e. rejection of the offer. After 
all, the German legislature believes that authors accept unfavourable deals too easily 
as long as they have no clue of the likely value of their works, but feel treated 
unfairly if their work, after it has been marketed, turns out a success.  
 
To measure ex post fairness attitudes, we capitalise on a tool that is standard in the 
experimental public goods literature, namely costly, simultaneous punishment. In that 
strand of the literature punishment is motivated as a technology to discipline 
freeriders and thereby induce higher levels of cooperation (Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
However, punishment chiefly is a technology for fairness-driven retaliation (Falk, 
Fehr et al. 2005). People are willing to incur a cost in order to express their discontent 
with somebody else’s behaviour. Therefore punishment is a good proxy for hurt 
feelings of fairness (for a similar approach see Fehr, Hart et al. 2010). This 
interpretation is particularly plausible in our context. The perfect stranger protocol 
excludes that a participant will herself derive a pecuniary benefit from disciplining a 
free-rider. Strategic punishment is thus not possible in this design.  
 
                                               
9 BT Drs. 14/6433, 8: “Today, in the Federal Republic of Germany many individual contracts 
concluded between copyright owners and media industry are not based on collectively negotiated 
tariffs; copyright owners have to accept standard form contracts prepared by industry on a take it or 
leave it basis“ (our translation). 
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An alternative to punishment would be a non-incentivized survey instrument, meant 
to elicit sellers’ and buyers’ discontent. For the following reasons we prefer the 
present design. First, any non-incentivized measure is “cheap talk” and therefore 
potentially unreliable. Since otherwise our experiment is set up in the tradition of 
experimental economics, we want to be in line with that tradition. Second 
psychologists, who routinely work with survey instruments, would not trust a mere 
set of straightforward questions. They instead would want to see standard validation 
tests, like test retest reliability, or the performance of the test in different 
environments. There are established psychological measures of related constructs, 
like the measure for the affective evaluation of risky outcomes by Mellers et al. 
(Mellers, Schwartz et al. 1997; Mellers, Schwartz et al. 1999). Yet these measures 
were developed for one-person gambles, while in our experiment participants play a 
strategic game. Given the rich literature on social preferences (see, for example, Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), it seems quite likely that feelings of 
discontent differ if a poor outcome for this player is associated with a good outcome 
for another player, and is even caused by this other player’s behaviour. 
B.  Provision (P) treatment 
The German provision introduces a third actor, besides the buyer and the seller of the 
copyright, the court. The court has jurisdiction to intervene, upon the request of the 
author, in the unlikely but possible event of the work being a big success in the 
market. The statute does not give the court any guidance about how to change the 
contract. It thus introduces a discretionary element, with the ensuing ex post 
uncertainty. In our experimental design we attempt to capture this element of the 
German solution by introducing a third player: the umpire. As in the case of real 
judges and juries, the experimental umpire’s earnings are unrelated
10
 to the decisions 
she takes; she is paid a fixed fee. This is known to all players. As with the courts, an 
applicant does not in advance know with certainty how the umpire will decide. The 
applicant only knows the abstract decision rule. We ask the umpire to determine the 
“appropriate purchase price”
 
, exactly as in the statutory provision. For the sequence 
of stages, the reader is referred to the flow chart of Fig.3.  
 
                                               
10 In Germany, judges are appointed at the beginning of their careers and then enjoy the status of civil 
servants with lifetime tenure. This arrangement is meant to shield them from being held personally 





Figure 3: Design of Provision (P) Treatment 
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Stages 1, 2, and 3 of the P-treatment are identical to the baseline. If Nature draws 
vlo=100, stage 4 is the punishment stage, so that in fact nothing changes compared 
with the baseline. If the random draw has determined the value of the commodity to 
be 1700, there are three additional stages, representing the main features of the 
provision from German copyright law. If vhi=1700, the punishment stage is deferred 
to stage 7. In stage 4, the umpire is informed about the purchase price and the random 
draw and asked to determine an “appropriate purchase price” pu for the commodity.
11
 
She may choose any price between 0 and 1700 Taler. Her own payoff does not 
depend on her choice. Moreover, pu is not revealed to buyer and seller until stage 7.  
 
Stages 5 and 6 repeat the negotiation protocol from stages 1 and 2. The buyer can 
make a new offer p2, which the seller is free to accept or to reject. If p2 is accepted, it 
replaces p. If p2 is rejected, the umpire's “appropriate purchase price” pu becomes 
effective and replaces p. Buyer and seller learn about pu if and only if renegotiation 
fails. Finally, stage 7 gives both players an opportunity to simultaneously punish each 
other, just as stage 4 in treatment B. 
 
In reality, the court intervenes only if renegotiation fails. Yet conditioning the 
decision of the umpire on the rejection of the second offer would have severely 
reduced the number of data points. This is why we ask the umpire to decide already in 
stage 4, but we keep her decision confidential until renegotiation fails. We are aware 
of the fact that this manipulation makes the risk of losing in court more salient. Other 
experiments have demonstrated that subjects attach more weight to an event if they 
know that they are betting on the past, rather than betting on the future (Rothbart and 
Snyder 1970; Ladouceur and Mayrand 1987; Brun and Teigen 1990; Heath and 
Tversky 1991). However, in our setting both players face the same uncertainty. If the 
buyer offers too little in stage 5, she risks losing much more in court. Likewise, if the 
seller rejects a good offer, she risks getting much less in court. Consequently, the 
stage 4 manipulation might make successful renegotiation somewhat more likely, but 
it is unlikely to bias the renegotiation outcome if a deal is struck.  
                                               





The experiment was run in April 2009 at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics 
of the University of Bonn using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Subjects were randomly invited with ORSEE (Greiner 2004) from a subject pool of 
approximately 3500 participants. 48 student subjects from different majors 
participated
12
, 27% of which were female. To allow for within-subject comparisons, 
each subject played first the baseline and then treatment P.
13
 Before every treatment 
participants received paper instructions and answered a set of control questions (see 
Appendix). Sessions lasted about one and a half hours. In addition to the earnings that 
depended on their performance in the experiment, participants received a show-up fee 
of 2 €. On average, participants earned 12.26 €, with 5.34 € from the baseline (6.04 € 
for buyers and 4.66 € for sellers), and 4.91 € from the P-treatment (5.13 € for buyers, 




The aim of this paper is to experimentally test the effect of a specific institutional 
intervention –the “bestseller paragraph”– in a stylised market for copyrights. 
Economic theory provides a roadmap for the subsequent analysis of our experimental 
results.  
A. Standard Framework 
Under standard assumptions, i.e. common knowledge of the fact that agents are 
selfish, risk neutral and apply backward induction, the equilibrium solution to the 
baseline is straightforward: Neither of the parties uses costly punishment in stage 4 
(since it has a cost, but no pecuniary benefit) and the seller accepts any positive offer 
                                               
12 12.5% of participants were law students and 25% economics students. 
13 We implement this specific sequence of treatments because we explore whether introducing this 
provision is desirable. We are not interested in the mirror question: what would happen, were the 
provision abolished?  
14 One-third of the buyers in baseline B and one-third of the sellers in baseline B became umpires in 
treatment P. The remaining buyers and sellers stayed in their roles. Buyers, sellers and umpires were 
re-matched after each round, such that no triad played together more the once and no buyer met the 
same seller twice. As we show later, umpire behaviour turned out not to be correlated with having 
previously experienced the role of the buyer or the seller. 
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in stage 2 (since any positive outcome is better than nothing, and the design of the 
experiment gives all the bargaining power to the buyer). This is anticipated by the 
buyer, who therefore offers the smallest positive price p>0 in stage 1 (since she is 
sure it will be accepted). 
 
In the P-treatment, we should again observe no punishment in stage 7 (or stage 4, 
when the commodity has low value), since for a purely profit maximising agent the 
benefits from punishing are zero
15
. Whether the seller accepts or rejects the new offer 
p2 in stage 6 depends on what she believes will be the umpire's “appropriate purchase 
price” pu. The seller will only accept the new offer if p2 ≥ E(pu). On the other hand, 
the buyer will not offer more than E(pu). 
 
In stage 4 the umpire has to state her appropriate purchase price pu. Since the 
umpire’s decision is not incentivised, we cannot predict her behaviour with rational 
choice theory. Instead, we assume three stylised types of umpires, each of whom 
having a different conception of fairness: Umpire L has a libertarian mindset and 
thinks that the initial agreement should simply be kept, hence pu
L
=p. Umpire EA is an 
egalitarian who looks at the situation from an ex-ante perspective, i.e. before the veil 
of uncertainty is lifted. Her definition of a fair price would anchor on the expected 
value of the lottery, yielding pu
EA
=E(v)/2=   hilo vv  1
2
1
. Umpire EP also holds an 
egalitarian attitude but rather considers the ex-post situation, i.e. after nature has 
determined the value of the commodity to be high. Therefore, her appropriate 




With umpire L, the P-treatment becomes identical to the baseline. In stage 2, the 
seller will accept any positive price and in stage 1, the buyer will just offer the 
minimum. With umpire EA, the seller accepts an offer p if and only if 
upp   )1(0 . Inserting the parameters of the experiment, we obtain p≥–
E(v)/6=–83.33 as the minimum acceptable price. Hence, with the prospect of an ex-
ante egalitarian umpire even negative offer prices appear acceptable to the seller. This 
is even more so with umpire EP, where, following the same logic, the minimum 
acceptable price in stage 2 would be p≥–vhi/6=–283.33. Since we exclude negative 
prices by design, under standard assumptions we should not observe any difference 
                                               
15 Recall that strategic/educative punishment is pointless with perfect stranger matching. 
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between the two treatments. As we have just shown, this prediction is independent of 
the expected type of umpire. Hence, the predictions can be summarized as follows: 
 
S1. Same offer prices in P as in B, namely the smallest possible price. 
S2. Same acceptance rate in P as in B, namely 100%. 
S3. Same punishment behaviour in P as in B, namely zero punishment, for both 
buyers and sellers. 
B.  Behavioural Framework 
Once we relax standard assumptions and allow for well-documented behavioural 
regularities, predictions are less clear cut. Several behavioural effects are likely to 
play a role in our setting, most notably risk aversion, loss aversion and social 
preferences. So far, however, there is no general theory that integrates all of them. It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a comprehensive theory of social 
preferences under risk and uncertainty, which would be needed in order to formally 
derive behavioural predictions. We can however use the individual behavioural 
building blocks in order to qualify the predictions derived on the basis of the standard 
model. 
 
Numerous studies in psychology and behavioural economics have shown that most 
people do not behave like rational money-maximisers but that they care about 
fairness (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1986; Konow 2000). This behaviour has most 
prominently been explained by social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton 
and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002). From many previous experiments 
with ultimatum games it is known that participants often reject deals that would make 
them strictly better off in monetary terms (Güth, Schmittberger et al. 1982). 
According to a survey by (Camerer 2003:49), if the offer does not exceed 20 % of the 
pie, it is rejected in approximately 50 % of the cases. Anticipating this type of seller 
behaviour, buyers would have to make more substantial offers if they do not want to 
miss the opportunity to obtain the gains from trade. In the literature on ultimatum 
games, median offers were in the order of 40 – 50 % of the pie and mean offers were 
in the order of 30 – 40 % of the pie (Camerer 2003:49).  
 
Our baseline setting, however, differs from the standard ultimatum game in one 
important respect: when buyer and seller negotiate, the value of the pie is uncertain to 
both parties. However, only one party, the buyer, bears the risk. Our design thus 
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involves two-sided uncertainty and unilateral risk-bearing. To the best of our 




In our design, the fact that the commodity trades before its true value is revealed 
implies that the buyer obtains a risky asset in exchange for a fixed fee paid to the 
seller. Empirically we know that most people are risk averse (Holt and Laury 2002; 
Fullenkamp, Tenorio et al. 2003; Dohmen, Falk et al. 2005). Risk aversion would 
reduce buyers’ willingness to pay for a risky commodity compared to a deterministic 
commodity with identical expected value. Provided p>vlo, the buyer even runs the 
risk of making a real loss. In that event, the effect of loss aversion (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) might even go beyond the effect of mere risk aversion. 
 
In contrast, the seller’s decision does not involve risk. Hence, we should not expect 
risk aversion to affect her willingness to accept a certain offer price; at least not 
directly. Indirectly, risk aversion might influence sellers’ behaviour through social 
preferences. If the rejection of low offers is driven by fairness concerns, we should 
expect that sellers are sensitive to the fact that buyers unilaterally bear the risk. This 
should lower the acceptance threshold of sellers, compared to deterministic ultimatum 
games. The dampening effect should be all the more pronounced given the 
distribution of gains is highly skewed. Thus, while we would expect offers in the 
baseline to be considerably above the minimum price, we also expect prices to be 
below the typical result from deterministic ultimatum games. 
 
We have shown above, for the case of standard rationality assumptions, that the 
acceptance threshold of the seller depends on the beliefs subjects hold about the 
fairness conception of the umpire: the acceptance level did not change if the seller 
expects an umpire of type L, but decreased for type EA and dropped even further for 
type EP. For the parameters of the experiment, however, this would not trigger a 
treatment effect since we exclude negative prices. Yet, if we account for the empirical 
regularity that, due to social preferences, prices need to be considerably above the 
minimum in order to be accepted, the predictions for the effect of the provision might 
indeed change. More specifically, if prices in the baseline are sufficiently high and if 
subjects anticipate umpires of type EA or EP, the commodity should trade at lower 
prices in treatment P than in the baseline. For umpires of type L, we would again 
                                               
16 There are, however, ultimatum games with one-sided uncertainty. See for instance Mitzkewitz and 
Nagel (1993) and Abbink, Bolton et al. (2001). 
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expect no treatment difference. Consequently, unless participants hold extreme 
beliefs about the distribution of umpire types, we expect lower average prices in the 
treatment. 
 
The provision’s effect on the number of deals closed is less clear. From a normative 
perspective, this is the most important measure. If copyright does not trade, all 
potential welfare gains are foregone. Behavioural theory predicts two effects that 
point in opposite directions. Just as umpires of type EA and EP make low offers more 
acceptable to sellers, they also reduce buyers’ willingness to pay high prices since the 
vhi prospect becomes less attractive in view of potential ex-post redistribution. Offers 
above vlo appear even more unattractive since buyers would then suffer a loss in 75% 
of the cases, never knowing how much the umpire will let them keep in case of vhi. If 
the decline in the sellers’ acceptance threshold outweighs the decrease of buyers’ 
willingness to pay, we should observe more deals being closed in the P-treatment 
than in the B-treatment. 
 
Equally open is the effect of the provision on ex-post unfairness. By ex-post 
unfairness we mean the fairness sentiments after the true value of the commodity has 
been revealed, which we attempt to measure by costly, simultaneous, non-strategic 
punishment. In the baseline this takes place in round 4; in the P-treatment it is elicited 
in round 4 if v=vlo and in round 7 if v=vhi, hence after renegotiation and after the 
decision of the umpire has been revealed. As stated above, the main expected effect 
of the provision is to reallocate profit from the buyer to the seller in case umpires are 
of type EA or EP
17
. In addition, the anticipation of those types of umpires might 
lower the acceptance threshold of sellers and consequently average selling prices. In 
that case buyers would be better off with the provision if v=vlo (due to lower prices) 
and worse off if v=vhi (due to ex-post reallocation), and vice-versa for sellers. Just as 
the provision might simply reallocate profits but not affect the number of deals 
closed, it might also merely reallocate ex-post discontent. If lower profits lead to 
more discontent, we should observe buyers (sellers) punishing less (more) in the P-
treatment than in the baseline if v=vlo and more (less) if v=vhi. However, for the 
provision to not only reallocate perceived unfairness but to actually “restore fairness” 
as the legal literature claims, overall punishment would have to go down. In sum, we 
thus have the following predictions: 
                                               
17 As we have also mentioned above, the provision should have no effect on ex-post unfairness if 
umpires are of type L and this is correctly anticipated by the subjects. 
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B1. Lower offer prices in P than in B. 
B2. Higher acceptance rate in P than in B indicates that the provision has a 
stronger effect on reducing sellers’ acceptance threshold than on decreasing 
buyers’ offer prices. 
B3. Less buyer punishment in P than in B for v=vlo and more for v=vhi; and vice-
versa for sellers.  
IV. Results 
In the following we discuss the impact of the provision in terms of ex-ante prices and 
number of deals closed as well as ex-post renegotiation, umpire decisions and 
expression of discontent according to our experimental results. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the data collected in the experiment. 
 
Table 1: Data Structure of the Experiment 
  















Provision 48 16 16 16 8 128 106 82 24 
Note: The numbers in parentheses denote the number of observations when we restrict the sample to those 
buyers and sellers who stayed in the same role during baseline and provision treatment. In all regressions we 
must work with the restricted sample. For the descriptives we use all data. Means and standard deviations look 
almost identical if we only use the restricted sample. 
A. Prices and Deals 
Fig. 4 Panel A shows that mean offer prices in stage 1 are way above the price of 1 
taler predicted by money maximisation. More importantly, both mean offer prices and 
mean accepted prices are considerably higher in the baseline than in the P-treatment. 
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These differences are significant.
18
 Note that in both cases average offer prices are 
above 100, namely 129 in the baseline and 104 in the P-treatment. Hence, in both 
cases the average buyer was willing to run the risk of incurring a loss in the vlo=100 
case, in the interest of reaping high profits if vhi=1700. Just as we hypothesised, the 
buyers’ willingness to pay high initial prices was reduced by the introduction of the 
provision. Moreover, offered and accepted prices are closer in the provision 
treatment, which hints at a more efficient functioning of the market. Indeed, the 
probability of acceptance in stage 2 rises from 73% in the baseline to 83% in the 
provision treatment. This suggests that the provision managed to reduce the 
acceptance threshold of sellers relatively more than the willingness to pay of buyers. 




Figure 4: Deals reached in both treatments 
Note: Panel A illustrates the average prices offered in stage 1 and accepted in stage 2 in the Baseline as well 
as in the Provision treatment. In the Baseline (Provision), 141 (106) out of 192 (128) offers were accepted. 
Panel B distinguishes the acceptance rate depending on the offer price being below, at, or above 100 Taler. 
The number of observations in the Baseline (Provision) is 53 (51) for p<100, 40 (38) for p=100, and 99 (39) 
for p>100. 
                                               
18 Wilcoxon signed-rank test over mean offer per buyer, using only data from those 16 participants 
who were buyers in both treatments, two-sided, p = .0525; same for mean accepted offer, p = .0247. 
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The main reason why more deals were struck is that the provision made low offers 
more acceptable to sellers. In Panel B we distinguish between offers below, at and 
above 100. This threshold is important because in the probable event of v=100 buyers 
are just equally well off with or without the deal if they paid p=100. At p<100 they 
are sure to make a profit whereas at p>100 they make a loss when v=100. In contrast, 
depending on the size of p sellers may make larger or smaller profits, yet they never 
make a loss. The Figure illustrates that while in the baseline buyers had to incur the 
risk of making a loss in order to strike a deal, the acceptance of risk-free offers nearly 
doubles in the presence of the provision.  
 
Result 1: The provision decreases the average price paid for the commodity 
Result 2: The provision increases the total number of deals reached by making 
low prices more acceptable to sellers.  
 
 
Figure 5: Buyers’ Offers and Sellers’ Acceptance over Time 
Note: The vertical line indicates the change of the institutional regime from Baseline (B) to Provision (P). As we 
are checking for learning, we only use data from those buyers (panel A) and sellers (panel B) who have been in 
this role in both treatments. 
 
In principle, the treatment effect could result from learning, rather than from the 
change in institutions. Specifically lower prices in P could be due to a general 
downward trend; and the lower acceptance rate could be the consequence of an 
upward trend. In contrast, if the institutional setting matters, we should observe a 
pattern break upon introducing the provision. Panel A of Fig. 5 suggests that buyers 
do indeed learn to make lower offers. Yet learning takes place within both treatments, 
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and the effect of learning does not appear linear. While in both treatments offers are 
highest in the beginning, they are lowest at some intermediate point, to go up again 
by the end of each treatment. More importantly, there is a visible level effect when 
moving from the baseline to the provision treatment. The sellers’ acceptance rate of 
offers, depicted in Panel B, is very volatile over time. There does not seem to be a 
general time trend. 
 
Table 2 – Treatment Effect on Buyers’ Offers Controlling for Learning  
Dependent variable: Buyers’ Offers 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment (0=B, 1=P) -25.766*** -25.766*** -25.766*** 
    
Time Trend  -2.234
+
 -12.563* 
    
Time Trend Squared   1.138
+
 
    
constant 129.734*** 140.191*** 157.256*** 
N 256 256 256 
Chi Squared 19.66 23.25 26.76 
    
        
Note: Panel Regression with a random intercept for individuals. + denotes significance level of 10 percent, * 
denotes significance level of 5 percent, ** of 1 percent and *** of 0.1 percent. The Hausman test is 
insignificant for all models, hence the Random Effects Model is consistent. 
 
We assess the significance of our results with parametric tests. For the buyers’ offers 
we estimate random effects models that account for subject heterogeneity and report 
the results in Table 2. As one should expect seeing Fig. 5, in both treatments there is a 
significant negative time trend. Offers become smaller over time. If we capture the 
upward movement by the end of the treatment with the square of the time trend 
(model 3), the negative time trend is significant at conventional levels. Yet adding 
these controls neither affects the treatment coefficients, nor significance levels. 
Actually, the treatment coefficients are identical to the third decimal place. Our 
models suggest that there is indeed learning. Yet learning is clearly independent of 
the treatment effect.  
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Table 3: Treatment Effect on the Sellers’ Acceptance Controlling for Learning  
Dependent variable: Sellers’ Acceptance 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Treatment (0=B, 1=P) 1.062* 1.065* 1.065** 
    
Time Trend  -.051 -.153 
    
Time Trend Squared   .011 
    
constant 1.509* 1.740* 1.914
+
 
N 256 256 256 
Chi Squared 6.71 7.02 7.08 
Log Likelihood -100.746 -100.570 -100.535 
        
Note: Panel Logit Regression with a random intercept for individuals. * denotes significance level of 5 percent, 
** of 1 percent and *** of 0.1 percent. The Hausman test is insignificant for all models, hence the Random 
Effects Model is consistent. 
 
As the seller’s decision to accept or reject the buyer’s offer is binary, we report panel 
logit models in Table 3. Also in this case, the treatment effect is not affected by 
including a linear or a quadratic time trend. The trend coefficients are insignificant. 
We have thus no indication of learning.  
B. Renegotiation and Umpire Decisions 
The very fact that we observe lower prices in the provision treatment suggests that 
subjects were anticipating some sort of ex-post redistribution towards the seller in 
case that v=vhi, be that through renegotiation or through the umpire’s decision. Yet 
when it comes to splitting the large gain, there is a pronounced self-serving bias. The 
histogram of second offers in Panel A of Fig. 6 shows that buyers believe they are 
justified in keeping most of the large gain, while sellers believe they have a right to a 
large portion. 54% of second offers are rejected. Sellers do not accept any second 
offers below or equal to 250 and accept only 15% of all second offers below or equal 
to 500. Seemingly, for second offers to be acceptable, they must be above 500; 82% 





Figure 6: Renegotiation and Umpire Decisions 
Note: Panel A shows the second offers made by the buyers in the Provision treatment in case the commodity 
turned out to have value 1700. The light (dark) bars denote the second offers rejected (accepted) by the sellers. 
Panel B displays the umpires’ choices of “appropriate purchase prices” in case the commodity had value 1700. 
The number of observations is 24. 
 
Apparently, sellers had a better intuition of how umpires would view the “appropriate 
purchase price”. On average, umpires decided that 767 Taler should go to the seller, 
which leaves 933 Taler to the buyer. From an ex-post perspective this average umpire 
decision may appear to slightly favour buyers. However, from an ex-ante perspective 
it clearly favours sellers: Considering that initial offer prices averaged 104 Taler, 
buyers could expect to make 0.75*(-4)+0.25*933=230 Taler whereas sellers would 
receive 270 Taler.
19
 The fact that buyers ran the risk of making a real loss does not 
seem to enter the fairness considerations of the average umpire. If any, the risk 
premium is negative. 
 
This result is highly surprising. The experiment was designed such that umpires had 
the same information as buyers and sellers. They knew that the initial offer price was 
paid in exchange for a lottery ticket which could be worth either 100 or 1700 Taler. 
They further knew that the game was repeated 8 times so that there were repeated 
                                               
19 With average accepted prices the difference is even larger: 225 to 275. 
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opportunities to land the jackpot. We therefore expected many umpires to focus on 
the expected value of 500 and judge the fair price to be somewhere around 250, 
which would be in line with ex-ante equality. We also expected some umpires to 
confirm the initial offer. Yet, we find no peak whatsoever around 250 and there is 
only a single instance in which an initial offer was confirmed. Instead, as can be seen 
in Panel B of Fig. 6, 38% of the umpires behaved like prototypical ex-post 
egalitarians and precisely split the ex post gain equally between the buyer and the 
seller. Moreover, our within design implied that half of the umpires were former 
buyers and the other half former sellers. However, previous experience as buyer or 




Result 3:  Ex post, buyers and sellers hold self-serving views about the equitable 
division of gains from trade. 
Result 4:  Umpires’ choices are predominantly guided by ex-post equality. 
C. Ex-Post Discontent 
We have seen that the provision increases the acceptability of low offers and thus 
enhances the incidence of trade. Yet despite the fact that the parties bargain under the 
shadow of the umpire’s decision (cf. Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979), more often 
than not renegotiation fails. This already suggests that there is a potential conflict 
which could support legal intervention. The German legislature claimed that the 
provision was necessary to “restore fairness”.
21
 We measure the seriousness of 
perceived unfairness by the amount of experimental money the two parties are willing 
to burn in order to express their discontent, and inflict harm on the other party.  
 
Buyers punish more severely in the baseline: 10 Taler per buyer per round versus 7 
Taler in the provision treatment.
22
 They also use the punishment option more 
frequently in the baseline (21% of all possible cases) than in the provision treatment 
(12%). Descriptively, this effect appears to be driven by the fact that buyers punish 
with higher probability (25%) if they have made an offer above 100, i.e. if they have 
                                               
20 Descriptively, former buyers on average even gave more to the seller (873 Taler) than former sellers 
(691 Taler). 
21 BT Drs. 14/8058, 19. 
22 Wilcoxon signed rank test over mean punishment in the baseline and the provision treatments, for 
those 16 participants who were buyers in both treatments, p = .0037. 
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accepted the risk of a real loss. With offers at or below 100, the punishment 
probability is only 8%. As we saw in Fig. 2, deals at or below 100 are much more 
probable in the provision treatment than in the baseline. In addition, this difference is 
considerably more pronounced in the provision treatment (3% at or below 100 and 
30% above 100) than in the baseline (15% to 24%). This shows an interesting 
relationship between the ex-ante and the ex-post dimension of fairness: In the 
baseline, offers below 100 appear (ex-ante) unfair to the sellers and offers above 100 
seem (ex-post) unfair to the buyers. The provision increases the acceptability of low 
offers for the sellers. This is anticipated by the buyers who make more low offers, 
which in turn reduces their ex-post discontent. Table 4 underpins the robustness of 
the provision’s effect on buyers’ use of punishment. All models show a large and 
significant treatment effect.  
 
Table 4: Explaining Buyer Punishment 
Dependent variable: Use of punishment by the buyer (0=No, 1=Yes) 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Treatment (0=B, 1=P) –1.634* –1.638* –1.666* –1.948* –5.514* 
Price offered  0.007    
Value = 1700 (0=No, 1=Yes)  1.350 1.294 0.895 1.130 
Offer > 100 (0=No, 1=Yes)   0.313 0.452 –1.355 
Treatment x Value=1700    0.952 -1948 
Treatment x Offer>100     4.392 
constant -3.517**   -5.243**  -4.193**  -4.122**  -3.649** 
N 204 204 204 204 204 
Chi Squared 5.334 7.541 6.989 6.695 6.519 
Log likelihood –47.435 –45.523 –46.055 –45.878 –43.758 
      
Note: Panel Logit Regression with a random intercept for individuals. * denotes significance level of 5 percent, 
** of 1 percent and *** of 0.1 percent. The Hausman test is insignificant for all models, hence the Random 
Effects Model is consistent. 
Sellers make very little use of punishment. Only in 16 cases, i.e. only in 6% of all 
possible instances, did sellers punish buyers. In the baseline, they punished twice 
when the commodity had value 1700, in the provision treatment they punished in a 
single case. Patently, sellers’ fairness sentiments are not offended. For them, it does 
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not cause a problem if, eventually, the commodity has high value, although the 
chance of making so much money was not reflected in initial offers. So, apparently, 
sellers do not feel ex post discontent in the first place and, as a consequence, there is 
no margin for the provision to improve upon the baseline situation. 
 
Result 5: The provision reduces buyers’ ex-post discontent, but does not affect 
sellers’ feelings of perceived ex-post fairness. 
V. Conclusion 
In this experiment we have compared two institutional arrangements for the market of 
copyrights. The two most important features of this market are the skewed 
distribution of earnings and their unpredictability. In the first institutional setting, the 
copyright must be traded under the veil of uncertainty for a fixed fee. In the unlikely, 
but possible event of high success in the market, the licence fee is nonetheless 
binding for the two parties. This situation reflects a type of contract that is very 
common in the market for copyrights, most notably between large production firms 
and little known copyright owners. In contrast, the second setting introduces 
renegotiation in the shadow of legal intervention. In case the work turns out a 
bestseller, the artist may appeal to a third party who is entitled to adjust the fee. This 
situation corresponds to a provision from German copyright law, the so-called 
“bestseller paragraph”. 
 
In a market characterised by high uncertainty about the value of the traded goods, 
conflicting fairness norms between buyers and sellers are amongst the biggest 
obstacles to trade. Yet even when the parties have reached an agreement in the first 
place, substantial discontent may arise as soon as the true value of the commodity is 
revealed. In this experiment we have measured fairness ex ante by looking at the 
acceptance of initial offers, and fairness ex post by analysing the expression of 
discontent through punishment. In addition, we had a third party judging fairness, the 
so-called umpire, who was free to choose among or compromise between competing 
fairness norms.  
 
Our first finding is that, in the presence of the provision, copyrights trade at lower 
prices. Second, they trade more often as the acceptance level of sellers is reduced 
more than the willingness to pay of buyers. Higher acceptance is a strong indicator of 
enhanced ex-ante fairness. Interestingly, so far the legal discourse has been totally 
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neglecting the provision’s effect on the market outcome. In contrast, both the German 
legislature and the legal literature have concentrated on the ex-post dimension of 
fairness, claiming that the main function of the provision is to “restore fairness” 
between the two parties. Our results suggest that, indeed, the provision reduces 
perceived unfairness for buyers. Rather surprisingly, though, we do not find a similar 
effect for sellers. This might of course be due to the fact that, in our design, sellers are 
not personally attached to the commodity they trade. Copyright combines a property 
right with a moral right. The latter is absent from our design.  
 
In the provision treatment, a third party, the so-called umpire, was asked to determine 
her “appropriate purchase price” in case the commodity had a high value. Even 
though our design was rather prone to highlight ex-ante equality (by repeating the 
game 8 times, by having umpires experience the roles of buyer and seller, and by 
telling subjects the exact probabilities so that they could calculate expected values), 
ex-post equality turns out the umpires’ single distinct fairness norm. If probabilities 
were not known, as is the case in reality, ex-ante equality would possibly be even less 
appealing. Similarly, there were no umpires whatsoever following a libertarian 
approach according to which voluntarily closed contracts should simply be kept. 
 
We have used the movie industry as our primary example because we have precise 
data on this market. Yet, given the neutral frame of our experimental design, the 
insights from this study should also be relevant to other copyright markets, 
characterised by comparable unpredictability of earnings, like exhibitions (Skinner 
2006) and music (Davies 2002). Other markets with highly skewed earnings, like 
venture capital, might also be affected by a similar fairness problem.  
 
Obviously, our stylised experimental setting had to abstract from features of reality. 
For instance to make a movie, a large number of holders of intellectual property 
rights must contribute. This feature of the market makes ex ante deals with all holders 
of such rights paramount. One might argue that there is less reason for legal 
intervention if the number of copyright holders is much smaller (as sometimes with 
music) or if there is just a single copyright (as sometimes with literature).
23
 Yet our 
data suggest that the provision has effects even if the relationship is strictly bilateral. 
                                               
23 In the special case of the music business, many authors are at the same time performers of their 
work. As a consequence they are often willing to accept very low or even negative license fees, just to 
get access to a larger audience, which increases concert revenues. 
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In our experiment, sellers have a single opportunity to sell a copyright to a specific 
buyer. The buyer has all the negotiation power. In the field, there may be more than 
one potential distributor, and sellers may have a chance to wait until they come into 
contact with such a firm. Experimental evidence suggests that in ultimatum games 
responder competition improves outcomes for proposers, i.e. lower prices, just as 
bargaining theory would have suggested (Grosskopf 2003). This may well also hold 
in the media industry. Yet the German provision is by no means contingent on market 
structure or bargaining power. Our experiment indicates that, at least in this static and 
bilateral setting the provision is beneficial for sellers, buyers and society. Future work 
might want to introduce different allocations of market power and test whether under 
such less favourable conditions the welfare enhancing effect of the provision is 
substantially reduced. In addition, one could make the sellers’ production of the 
copyright endogenous, to study the dynamic effects of different institutional 
arrangements. Another extension could allow the buyers’ effort to influence the 
probability of success. One might also want to study to which degree reputation is a 
substitute for legal intervention. 
 
The German solution discussed in this paper neglects more sophisticated schemes 
that have been proposed in the economics literature to guide contracting about 
copyright when success is uncertain (Watt 2006 surveys this literature). Further 
research might seek to experimentally compare the performance of those alternative 
schemes. This paper’s results highlight the need for a general theoretical framework 
that integrates social preferences – both of interested and neutral parties – with 
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Appendix A: Instructions Baseline 
 
General Instructions for Participants 
 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
 
If you read the following explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a substantial sum of money, 
depending on the decisions you make. It is therefore crucial that you read these explanations carefully.  
 
During the experiment there shall be absolutely no communication between participants. Any violation 
of this rule means you will be excluded from the experiment and from any payments. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. We will then come over to you. 
 
In any event, you will receive a lump sum of 2 euro for taking part in the experiment. 
 
During the experiment we will not calculate in euro, but instead in Taler. Your total income is 
therefore initially calculated in Taler. The total number of Taler you accumulate in the course of the 
experiment will be transferred into euro at the end, at a rate of 
 
1000 Taler = 1 Euro. 
 
At the end you will receive from us the 2 euro plus the cash sum, in euro, based on the number of 






The experiment consists of 8 rounds, each of which has 4 stages (maximum). In the experiment, there 
are 2 different roles, Player S (Seller) and Player B (Buyer). 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly allocated one of these two roles. During the 
entire 8 rounds of the experiment, you will remain in the same role. 
 
At the beginning of each round, each Player S is paired with a Player B at random. In the course of the 
experiment, Player S never plays twice with the same Player B. And Player B, in the course of the 
experiment, never plays twice with the same Player S.  
 
Stage 1: Player B makes Player S an offer. 
Stage 2: Player S decides whether to accept or decline the offer. 
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Stage 3: A draw decides whether the object is worth 100 or 1700 Taler. 
Stage 4: Distribution of points. 
 
 





Each player receives an initial endowment of 500 Taler onto a Taler account.  
 
Player S is in possession of an object, Player B can purchase this object. The object only has a value 
if Player B buys it. At the time of purchase, however, the value of the object is still unknown. All you 
know is the distribution of these values. 
 
 
In 3 out of 4 cases, a value of 100 Taler is realized later. 
In 1 out of 4 cases, a value of 1700 Taler is realized later. 
 




Player S hears about Player B’s offer and decides whether to accept or decline Player B’s offer.   
 
If Player S accepts the offer, the object becomes Player B’s possession, and the purchase price is 
transferred to Player S’s Taler account (500 + purchase price). Player B’s Taler account is reduced by 
the purchase price paid (500 – purchase price). 
 
If Player S declines the offer, the round is ended. Stages 3 and 4 of this round are not played in that 






















A draw decides whether the object is worth 100 or 1700 Taler. You are told the result of this draw and 
of the account balances resulting from it. 
 If the object is worth 100 Taler, Player B’s Taler account is: 500 – purchase price 
+ 100. 
 If the object is worth 1700 Taler, Player B’s Taler account is: 500 – purchase 
price + 1700. 




Player B and Player S are given the opportunity to reduce the other player’s Taler account by 
distributing points. Each point that you allocate to another player costs you 1 Taler and reduces the 
other player’s Taler account by 3 Taler. 
 
(At the latest) after Stage 4, the round is ended. Stage 1 of the next round follows, in which each Player 
S is paired with a new Player B and each Player B is paired with a new Player S. The Taler accounts of 
all players are saved (for the later payment) and reset to zero (for the new round). 
 




Appendix B: Control Questions Baseline 
1. In Stage 1 Player B has offered Player S a purchase price of 10 Taler. In Stage 2 Player S has 
rejected the offer. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 2?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 2?........ 
 
 
2. In Stage 1 Player B has offered Player S a purchase price of 150 Taler. In Stage 2 Player S has 
accepted the offer. In Stage 3 the random draw has determined the value of the commodity to be 100 
Taler. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 3?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 3?........ 
 
 
3. In Stage 1 Player B has offered Player S a purchase price of 80 Taler. In Stage 2 Player S has 
accepted the offer. In Stage 3 the random draw has determined the value of the commodity to be 1700 
Taler. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 3?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 3?........ 
 
 
4. After the random draw in Stage 3 (Price=90 Taler, Value=100 Taler) Player B has an income of 510 
Taler and Player S of 590 Taler. In Stage 4, Player B allots 50 Points and Player S 0 Points. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 4?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 4?........ 
 
 
5. After the random draw in Stage 3 (Price=150 Taler, Value=1700 Taler) Player B has an income of 
2050 Taler and Player S of 650 Taler. In Stage 4, Player B allots 4 Points and Player S 200 Points. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 4?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 4?........ 
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We now repeat the experiment and introduce a few changes. 
 
Once again, the experiment consists of 8 rounds. Each of these rounds, however, no longer consists of 
4 stages, but of (a maximum of) 7 stages. 
 
Stages 1, 2 and 3 are the same as in the first experiment. Stage 7 corresponds to Stage 4 of the first 
experiment. Stages 4, 5 and 6 are new. 
 
There are now 3 different roles, Player S (seller), Player B (buyer) and Player U (umpire). At the 
beginning of the experiment, you are allocated one of the three roles at random. During the entire 8 
rounds of the experiment, your role shall remain the same.  
 
At the beginning of each round, a random procedure pairs each Player S with a Player B and a Player 
U. In the course of the experiment, Player S never plays twice with the same Player B. And Player B 
never plays twice with the same Player S in the course of the experiment.  
 
Stage 1: Player B makes an offer to Player S. 
Stage 2: Player S decides whether to accept or decline the offer. 
Stage 3: A draw decides whether the object is worth 100 or 1700 Taler. 
Stage 4 (only if 1700): Player U names an appropriate purchasing price. 
Stage 5 (only if 1700): Player B can make Player S a new offer. 
Stage 6 (only if 1700): Player S decides whether to accept or decline the new offer. 
Stage 7: Distribution of points. 
 
 





Each player receives an initial endowment of 500 Taler, transferred to their Taler account.  
 
Player S is in possession of an object, Player B can purchase this object. The object only has a value 
if it is bought by Player B. At the time of the purchase, however, the value of the object is still 




In 3 out of 4 cases, a value of 100 Taler is realized later. 
In 1 out of 4 cases, a value of 1700 Taler is realized later. 
 




Player S is told the offer by Player B and decides whether to accept or decline Player B’s offer. 
 
If Player S accepts the offer, the object becomes Player B’s possession, and the purchase price is 
transferred to Player S’s Taler account (500 + purchase price). Player B’s Taler account is reduced by 
the purchase price paid (500 – purchase price). 
 
If Player S declines the offer, the round ends. Stages 3 to 7 of this round are not played in such a case. 




A draw decides whether the object is worth 100 or 1700 Taler. You are told the result of the draw as 
well as the account balances resulting from it. 
 If the object is worth 100 Taler, Player B’s Taler account is: 500 – purchase price 
+ 100. 
 If the object is worth 1700 Taler, Player B’s Taler account is: 500 – purchase 
price + 1700. 
 In both cases, Player S’s Taler account is: 500 + purchase price. 
 
Stage 4: 
  (Stage 4 is only played if the object is worth 1700 Taler.) 
 
Player U decides which purchase price is to be deemed appropriate. This decision is initially not 






















  (Stage 5 is only played if the object is worth 1700 Taler.) 
 
Player B now has the chance to make Player S a new offer. Player B may augment the puchase price 
that was paid to Player S in Stage 2, or reduce it, or leave it as it is. 
 
Stage 6: 
  (Stage 6 is only played if the object is worth 1700 Taler.) 
 
Player S is told Player B’s new offer and decides whether to accept or decline Player B’s new offer. 
 
If Player S accepts the new offer, the purchase price paid in Stage 2 is no longer valid, and the new 
purchase price is transferred to Player S’s Taler account.  
Player S’s Taler account is therefore: 500 + new purchase price. 
Player B’s Taler account is then: 500 – new purchase price + 1700. 
 
If Player S declines the new offer, the purchase price paid in Stage 2 is no longer valid either. Player B 
and Player S are told which purchase price Player U deemed appropriate in Stage 4. This “appropriate 
purchase price” replaces the old purchase price.  
Player S’s Taler account is therefore: 500 + appropriate purchase price. 




Player B and Player S are given the possibility of reducing the other player’s Taler account by 
distributing points. Each point you distribute to the other player costs you 1 Taler and reduces the 




(At the latest) after Stage 7, the round ends. Stage 1 of the next round follows, in which each Player S 
is paired with a new Player B and a new Player U, and each Player B is paired with a new Player S and 
a new Player U. The Taler accounts of all players are saved (for the subsequent payoff) and reset to 
zero (for the new round). 
 





Appendix D: Control Questions Provision Treatment 
 
1. After the random draw in Stage 3 (Price=150 Taler, Value=1700 Taler) Player B has an income of 
2050 Taler and Player S of 650 Taler. In Stage 5, Player B confirms her offer from Stage 1 (150 Taler). 
In Stage 6, Player S accepts the new (=old) offer. In Stage 7, Player B allots 4 Points and Player S 200 
Points. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 7?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 7?........ 
 
 
2. After the random draw in Stage 3 (Price=150 Taler, Value=1700 Taler) Player B has an income of 
2050 Taler and Player S of 650 Taler. In Stage 5, Player B increases her offer to 400 Taler. In Stage 6, 
Player S accepts the new offer. In Stage 7, Player B allots 0 Points and Player S 0 Points. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 7?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 7?........ 
 
 
3. After the random draw in Stage 3 (Price=150 Taler, Value=1700 Taler) Player B has an income of 
2050 Taler and Player S of 650 Taler. In Stage 5, Player B increases her offer to 747 Taler. In Stage 6, 
Player S rejects the new offer. The Players B and S are informed that Player U regards the appropriate 
purchase price to be 50 Taler. In Stage 7, Player B allots 0 Points and Player S 0 Points. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 7?........ 
b) Income of Player S after Stage 7?........ 
 
 
4. After the random draw in Stage 3 (Price=150 Taler, Value=1700 Taler) Player B has an income of 
2050 Taler and Player S of 650 Taler. In Stage 5, Player B increases her offer to 583 Taler. In Stage 6, 
Player S rejects the new offer. The Players B and S are informed that Player U regards the appropriate 
purchase price to be 950 Taler. In Stage 7, Player B allots 250 Points and Player S 100 Points. 
 
What is the 
a) Income of Player B after Stage 7?........ 











The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations: 










Customary law has been criticized from very different angles. Rational choice theorists claim 
that what looks like custom is nothing but self-interest. Positivists doubt that anything beyond 
consent assumes the force of law. In this paper, we adopt an experimental approach to test 
these claims. We show that both critics miss an essential feature of custom. Custom guides 
behavior as normative expectations and behavioral patterns coevolve. Customary law 
capitalizes on this more general social mechanism. If it is not backed up by sanctions, 
customary law is not more effective than mere custom in realigning individual action and 
social well-being. Yet if the emerging rule is perceived to be grounded in law, sanctions and 
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I. Introduction 
Conceptual rigour can be a dangerous weapon. From several directions, this weapon 
has been directed to customary law, with lethal effect as aggressors pretend, or 
leaving the target badly wounded but able to recover as defenders believe. This article 
objects that neither position gives customary law the credit it deserves. It uses a 
laboratory experiment to show the power of customary law, and the behavioural 
forces driving it, thereby contributing to the nascent experimental law and economics 
literature (characteristic contributions include Croson and Johnston 2000; Arlen, 
Spitzer et al. 2002; Loewenstein and Moore 2004; McAdams and Nadler 2005; 
Nadler and Seidman Diamond 2008; Grechenig, Nicklisch et al. 2010; Zeiler 2010). 
 
In almost all legal orders of the world, customary law is acknowledged as a valid 
source of law. Law need not originate in legislation or precedent, but may be created 
by the behaviour and the will of those supposed to abide by it. Yet in most national 
legal orders, customary law in the strict sense has become rare. Within nation states, 
if there is need for a new rule, more convenient law making procedures are readily 
available. Society need not wait until custom has formed. Moreover, when a rule is 
generated by explicit decision in a formalized procedure, this notably reduces 
ambiguity about its precise contents. In contrast, substitutes for customary law are 
less easily employed in the dealings of sovereign states with each other, the main 
reason for this difference being, the absence of a sovereign ruler who could ordain 
reluctant states to subdue to the common will or good. This explains why, these days, 
most of the legal debate on customary law is conducted by international lawyers.  
 
In this paper, we use a lab experiment to test the main claims made in the legal debate 
over customary law. This creates an obvious tension. The debate originates in a field 
of law where entire states are the main actors. We test these claims with individuals. 
Since it is impossible to bring states to the lab, or to engage them in a field 
experiment, we have to trade off a loss in context specificity for a gain in 
experimental control and thus causal inference. We do of course not mean to argue 
that states essentially behave the same way as individuals. States are highly 
aggregate, institutionally and historically embedded corporate actors. We abstract 
from all of this. Yet we believe this price for experimental control to be justified for 
three reasons: First, the legal debate does not posit that customary international law is 
conceptually different from customary law in national law. Insights that are valid for 
customary national law, which does engage and address individuals, are therefore in 
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principle also valid for international law. Second, the arguments brought forward in 
the international law debate over customary law, which we review in the next section, 
do not rely on the character of states as corporate actors, but invoke mechanisms that 
hold for any actor, and for individuals as well. Third, a very similar legal debate is 
indeed concerned with the normative force of custom on the behaviour of individuals. 
While this is not customary law in the strict sense, there are many instances where the 
law acknowledges the normative relevance of custom, short of regarding it as a 
source of law. Classic illustrations are lex mercatoria, trade practice, or codes of 
conduct.  
 
We argue that the critics of customary law use an overly narrow and therefore 
inappropriate concept of normativity. Norms do not only direct behaviour if norm 
violation is against the addressee’s self-interest. On the other hand, the duty to abide 
by the law in force is not the exclusive motivating force either. Norms matter because 
they provide guidance. Most actors are most of the time willing to follow the norms 
prevailing in their context, or at least to be not too far off the mark, and most actors 
expect other actors to be thus guided.  
 
The article takes issue with the furthest reaching claim: customary law is 
“epiphenomenal”, i.e. what looks like an effect of law actually is nothing but an act of 
self-interested behaviour. The proponents of this claim rely on game theory. They 
model states as unitary actors, i.e. as if they were individuals. In the experiment, we 
test a situation where game theory unequivocally predicts total defection: a public 
good game. In line with a rich literature in experimental economics, we refute the 
claim even in our Baseline, where normativity plays no (explicit) role. In our Law 
treatment, we introduce a meta-rule for the formation of customary law. In game-
theoretic terms, this meta-rule is totally irrelevant. Yet it turns out to have a 
pronounced positive effect on people’s cooperativeness. 
 
Positivists will not be surprised by this result. Since we have explicitly invoked the 
legal order, this is what they would expect. Yet for them, the motivational force rests 
in the legal order. Actors abide by the law since this is their duty. Consequently, if we 
do not invoke the law but only ask participants whether they believe a (non-legal) 
norm to exist, the effect should vanish. This is what we test with our Comity 
treatment. Contrary to the positivist prediction yet in line with the position of Maurice 
Mendelson (Mendelson 1998), this turns out to be at least as effective at enhancing 
cooperation as the Law treatment. 
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Based on these findings, we propose an alternative conceptualisation of customary 
law: Customary law guides behaviour into the normatively desired direction as 
normative expectations and behavioural patterns coevolve. We back this claim by 
further data analysis. What our participants have (privately) stated in the preceding 
period significantly explains their behaviour in the subsequent period; what the group 
has done in the preceding period significantly explains their statements about norm 
existence and minimum required contributions in the subsequent period. 
 
Thus far, our results seem to suggest that the power of customary law boils down to 
the power of normativity. Law would be immaterial, not because it has no 
behavioural effect, but because one does not need the legal order to bring the effect 
about. To test this hypothesis, we rerun the experiment in a setting where participants 
can sanction each other (Baseline-S). Also in this setting, the introduction of the 
meta-rule for the formation of customary law (treatment Law-S) has a strong positive 
effect on cooperation compared to Baseline-S. However, if we only privately ask 
participants whether there is a norm (treatment Comity-S), cooperation is even lower 
than in Baseline-S. If participants do not perceive the norm to be legal, sanctions 
“crowd out” some of the beneficial effect of the norm. By contrast sanctions and 
normative expectations corroborate each other if normative behaviour is required in 
law. 
 
In the next section, we develop the legal research question from the lively debate over 
customary law in public international law, and derive the hypotheses to be tested in 
the experiment. Section 3 presents the design of our first experiment. Section 4 
reports the results. Section 5 investigates the driving forces. Section 6 reports findings 
from the additional three treatments with sanctioning opportunities. Section 7 
concludes. 
II. The Legal Debate 
In an influential, provocative paper, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have argued that 
customary international law is a mere epiphenomenon. What looks as if states were 
abiding by international law effectively is nothing but an exercise of self-interest, 
they say. States maximise their utility. They cooperate if this is the optimal strategy, 
given the (expected) behaviour of other states. Cooperation may even occur if states 
face a social dilemma. Through the folk theorem, if their interaction is repeated and 
the end is uncertain, cooperation may occur as long as neither of them is too 
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impatient (Aumann and Shapley 1994). Yet cooperation is much less likely to occur 
if the group is large. In an n-person prisoner’s dilemma, the conditions for 
cooperation are close to heroic (Goldsmith and Posner 1999). 
 
“A nation's ‘compliance’ with the cooperative strategy in the bilateral 
prisoner's dilemma has nothing to do with following a norm from a sense of 
legal obligation. Nations do not act in accordance with a norm that they feel 
obliged to follow; they act because it is in their interest to do so” (Goldsmith 
and Posner 1999: 1132). 
 
Many have taken issue with this claim (for a survey see Norman and Trachtman 
2005). Critics have in particular argued that the authors give too little credit to 
reputation, retaliation and segmentation (Chinen 2001), that international law changes 
the payoffs of the game (Guzman 2008), and that the strategies of grim trigger and 
penance make it possible to sustain cooperation even if the number of actors is large 
(Norman and Trachtman 2005). Our approach differs in that we take exactly a 
situation Goldsmith and Posner claim makes cooperation impossible, and test 
experimentally whether it nonetheless occurs. We thus test: 
 
H1: In a multi-person dilemma game of finite horizon, there is no cooperation. A 
meta-rule requiring persons to abide by the rules of customary law is 
immaterial. 
 
The positivist tradition stands in sharp contrast to the ideas of Goldsmith and Posner. 
For them the force of customary law rests in the individual addressee’s consent, either 
to a specific rule on the issue at hand (Triepel 1899; Anzilotti 1955), or to a meta-rule 
stipulating the conditions under which a new rule comes into being (Kelsen 1952; 
Morelli 1967); (Elias 1995). Consequently, the scope for customary law that 
positivists are willing to grant is rather small. 
 
Positivists are not primarily interested in extra-legal effects. Their main contribution 
is to the doctrine about rules on rules. Positivists define the conditions under which 
an utterance of words assumes the force of law. Yet the exercise has a natural 
corollary. If the law’s addressees care about the law at all, they should care much 
more if this utterance of words is actually law, rather than a mere statement about 
desirability, on whatever non-legal grounds.  
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From this angle, the positivist position is related to a facet of the debate over an 
“expressive” function of law. While some contributions narrowly conceive law as a 
mere sanction (Bohnet and Cooter 2001; Tyran and Feld 2006; Galbiati and Vertova 
2008; Bernasconi, Corazzini et al. 2010), others adopt a richer concept of law, 
arguing that the law serves as a focal point (McAdams 2000; McAdams and Nadler 
2005; McAdams and Nadler 2008), informs people about behaviour others will 
approve (McAdams 2000), induces people to change their beliefs about the 
consequences associated with an action (Geisinger 2002), or changes the perception 
of underlying social norms (Feldman and Nadler 2006). Empirical findings have been 
mixed. The willingness to disregard the copyright protection of electronic works was 
not significantly affected by either making the illegality salient, nor by also pointing 
to informal sanctions, like a loss in reputation (Feldman and Nadler 2006). By 
contrast, in Switzerland voter turnout went down once a canton had abolished the 
legal obligation to vote, although enforcement had only been symbolic (Funk 2007).  
 
As long as there is no enforcement, in psychological parlance the difference between 
mere comity and actual law boils down to a frame. It makes people see the issue in a 
different light. The requested behaviour is not only desirable; it is mandated by the 
legal order. Frames have been shown to strongly influence behaviour. Whether 
context makes people see a choice as involving a gain or a loss has a heavy impact, 
despite the fact that the task can easily be reframed by manipulating the reference 
point (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Also if a choice is contrasted with another, 
irrelevant outside option, choices change substantially (Tversky and Simonson 1993). 
When an agency aims at eliciting voters’ willingness to pay for a public venture, 
responses heavily depend on how the issue is presented (Kahneman, Ritov et al. 
1999). In all these tasks, the frame activates people’s world knowledge. By the same 
token, we expect that people’s attitudes toward law in general are activated if it is 
made salient that custom can be binding law (for a more elaborate theory of what this 
implies see Engel 2008). Most legal rules are meant to tame egoism and to make the 
law’s subjects see the issue in the light of what is socially desirable. We therefore 
derive the following positivist prediction: 
 
H2: People are more likely to overcome a social dilemma if they are made aware 
that this is their duty in law.  
 
Rational choice theorists have a hard time with customary law since it seems unclear 
why self-interested actors should contribute to the formation of a rule that will 
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prevent them from acts of selfishness. Positivists have a hard time with customary 
law since it seems unclear how a new norm of customary law could ever come into 
being. Must those who originally claim the norm to exist actually have been mistaken 
(Elias 1995: 503; Stern 2001: 97)? Are the proponents of a new rule of customary 
law actually only making a proposal, which must be accepted by other actors (Elias 
1995: 508)? Must one have recourse to some external authority, like divine 
emanation, natural law, or social necessity, to explain the formation of a new rule of 
customary law (Stern 2001: 92)?  
 
It seems that both the positivist and the rational choice conceptualisations of 
customary law miss a key ingredient. Practice turns into law since behaviour and 
normative expectations coevolve. If nearly everybody behaves in a certain way, this 
shapes beliefs about others’ future behaviour. If the pattern has been repeated for a 
while, the behavioural belief (i.e. how others will probably behave) turns into a 
normative expectation (i.e. how others should rightly behave). The belief is no longer 
is purely cognitive. A motivational component is added to it. If an actor deviates from 
established practice, she violates others’ normative expectations. Others regard such 
behaviour not only as anti-social but as illegitimate.  
 
In his Hague lectures, Maurice Mendelson has offered a related explanation 
(Mendelson 1998). For him, the textbook approach to customary law misses a central 
feature of public international law. The international legal order is “semi-anarchic” 
(166), embryonic, and in a deep way incomplete. “Whilst modern domestic societies 
are characterised by highly centralised and compulsory systems of law-making and 
adjudication, not to mention enforcement, international society is not like that” (168). 
Therefore a “formalistic approach” (168) is misplaced. It is not possible to state in an 
abstract way the conditions that must be fulfilled for a new rule of customary 
international law to come into being (172). “The characteristic of this kind of law is 
that it is not just unwritten, it is informal” (172). The customary process is in fact a 
continuous one, which does not stop when the rule has emerged […]. Even after the 
rule has ’emerged’, every act of compliance will strengthen it, and every violation, if 
acquiesced in, will help to undermine it” (175). Customary international law rests on 
the conviction that “states should comply with the legitimate expectations of the 
international community” (185), where the ambiguity of the term “expectation” is 
deliberate: “If, within a social group, people habitually behave in a certain way, then, 
particularly if others rely on the continuation of this conduct, the sentiment may 
develop within that society that one is obliged to continue so to act. In other words, a 
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norm emerges from what is normal […]. If the generality of states has regularly 
behaved in certain ways […], then a legitimate expectation arises that they will 
continue to do so” (185 f.).  
 
In essence, this is a claim about normativity in general. Yet it can be combined with 
the reasons expressive law theorists give for the specific behavioural effects of law, 
which we have reported above. If this were to hold true, we would have to see the 
following:  
 
H3: Normative expectations and behaviour coevolve. Coevolution is faster and 
more robust if the normative expectation originates in the legal order. 
III. Experimental Design 
To test these hypotheses, we run a standard linear four person public goods game. In 









  (1) 
Every period, each participant receives the same endowment  . She can freely decide 
how much of the endowment she wants to keep and how much she wants to   
contribute ic  to a joint project. Contributions by all members are multiplied by the 
marginal per capita rate 1m . As long as 1mN , the society of all group members 
is best off if everybody contributes everything. However individually, each member 
is best off if others contribute while she freerides. This constitutes an n-person 
prisoner’s dilemma with continuous action space. As is standard in the experimental 
literature on public goods (for overviews see Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 
2011), subjects are informed after how many periods the game ends. Under standard 
game theoretic assumptions, players reason backwards. Since it is rational to defect in 
the last period, to preempt being the sucker in this period, a rational player defects in 
the penultimate period, and so forth until the first period (Selten 1978; Rosenthal 
1981). Hence the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is all players defecting 
from the beginning. Note that, by this design, we give the rational choice critique of 
customary law its best shot. Since the number of periods is announced and subjects 
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interact anonymously, game theory would even predict that customary law is 
pointless if there were only two players.  
 
In our Baseline treatment participants play this game in fixed groups of 4, interacting 
over 30 announced periods, with an endowment of 20 experimental currency units 
(ECU), and a marginal per capita rate    . These parameters are standard in the 
experimental literature on public goods, except for the number of periods. We have 
replaced the usual duration of 10 periods by a longer spell since we want more scope 
for analysing the coevolution of norms and behaviour. With these parameters, if all 
participants contribute their entire endowments to the joint project, all receive 32 
ECU. If all keep their entire endowments, all receive 20 ECU. If three participants 
contribute fully, while the fourth keeps everything, the former have 24 ECU, while 
the latter has 44 ECU. If one contributes fully, while three freeride, the former has 8 
ECU, while the latter each have 28 ECU.  
 
The first stage of the Comity treatment is exactly the same as the baseline. However, 
Comity has one additional stage: In each period, after participants have made their 
contribution decisions, but before giving them feedback, we ask them the following 
two questions: 
 
“1.  Do you believe in your group exists a general norm regarding an 
adequate minimum contribution to the project (yes/no)? 
2.  If so, which is the generally expected minimum contribution (number 
from 0 to 20)?” 
 
The instructions make it clear that participants will not get feedback about other 
participants’ statements.  
 
The Law treatment is identical to Comity but for the fact that, in addition, participants 
read the following paragraph in the instructions: 
 
“For new law to originate, it is not necessary that the legislator pass a statute, 
or that the parties agree on an explicit contract. Customary law is equally valid 
and binding. Customary law comes into being if the large majority of those 
affected for a sufficiently long period behave in a sufficiently similar way. 
The fact that some contribute even more to the joint project does not prevent 
that a norm of customary law originates. Hence a rule of customary law may 
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prescribe a minimum standard. Customary law may originate here in the lab 
as well.” 
 
Note that we have deliberately kept this paragraph procedural. Participants are 
informed about the conditions under which they themselves are able to make new law. 
This is not only in line with customary law doctrine, but also a safeguard against the 
risk of imposing any specific material norm on participants.  
 
The experiment was run in the Bonn EconLab and programmed in zTree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Participants were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). After 
being seated in individual cubicles, participants received experimental instructions 
and answered a set of control questions (see the Appendix). We had 20 participants, 
interacting in 5 groups in the Baseline,
1
 and 24 participants, interacting in 6 groups, 
in each of the two treatments. Participants were randomly drawn from a pool of some 
3500 subjects. They held various majors. Approximately half of them were female. In 
the Baseline, participants on average earned 12.42 € (15.73 $), in the Comity 
treatment earnings were on average 14.07 € (17.82 $), and in the Law treatment 13.80 
€ (17.48 $).  
IV. Results 
A. Treatment Effects 
From Figure 1 one directly sees that both our treatments have a pronounced effect on 
cooperation. Whereas the Baseline displays the characteristic decay of contributions 
over time (see for example Fehr and Gächter 2000), both in Comity and in Law, 
average contributions even increase in the first periods, and they are much higher 
than in the Baseline until the endgame effect kicks in. Descriptively, Comity has a 
slightly stronger effect on contributions than Law. 
 
                                               




Figure 1: Contributions to the Public Good 
Note: Cumulative distribution function, displaying the share of individuals willing to pay (up to) a certain price to 
deviate from material selfishness. Every deviation from the selfish optimum implied forgone payoffs of 10 tokens. 
 
The visual impression is confirmed by statistical analysis. In a conservative non-
parametric test over means per group, the difference between the Baseline and Comity 
is significant at conventional levels (Mann Whitney, N = 11, p = .0446). In this test, 
the difference between the Baseline and Law is insignificant (p = .1441). We analyse 
the data parametrically using a random effects Tobit estimator.
2
 Using this procedure, 
                                               
2 The random effect captures the dependence at the level of individuals and the Tobit functional form 
accounts for the fact that our dependent variable is both left and right censored (many participants 
contribute their entire endowment of 20 tokens, while many contribute nothing). Participants interact 
in the same group of four over 30 periods. This creates a second source of dependence. Ideally we 
would therefore want to estimate a mixed effects model with two random effects: one for the group 
and another for the individual. Yet unfortunately there is no generally acknowledged mixed effects 
estimator for censored data. As a substitute, to make sure standard errors are not deflated, we bootstrap 
the estimator, with random draws of entire groups. 
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in the regressions of Table 1 we establish a significant treatment effect for both 
Comity (model 1) and Law (model 2), in comparison with the Baseline. By contrast 
the difference between Comity and Law is clearly insignificant (model 3, p-value Law 
= .535).  
 
Our results clearly refute H1, which was derived from the rational choice critique of 
customary law. In a way, already our Baseline speaks against the claim that there is 
no cooperation in a multi-person dilemma. For sure, in the reality of international 
law, there are many more than just four actors. Yet note that a four person game 
excludes stabilising cooperation by threatening a defector with Nash reversion. Since 
there is more than one partner, players cannot use their own contributions, in the 
subsequent period, as a sanctioning technology. They would not only hit free riders, 
but also those who have faithfully contributed to the joint project. On the conceptual 
grounds on which the rational choice critique of customary law is built, a four actor 
dilemma is no different from a 192 actor dilemma.   
 
Moreover, as model 2 shows, if we only compare the Baseline with the Law 
treatment, law clearly matters. The fact that behaviour is required by law has a big, 
positive effect. Note that our Law treatment is very subtle. The legal norm not only 
lacks sanctions, there is not even communication among those expected to abide by 
the legal rule, neither about its existence nor about its contents.  
 
Table 1: Treatment Effect on Contributions 
Dependent Variable: Contributions to PG 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline vs. Comity Baseline vs. Law Comity vs. Law 
Comity 13.661*   
Law  9.597* -3.150 
Period -.813*** -.604*** -.517*** 
Cons 18.175*** 15.217*** 26.483*** 
N 1320 1320 1440 
left censored 311 327 198 
right censored 469 380 595 
p model <.001 <.001 <.001 
Note: random effects Tobit, ll(0) ul(20), bootstrapped with random draws of entire groups. 50 
reps. reference category: models 1 and 2: Baseline, model 3: Comity. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, 




By contrast, we do not find support for H2, which we derived from legal positivism, 
and from expressive law theory. We do not find any statistical difference between 
Comity and Law. In our data, customary law boils down to normativity. The fact that 
the rule is embedded in the legal order does not help participants overcome the 
dilemma even better. Descriptively they even fare slightly worse. We will revisit this 
issue in our second experiment, but first turn to our process hypothesis H3. 
B. The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations 
Figure 2 shows for both the Comity and the Law treatment that normative 
expectations and behaviour are indeed synchronous. As long as many participants 
believe there is a norm, contributions are high. If this belief erodes, ultimately 
behaviour is affected. There is also a clear relationship between statements about the 





Figure 2: Coevolution of Behaviour and Normative Expectations 
Note: Left axis denotes % of participants who say there is a norm. Right axis denotes actual and expected 
contribution. 
                                               
3 The apparent kink in statements about the required contribution level by the end in the Law treatment 
is due to a selection effect. If we analyse first differences of these statements, in neither treatment do 
they go up over time. Hence in the final periods, those remaining faithful to the norm do not believe it 
to be even stronger. Rather those who always believed the norm to be more demanding are more likely 
to still think it exists. 
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We can exploit the panel structure of our data to identify effects in both directions. If 
a participant has claimed in the previous period that there is a norm, this significantly 
and substantially increases how much she contributes to the joint project in the 
subsequent period (Table 2, model 1). Likewise, if one only looks at those 
participants who claim norm existence, the higher a participant has claimed the 
minimum contribution to be, the more she contributes in the subsequent period 
(model 2). This finding suggests a desire for self-consistency between one’s stated 
normative expectations and one’s contribution behaviour. In the reverse direction, the 
higher mean contributions in the participant’s group in the previous period
4
, the more 
this participant is likely to state that there is a norm (model 3).
5
 Likewise, the higher 
mean contributions in the previous period, the more demanding are the statements 
about the required minimum contribution (model 4). 
 
Table 2: Coevolution of Behaviour and Normative Expectations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Lagged statement of 
norm existence 
6.465**    
Lagged statement of 
norm level 
 1.699***   
Lagged mean  
contribution in group 
  .202*** 1.189*** 
Law -3.530 -1.231 .784 -.914 
Period -.510*** -.445* -.030** .123+ 
cons 23.408*** 3.803 -2.588*** -3.583 
N 1392 724 1392 715 
left censored 198 54  23 
right censored 574 424  303 
p model <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Note: models 1,2,4: random effects Tobit, ll(0) ul(20). Standard error from bootstrap, sampled at group level, 
50 reps. model 3: mixed effects logit, period nested in individual nested in group. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p 
< .05, + p < .1. 
 
                                               
4 We work with the lag of average contributions, although participants made their statements after 
contribution choices since they did not yet have feedback about this period’s contributions. 
5 In a logit model, both events are equally likely if the predicted coefficient is 0. 
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Figure 3 separately draws the contributions of participants who affirm and who deny 
the existence of a norm, together with the lagged mean contribution of all 
participants. The left panel displays the Comity treatment, and the right panel the Law 
treatment. As one sees, in all periods those who claim norm existence on average 
contribute more than the mean in the previous period. By contrast, those who say 
there is no norm contribute less than the lagged mean in all but the very first periods. 
Moreover, until the endgame effect kicks in, contributions of those who say there is a 
norm are almost stable, while contributions of the remaining subjects visibly decay 
over time. We thus support the main claim of H3: normative expectations and 
behaviour coevolve. These observations hold likewise for the Comity and the Law 
treatment. We do however not find any additional effect of law over mere social 
expectations. The next section further examines this result within a slightly modified 
experimental paradigm. 
 
Figure 3: Contributions by Claim of Norm Existence 
C. Law beyond Normativity? 
The results reported above strongly suggest that customary law matters. It 
substantially improves behaviour, as we have clearly seen in Figure 1. This is 
welcome news for public international law, and for law in general. Yet it is troubling 
that, seemingly, an equally strong behavioural effect could be brought about without 
explicit reference to law. Seemingly, customary law only matters because it makes 
normativity salient. In the terminology of international law doctrine we might thus 
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conclude that customary law is not more effective than mere comity. If that was the 
end of the story, why has (customary) law evolved? Why do states seem to care? 
Why do they exert considerable effort to show that what might appear to be in 
violation of customary international law actually is in harmony with it, for instance 
because the rule has an exception? Within international law doctrine, the answer is 
straightforward: If and only if the state that has violated an obligation from customary 
international law, it must tolerate that the victim retaliates by itself violating another 
rule of international law (within the limits of the law of reprisals, for sure). Yet is this 
doctrinal distinction of any behavioural relevance? 
 
To answer these questions, we have run a second experiment. In this experiment we 
repeat our three treatments from above with a slight modification. In every period we 
now add an additional stage in which participants have the possibility to sanction 
each other (cf. Fehr and Gächter 2000; Nikiforakis and Normann 2008). Specifically, 
to destroy one ECU of another group member, a participant must spend one ECU of 
her own period income. The first stage payoff function remains as in (1). If we write 









ij ss1  (2) 
First stage income is reduced by all sanctioning points this player gives to another 
group member (    , and by all sanctioning points other group members inflict on her 
(    . Another 72 students have participated in these three treatments with sanctioning 
opportunities (“S-treatments”). They have on average earned 14.45 € (18.44 $) in the 
Baseline-S, 13.78 € (17.58 $) in Comity-S, and 15.19 € (19.38 $) in Law-S. 
 
Of course, the caveat made when introducing the first experiment applies here too: 
we test students, and the reactions of states to the availability of a sanctioning 
mechanism may well be driven by other forces. In particular, the cost or risk involved 
in enforcing international law against a powerful state may be very high. Yet note that 
apart from that our design is very close to the situation of customary international 
law: There is no central enforcement agency. The cost of enforcement is borne by 
those who engage in it. If the rule is valid erga omnes (for an economic analysis see 
Engel 2009; Posner 2009), each state is entitled to enforce it, even if another state has 
been violated. Since the rule originates in state practice, it need not be explicit. 
Frequently, whether there is a rule or not is disputed. Also, using a 1:1 fine-to-fee 
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ratio, we have made punishment as costly as it reasonably can be made in the lab; 
typically in public good experiments the leverage of punishment is much higher. 
 
Figure 4 compares cooperation in the three treatments without (left panel) and with 
(right panel) decentral sanctioning. There are two messages. The first is 
straightforward. Sanctions are very effective at improving cooperation, even if they 
are weak. For the rational choice theorists of customary international law this again 
should be surprising. In our game every player is best off if others bear the cost of 
sanctioning, which is why theory predicts zero sanctions; the original dilemma 
repeats among those actors who are willing to contribute to the public good 
themselves, but would rather have other loyal contributors bear the cost of enforcing 
it (Yamagishi 1986; Heckathorn 1989). Consequently adding the sanctioning option 
should not change behaviour. Yet empirically people, and states for that matter, are 
willing to engage in costly sanctioning. Potential addressees rightly expect sanctions, 
and react by changing their behaviour (key contributions to this literature are Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002). Both the difference between Comity and 
Law-S (N = 12, p = .0163) and the difference between Law and Law-S (N = 12, p = 
.0104) is highly significant in a simple Mann-Whitney test over group means.  
 
The more important message of Figure 4 is more subtle, but also more relevant for 
understanding the difference between comity and customary law. While contributions 
were slightly lower in Law than in Comity when there was no sanctioning option, in 
the presence of sanctioning the order reverses. Now Law-S outperforms all other 
treatments, while Comity-S performs even poorer than the Baseline-S. There is a well-
understood behavioural explanation for the latter effect. Extrinsic interventions crowd 
out intrinsic motivation (Bolton and Katok 1998; Fehr and Gächter 2001; Frey and 
Jegen 2001; Nyborg and Rege 2001; Chan, Godby et al. 2002; Janssen and Mendys 
2004; Eckel, Grossman et al. 2005; Borges and Irlenbusch 2007). Yet interestingly 
the socially detrimental effect of sanctions disappears if behaviour is not only socially 
but legally required. Now, to the contrary, sanctions and intrinsic motivation are no 




Figure 4: Contributions with and without Sanctions 
 
Table 3 analyses the complementarity between law and sanctions in further depth. 
Specifically, we want to see how people change their contribution behaviour as a 
result of receiving a sanction in the previous period. Consequently, we do not look at 
contribution levels, but at contribution changes, i.e. first differences.  
 
Table 3: Sensitivity to Sanctions 
 
lagged received sanction .659*** 
Comity -.161 
lagged received sanction*Comity -.217** 
period -.008 
period 30 -5.418*** 
cons -.026 
N 1392 
p model <.001 
Note: Dependent variable: first differences of contributions. Mixed effects 
model, period nested in individual nested in group. Reference group: Law 
treatment. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .1. 
 
There is a strong main effect of sanctions: each sanctioning point a participant has 
received in the previous period induces her to increase her contributions by .659 
points. More importantly even, from the negative interaction of sanction with Comity-
S we see that the beneficial effect of punishment is significantly less pronounced 
when the normative expectation does not originate in law. In the Comity-S treatment, 
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one punishment point only induces the recipient to adjust her contributions by .659 - 
.217 = .442 points. 
 
Figure 5 provides additional support for our process hypothesis H3. In addition, one 
clearly sees that the main difference between Comity-S and Law-S originates in the 
perception of norm existence. If we make the possibility of the formation of 
customary law salient, and if participants have the possibility to sanction norm 
violations, after a small number of periods almost all participants believe a norm to 
exist. And this norm closely corresponds with actual behaviour. One way of 
explaining this effect is game theoretic. Our Law-S treatment can be interpreted as 
turning the meta-rule, i.e. the possibility that a normative expectation emerges, into 
perceived common knowledge.
6
 Our experiment thus also points to an additional 
option for explaining the effect of customary law when keeping the rational choice 
assumption that actors just maximise their payoffs. 
 
Figure 5: Norm Existence and Norm Level with Sanctioning 
 
Figure 5 shows that the dynamics of norm perception are substantially different in 
Comity and Law. The positive and significant time trend indicates that participants 
become more and more likely over time to state there is a norm when this norm 
originates in law. However, they are less likely to say so in the absence of law (.100 - 
                                               
6 We are grateful to Carlos Alós-Ferrer for this interpretation. Descriptively, we already see a similar 
effect without sanctions, Figure 2, yet it is not significant. 
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.217 = -.117). This qualifies our finding from the first experiment. While we do not 
find support for H2 in the absence of sanctions, once the law is backed up by a 
sanction, law is indeed more powerful than mere comity. In our second experiment 
we thus support H2.  
 







p model <.001 
Note Dependent variable statement of norm existence (yes/no). Mixed effect logit, statement nested 
in individual nested in group. Data from Comity and Law treatments only (since norm question is not 
asked in the Baseline). Reference category: Law treatment. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.  
V. Conclusion 
Using a standard paradigm from experimental economics, this paper shows that 
customary law has a strong beneficial effect. It helps experimental participants 
overcome a social dilemma. If there are no sanctions, the effect basically coincides 
with the behavioural effect of what public international law calls comity. In essence, 
customary law governs behaviour since normative expectations and behaviour 
coevolve. Whether the rule invokes the authority of the law is at best immaterial, if 
not detrimental. Yet the authority of the law becomes instrumental as soon as there 
are sanctions. If combined with comity, sanctions crowd out some of the beneficial 
effect. If the rule originates in law, however, the authority of the law and the threat of 
sanctions reinforce each other.  
 
There is an obvious gap between the behaviour of students in a computer lab and state 
practice. It could well be that states are not affected by normativity the same way as 
individuals. But as laid out in section 2, the debate in public international law does 
not rest on factors that are specific to states being the actors. The underlying claims 
address actors in general, and should therefore also be valid for individuals. It is these 
claims we address. 
Experimental law and economics is still a very young discipline. Legal readers often 
expect a one to one mapping between the legal issue and the experiment. Experiments 
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cannot but disappoint those readers. Of necessity, any experiment is contextually 
poorer than the real life phenomenon it aims to understand. The purpose of an 
experiment is not being realistic but to isolate specific factors the theoretical debate 
believes to be important, and determine their causal effect. Experiments solve the 
identification problem that plagues the analysis of field data. Through random 
assignment, in an experiment the observed difference in behaviour between two 
treatments can only be caused by the deliberate difference in the design. One is sure 
in which direction the arrow of causality points, and one may safely conclude that the 
effect is not caused by unobserved, omitted variables. Experimental findings can 
never decide a complex legal issue. Experiments serve a different function but one 
that may be highly instrumental for law. Not so rarely, within a much richer legal 
discourse, one argument carries special weight. If this argument is empirical, 
experiments may make a valuable contribution. They may corroborate, or refute, this 
one argument. Such has been the purpose of our study. As we have laid out in the 
introduction and in the section on the legal debate, fairly abstract claims have been 
brought forward to invalidate the normative force of customary law in international 
relations. We have taken these arguments at face value, and refuted them.  
 
An obvious next step for studying the coevolution of behaviour and normative 
expectations in public international law would be to qualitatively explore normativity 
in international relations (cf. Risse 1999; Risse 2000). In one respect, the character of 
states as corporate actors makes this even easier than with individuals. While the 
formation of the individual will occurs in her forum internum, the formation of the 
corporate will is open to public scrutiny. Through freedom of information legislation, 
even internal government deliberation is made accessible. While the proof may not be 
provided in this paper, it seems plausible that normativity in international relations is 
not fundamentally different from normativity in personal relations. Normativity is a 
key ingredient of human sociality (Wyman, Rakoczy et al. 2009). It might be scaled 
up to international law but not a substantially different force. If that could be shown 
to be true, the experimental findings reported in this paper would not only help 
international lawyers repel premature criticism of customary law. Our findings would 
even provide international lawyers with a conceptual framework for understanding 
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In the following, we present the experimental instructions as well as the control 
questions for Treatment Law-S. All other treatments are reduced forms of Law-S: 
 Omitting the box “Customary Law:…” we obtain Comity-S. 
 Additionally omitting the shaded areas we obtain Baseline-S. 
 Finally, by omitting Stage 3 of the instructions and Question 5 of the 





General instructions for the participants 
 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
 
If you read the following explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a substantial sum of money, 
depending on the decisions you make. It is therefore crucial that you read these explanations carefully.  
 
During the experiment there shall be absolutely no communication between participants. Any violation 
of this rule means you will be excluded from the experiment and from any payments. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. We will then come over to you. 
 
During the experiment we will not calculate in euro, but instead in taler. Your total income is therefore 
initially calculated in taler. The total number of taler you accumulate in the course of the experiment 
will be transferred into euro at the end, at a rate of 
 
1 Euro = 60 Taler 
 
At the end you will receive from us the cash sum, in euro, based on the number of taler you have 
earned. 
 
The experiment consists of 30 periods, and each period consists of 3 stages. Participants are randomly 
divided into groups of four. Apart from yourself, your group therefore has 3 further members. During 
these 30 periods, the constellation of your group of four remains unchanged. Hence, you are with the 
same people in the same group for 30 periods. At the beginning, each group member is allocated a 










At the beginning of each period, each participant is given 20 taler to work with, referred to henceforth 
as endowment. Your task is to decide upon how to use your endowment. You must decide how many 
of the 20 taler you wish to pay into a common project, and how many you wish to keep for yourself. 
The consequences of this decision are explained in more detail below. 
 
Your endowment hence consists of 20 taler in each period. You make a decision on your payments 
by typing whole numbers between 0 and 20 in the input field on your screen. Once you have keyed in 
your amount, press Continue. As soon as you have done this, you may no longer reverse your decision 
for this period. 
 
Once all group members have made their decisions, you are told how much each individual group 
member has contributed to the project. 
 
Your total income (in taler) therefore consists of two parts: (1) the taler income from the common 
project and (2) the taler you have retained. 
 
 












The income from the common project is calculated as the total sum of all contributions to the project 
(within your group of four) times 0.4. 
 
 





total sum of all contributions to the project 







If the sum of contributions from all group members to the common project is 60 taler, you and each 
other group member receive an income from the project of 0.460 = 24 taler. If the group members 
have contributed a total of 9 taler to the project, you and each other group member receive a taler 
income from the project of 0.49 = 3.6. 
 
If you contribute one taler from your endowment to the group project, the sum of contributions to the 
common project increases by 1 taler, and your income from the project increases by 0.41 = 0.4 taler. 
However, this also means that each individual other group member’s income increases by 0.4 taler, so 
that the total income of the group increases by 0.44 = 1.6 taler. The other group members therefore 
also earn something from your contribution to the project. On the other hand, you profit from the 
contributions made by the other group members. For each taler contributed to the project by another 
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group member, you earn 0.41 = 0.4 taler. Hence, if each member of your group of four contributes 1 






In Stage 2, you will see a screen requesting you to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Do you believe that there is a general norm in your group on an appropriate minimum 
contribution to the project? (Yes/No) 
 




For new law to originate, it is not necessary that the legislator pass a statute, or that the parties agree on 
an explicit contract. Customary law is equally valid and binding. Customary law comes into being if 
the large majority of those affected for a sufficiently long period behave in a sufficiently similar way. 
The fact that some contribute even more to the joint project does not prevent that a norm of customary 
law originates. Hence a rule of customary law may prescribe a minimum standard. Customary law may 
originate here in the lab as well. 
 
From the second period onwards, you will receive information on the behavior of individual group 
members in past periods. In order to receive this, you will have to click on an appropriate button on 
your screen. This can be done as often as you like. 
 
 Button "contributions": how much have the individual group members contributed 






In Stage 3 you learn how much the other group members have contributed to the common project in 
this period. You then have the possibility of reducing the other players’ income by distributing 
points. Each point you distribute to the other players costs you 1 Taler and reduces the other players’ 
income also by 1 Taler. 
 






1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 taler. Nobody (including you) contributes any taler 
to the project. What is:  
a. Your income from the common project?  ………  
b. Your total income?………  
 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 taler. You contribute 20 taler to the project. All 
other group members contribute 20 taler each to the project. What is:  
a. Your income from the common project?  ………  
b. Your total income?………  
 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 taler. You contribute 0 taler to the project. The other 
three group members contribute together a total of 30 taler to the project. What is: 
a. Your income from the common project?  ………  
b. Your total income?………  
 
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 taler. You contribute 15 taler to the project. The 
other three group members contribute together a total of 5 taler to the project. What is:  
a. Your income from the common project?  ………  
b. Your total income?………  
 
5. After Stage 1 you have a total income of 30. Then you distribute 2 points to group member 1 and 
3 points to group member 2. You also receive from the members of your group a total of 4 points. 













Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? 










Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday situations. In this paper, we propose 
a very simple and light-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in 
a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation by controlling 
experiences, more specifically, it "manipulates" subjects’ initial beliefs by providing them 
with selective information about (un)cooperative behavior in other, unrelated, groups. We 
observe that contributions are considerably sensitive to such selective information. First 
impressions participants happen to make predict subsequent behavior. Our results, however, 
suggest an asymmetry in the strength of the reaction – which might pose a limit on the 
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Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday situations. For example, 
when it comes to protecting the environment, defending one’s country, generating 
new knowledge, joining a political party, extending the infrastructure, or exploiting 
the opposite market side, agents face a social dilemma. Jointly they are best off if 
everyone contributes her fair share. But individually, free-riding on others’ efforts 
yields the highest payoff. A large number of theoretical and empirical papers have 
explored how people should be expected to and how they actually do behave in such 
situations. Many empirical contributions make use of laboratory experiments where 
subjects participate in a prisoners’ dilemma or in a public-good game.  Absent 
institutional interventions like punishment (Fehr and Gächter 2000), contributions are 
heterogeneous in the beginning, but average cooperation quickly declines and most 
participants free-ride in the end (e.g. Andreoni 1988). These results have been stress-
tested extensively, e.g., with respect to anonymity (Andreoni and Petrie 2004), 
culture (Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008), group size (Isaac, Walker et al. 1994), 
efficiency (Glöckner, Irlenbusch et al. 2010), or framing (Goerg and Walkowitz 
2010). Interventions that mitigate the dilemma are not easily designed. Effective 
interventions tend to be heavy-handed, often altering the incentive structure of the 
game such that free-riding is not in an individual’s self-interest any more (e.g. 
Ostrom, Walker et al. 1992; Falkinger, Fehr et al. 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002; 
Gürerk, Irlenbusch et al. 2006; Glöckner, Irlenbusch et al. 2010). In this paper, we 
propose a very simple and light-handed mechanism and test its effectiveness by using 
laboratory experiments.  
 
Our mechanism is based on an observation that has previously been made in public-
goods experiments, namely that (initial) group composition and initial cooperation 
rates significantly affect the future development of cooperation rates in a particular 
group (Burlando and Guala 2005; Gächter and Thöni 2007; Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 
2009). A likely reason for this behavioral pattern is provided by the influential 
concept of reciprocity and conditional cooperation (Fischbacher, Gächter et al. 2001; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Fischbacher and 
Gächter 2010, among many others). If persons are sensitive to the behavior of other 
group members, those groups who cooperate little in the beginning will become even 
less cooperative over time, while groups with substantial cooperation in the beginning 
are able to sustain cooperation over time. This suggests that outsiders might moderate 
cooperation by controlling experiences. Our mechanism is even less invasive in that it 
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is confined to the first impressions subjects happen to make. More precisely, the idea 
is to “manipulate” initial beliefs by providing participants with selective information 
about (un)cooperative behavior in other, unrelated, groups. The information affects 
initial beliefs about others’ behavior, which in turn changes how I myself behave 
initially. A virtuous (or vicious, depending on the kind of information that is 
provided) cycle starts: via beliefs, our manipulation determines cooperativeness in the 
beginning, which in turn determines cooperativeness later on. 
 
Our intervention idea is in the spirit of James Q. Wilson’s Broken Windows Theory 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982) which is based on the work of American sociologist Philip 
Zimbardo. In 1969, Zimbardo abandoned two identical cars in two different locations: 
the Bronx, NYC and Palo Alto, California. “The license plates of both cars were 
removed and the hoods opened to provide the necessary releaser signals” (Zimbardo 
1969). In the Bronx, the abandoned car was stripped and demolished after only 26 
hours, the result of 23 separate incidents of vandalism. In contrast, the car in Palo 
Alto still sat unmolested after the course of an entire week. Zimbardo then decided to 
provide an example of vandalism to the affluent and seemingly non-violent 
neighborhood of Palo Alto. So he and two graduate students of his took a 
sledgehammer and started bashing the car. After they had taken the first blow, 
observers shouted encouragement and finally joined in the vandalism, until the car 
was completely wrecked (Zimbardo and Ebbesen 1969). 
 
In order to clearly identify the short- and long-run effects of our mechanism we run 
laboratory experiments, which have the benefit of providing a sufficient degree of 
control over the environment. The environment that we use has been prominent lately 
to study social dilemmas and cooperation problems. It is a complex public-good 
game (more precisely, a voluntary contribution mechanism) with decentralized 
sanctions (Fehr and Gächter 2000) and counter-punishment opportunities (Nikiforakis 
2008). We have chosen this rich environment, since it mimics several potentially 
important features available in natural environments. Moreover, it is sufficiently 
complex, so that conflicting behavioral norms might emerge – which allows us to test 
the effect of both favorable and unfavorable first impressions.  
 
In the baseline, subjects play the game for 10 periods without any exogenous 
interventions. In two treatments (FAV and UNFAV), prior to making their first 
contribution decision in the game, we provide subjects with selected data from the 
baseline. Specifically, we show them graphs of the development of mean 
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contributions over time from selected cooperative (resp. uncooperative) groups. The 
information that we give is unfavorable for cooperation in treatment UNFAV – similar 
to Zimbardo, we “attack the car with a hammer” and explore whether “the car will 
then go to ruins”, i.e., whether cooperation breaks down in the public-good 
experiment. Contrarily, in treatment FAV we reverse the manipulation by exposing 
subjects to favorable initial impressions – i.e., similar to Wilson, metaphorically 
speaking we repair the windows in a bad neighborhood, and investigate whether 
newly arriving inhabitants behave more cooperatively. 
 
We find that cooperation rates strongly react to the treatment manipulation.
1
 
Unfavorable information substantially reduces initial contributions to the public good. 
Moreover, the effect is long-lasting and translates into future development of groups’ 
cooperation behavior. Contributions in treatment UNFAV do not recover during the 
experiment. More importantly even for policy making, the favorable selective 
information in treatment FAV prevents cooperation rates from decaying over time. 
Taken together, our results suggest that subjects’ behavior is indeed conditional on 
initial expectations of how others are likely to behave, and that these expectations are 
open to purposeful intervention. 
 
The next section embeds our study into the existing literature. Subsequently, we 
explain the design of the experiment. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
experimental results of our main study, and features an additional experiment that 
explores whether the effect of our manipulation is mediated by subjects’ initial 
expectations. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. Related Literature 
Our study closely relates to the experimental literature on reciprocity and conditional 
cooperation. This literature suggests that a substantial fraction of subjects usually 
consists of conditional cooperators, i.e., people who are willing to cooperate, 
provided a sufficiently large fraction of the population does the same. (Fischbacher, 
Gächter et al. 2001; Mengel 2007; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). For conditional 
cooperators, information about contribution patterns in other groups has a first- and a 
                                               
1As we demonstrate in a second series of experiments (reported below in Section 4), the effect of our 
manipulation is mediated via subjects’ initial beliefs. Beliefs about others’ initial contribution 
decisions are much more pessimistic when unfavorable information is provided. 
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second-order effect. Given the uncertainty about the composition of the group of 
which they happen to be a member, information about other groups helps them form 
beliefs. Moreover, each participant knows that each other participant has received the 
same information. This makes it possible to also form a second-order belief, based on 
knowing that the remaining group members have received the same information. The 
finding that, in our experiment, cooperation rates are sensitive to the initial 
information-manipulation is fully reconcilable with the idea that a non-negligible 
fraction of the population acts as if they were conditional cooperators. This yields 
further support for the existence and importance of conditional cooperation. 
 
The research question covered here is also closely related to the literature on 
institutional design, specifically the branch that explores interventions aiming at 
raising contributions to public goods. Usually, the proposed mechanisms alter the 
incentive structure such that free-riding becomes less attractive, or even a dominated 
strategy for self-centered money maximizers. For example, in (Falkinger, Fehr et al. 
2000) the payoff structure is changed such that “each individual gets a reward or has 
to pay a penalty depending on the deviation of its contribution from the mean 
contribution.” In other studies, group composition is changed such that the payoff 
structure is changed implicitly. For example, in (Gunnthorsdotir, Houser et al. 2007), 
subjects are re-matched every period according to their cooperativeness in the 
previous round; which is found to raise cooperation levels. Likewise, if groups have a 
chance to exclude free-riders, this improves cooperation in a dilemma setting 
(Cinyabuguma, Page et al. 2005; Croson, Fatas et al. 2008), as does a mechanism that 
allows members to self-select into groups (Page, Putterman et al. 2005), in particular 
if free-riders are effectively excluded by a rule that sacrifices a portion of the group 
income to outsiders ( the Red Cross, as it was , Brekke, Hauge et al. 2009). Our study 
differs from this literature in that we leave the incentive structure of the game 
completely unchanged. All we alter are the first impressions participants happen to 
make – which is an option that should naturally be available in any public good game, 
and in many real-life social dilemmas.  
 
Parts of the legal literature, particularly those at the intersection of law and 
economics, have also been asking how socially desirable behavior and/or compliance 
with the law can be brought about. Again, a prominent approach is to change the 
incentive structure, e.g., by increasing the expected costs of breaking the law. For 
example, Braga, Weisburd et al. (1999) report evidence from a field experiment that 
randomly exposed 12 of 24 matched violent crime places in Jersey City to intense 
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police scrutiny and intervention. In the places chosen, crime rates dropped 
substantially, while they did not in the unaffected places. In a similar vein, in a series 
of sociological field experiments, when there were signs of disorder, like graffiti, 
abandoned shopping carts, littering or bicycles locked where they were not supposed 
to be, this induced passers-by to also break these and other rules (Cialdini, Reno et al. 
1990; Keizer, Lindenberg et al. 2008; Ramos and Torgler 2010). In laboratory 
experiments, Galbiati and Vertova (2008) demonstrate that cooperation behavior 
increases when an explicit expectation is spelt out and enforced by (non-deterrent) 
sanctions (see also Kube and Traxler 2010).  
 
Besides, our findings also underline the power of information, as it has also been 
observed in other contexts. For example, previous work on voting behavior points out 
that information in the form of polls (Forsythe, Myerson et al. 1993; Forsythe, Rietz 
et al. 1996; Klor and Winter 2007) or of cheap-talk electoral campaigns (Corazzini, 
Kube et al. 2010) affect subsequent voting outcomes. Similarly, information gathered 
during pre-play communication
2
 strongly affects subjects’ decision in subsequent 
coordination games (Blume and Ortmann 2007), as does information from preceding 
asset-market outcomes (Kogan, Kwasnica et al. 2010) or information about group 
members’ previous decisions (Weber 2006). Interestingly, the literature on 
coordination games comes to the conclusion that pre-play information promotes 
Nash-equilibrium play (assuming self-centered money maximizers). By contrast, our 
experimental results show that the opposite might happen in a cooperation game like 
the one reported here, where the socially efficient outcome is usually not part of the 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Pre-play information may indeed promote 
socially efficient outcomes. 
III. Experimental Design, Procedure, and Behavioral Predictions 
Experimental Design: The baseline treatment is a typical public-good game with 
punishment and counter-punishment opportunities as implemented by Nikiforakis 
(2008).
3
 The basic game features n=4 players and consists of three stages: 
                                               
2 See alsoCrawford (1998) for a general survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk. 
3We have chosen this design because it provides a rich environment in which different behavioral 
norms may emerge. Moreover, this design has the advantage to leave sufficient room for testing the 
effect of both favorable and unfavorable first impressions. Had we tested a mere voluntary contribution 
mechanism, previous experiments would have indicated that cooperation is very difficult to sustain in 
the first place. Conversely, had we chosen a public good game with one-step punishment, successful 
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At the beginning of stage 1 (“contribution stage”), players are endowed with 20 
tokens each. Players then decide simultaneously and independently how much of 
their endowment they want to contribute to a public account. We denote this decision 
with i
c
. Each token that is contributed to the public account increases the payoff of 
each player in the group by 0.4 tokens (i.e., the MPCR is α=.4). Each token unspent 
increases a player’s own payoff by one token. The preliminary payoff at the end of 











Table 1: Punishment points pij per player j and costs C(pij) for punisher i 
 
pij 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
C(pij) 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
 
 
At the beginning of stage 2 (“punishment stage”), players are informed about every 
group member’s contribution to the public account. Every player i then has the 
opportunity to reduce the income of each other group member j by assigning costly 
punishment points pij. Each punishment point received reduces a player’s income 
from stage 1 by ten percent. At the same time, each punishment point assigned 
reduces one’s own payoff according to the cost function given in Table 1. The 





















At the beginning of stage 3 (“counter-punishment stage”), players observe who 
punished them by how much in stage 2. They then have the opportunity to counter-
punish the punishers by assigning them counter-punishment points cpij. The 
punishment technology is the same as in stage 2. Each counter-punishment point 
received reduces a player’s preliminary income from stage 2 by ten percent and each 
                                                                                                                                      
cooperation would have been very likely. By contrast, according to the existing literature, if we also 
add the counter-punishment option, expectations are in the middle between both extremes. 
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counter-punishment point assigned reduces one’s own payoff as given in Table 1, but 
the cost of counter-punishment also depends on this player’s punishment decision.
4
 




















In treatments FAV and UNFAV, the underlying game structure remains unchanged. 
Compared with the baseline the only change is that we append the experimental 
instructions by one additional page. The page contains selected information about 
unrelated groups who previously played this game – and players know that the 
information is actually taken from previous experiments. They are also told that the 
information is selective and that all players in their group receive the same 
information. The information we give is the development of mean contributions over 
time from four selected groups. Furthermore, we provide them with selected data 
about the number of persons choosing to contribute zero in the first, resp. in the last 
period, and the average amount of counter-punishment that was meted out in these 
experiments. The way this data is presented and the selection of the four groups are 
such that they constitute a positive (i.e. cooperative) impression in treatment FAV, 
while they constitute a negative (i.e. uncooperative) impression in treatment UNFAV.
5
  
Thus, the treatment manipulations allow us to study to what extent different contents 
of pre-play information affects behavior. 
 
Procedure: The experiments were run in two different locations, namely in London 
(UK) and Bonn (Germany). The baseline treatment was played in both locations. As 
will be seen below, the cooperation rates in the baseline treatment differ between 
these two locations. The observed cooperation rates in this environment are rather 
low in London, while they are rather high in Bonn .
6
 Taking advantage of this 
                                               
4
That is, if i assigns counter-punishment points to j, the specific costs of the counter-punishment points 
depend on the number of punishment points that i has assigned to j on stage two. For example, if i had 
already assigned four points to j on stage 2, assigning him a single counter-punishment point on stage 
three costs 3 tokens. Hence the costs of counter-punishment are given by C(pij+cpij)-C(pij). 
5The Appendix contains the exact wording of these two pages including the graphs, as well as a 
translation of the general instructions that were used in all treatments. 
6The corresponding data that we use for our baseline treatments BASEFAV and BASEUNFAV are taken 
from Nikiforakis (2008) and Beckenkamp, Engel et al. (2009), respectively. The data reported from 
treatments FAV and UNFAV were collected by us. They are novel and not reported elsewhere. We are 
thankful to Nikos Nikiforakis for providing us with his data.  
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observed variation between the two locations, we run treatment FAV in London and 
treatment UNFAV in Bonn. Consequently we refer to the London baseline as 
BASEFAV and to the Bonn baseline as BASEUNFAV. Apart from the difference in 
location and thus the language of the instructions, the procedure was as similar as 
possible in all treatments. 
 
All experiments were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects in 
Bonn were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The composition of subjects with 
respect to age, gender and field of studies was similar between locations and between 
treatments. Subjects were not allowed to participate in more than one treatment 
(between-subject design). When subjects arrived in the lab, they were seated in 
separate cubicles. The experimental instructions were then handed out to them and 
read out aloud. This was done to create common knowledge and to ensure that 
everybody had read and understood the instructions. Additionally, subjects had to 
take a quiz and could pose comprehension questions in private before the game 
started. The instructions were written in neutral language, avoiding potentially loaded 
terms like punishment or public good (cp. Appendix 1). 
 
After subjects had finished reading the instructions, in treatments FAV and UNFAV 
they were provided with the additional information sheet (cp. Appendix 3 and 4). 
Subjects were then randomly divided into groups of four and played the above 
described game repeatedly for ten consecutive periods. A partner protocol was used, 
i.e., the group composition stayed constant over the entire 10 periods of anonymous 
interaction. In the end, subjects were privately paid their cumulated earnings and left. 
 
We had 60 participants (3 sessions) in treatment FAV in the Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics at the University of Bonn in 2009. Participants received 
their accumulated earnings from the experiment (1 token = Euro 0.04) and an 
additional show-up fee of 5 Euro. On average, a session lasted 60 minutes and 
subjects earned Euro 14.46. The four sessions for treatment UNFAV were run in 2010 
at the experimental laboratory of Royal Holloway, University of London, UK. We 
used the same lab and recruited 64 students from the same subject pool as in 
Nikiforakis (2008). We also used the same software. Again, participants received 
their accumulated earnings from the experiment (1 token = 0.04 British Pounds). On 
average, a session lasted 60 minutes and subjects earned 9.06 Pounds. In the two 
baseline treatments, analogous procedures had been used. The datasets comprise 48 
subjects in BASEFAV and 68 participants in BASEUNFAV. Additional details on the 
84 
two baselines can be found in Nikiforakis (2008) and Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 
(2009), respectively. 
 
Behavioral Predictions: For rational, self-centered money maximizing players, the 
game at hand is a cooperation problem. Using backwards induction, it is 
straightforward that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is to contribute nothing 
to the public good at the first stage, and not to punish nor counter-punish at 
subsequent stages. This leads to an equilibrium payoff of 20 tokens per period and 
player. By contrast, the socially efficient outcome would be achieved if everyone 
contributed their entire endowment, in which case every player would earn 32 tokens 
per period. But in that case, each player would have an individual incentive to free-
ride on the others’ contributions, which would yield him a payoff of 44 tokens, ceteris 
paribus. Since we announce the number of periods, through unraveling this is also the 
prediction for the repeated game. The standard prediction of no cooperation not only 
holds true in the baseline treatment. Providing subjects with additional information 
about other groups does not change the equilibrium prediction. Therefore, with 
rational, self-centered money maximizing players we should not expect to observe 
different behavior in treatments FAV or UNFAV. 
 
By contrast, things might change as soon as we allow for social preferences, in 
particular if we expect a substantial fraction of the population to act as conditional 
cooperators. If conditional cooperators are sufficiently optimistic about the 
cooperativeness of their interaction partners, cooperation gives them higher utility 
than defection. Facing a public good, conditionally cooperative subjects should 
therefore base their decision on what they believe other subjects to do. The beliefs are 
likely to be related to other group members’ behavior in the previous period(s). Yet, 
upon the first encounter (in the first period), a conditional cooperator needs to form 
initial expectations of how others are likely to behave. This is where our treatment 
manipulation might make a difference. Pre-play information about other, unrelated 
groups might influence a participant in forming initial beliefs, which should then 
guide her first-period decision. If her (conditionally cooperative) group peers were 
also influenced by the selective pre-play information, then group contributions in the 
first period are likely to mirror the pre-play information. Her beliefs for the second 
period will thus be very similar again, and so will contributions be in the second 
period; and similarly in subsequent periods. In that case, we would expect to observe 
more cooperation in treatment FAV than in BASEFAV, and less cooperation in 




In the following, we will first briefly describe the results from the two baseline 
treatments BASEFAV and BASEUNFAV. As will be seen, observed cooperation rates 
are low in London while they are high in Bonn. Afterwards, we move on to show that 
the treatment manipulations have a substantial and significant influence on subject’s 
behavior. Compared to the respective baseline treatment, cooperation rates are lower 
in treatment UNFAV while they are higher in treatment FAV. As will be seen, this is 
likely to be driven by the change in first period’s contributions which, in turn, are 
sensitive to our manipulation of first impressions. In line with this, group’s behavior 
in the first period is strongly correlated with its future development, as we 
subsequently show. In the last subsection, additional experiments further underline 
our result by explicitly exploring how beliefs react to the treatment manipulations. 
 
BASELINES: 
Figure 1 shows the mean development of contributions over time in BASEFAV and 
BASEUNFAV. As can be seen, the environment in which subjects interact is complex 
and allows for different behavioral patterns.
7
 Without any manipulation, cooperation 
rates are rather low in London (BASEFAV). The mean contribution in BASEFAV is 
8.72. By contrast, subjects in Bonn (BASEUNFAV) display a high degree of 
cooperation. They contribute on average 16.45 to the public good. We therefore test 
in Bonn whether poor first impressions reduce the tendency to contribute much, and 
thereby trigger a vicious cycle. Conversely we test in London whether promising first 
impressions increase the willingness to give more initially, and thereby trigger a 
virtuous cycle. 
 
                                               
7While this observation, in particular the behavioral differences between locations, is interesting per 
se, here we do not want to elaborate on this point but would like to refer the interested reader to 
(Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 2009) for an extensive discussion. 
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Figure 1: Mean Contribution over time in BASEFAV and BASEUNFAV 
Notes: With 95% Confidence intervals around the period means. Group clustered standard errors. 
BASEFAV(Nikiforakis 2008) has 48 subjects (12 groups). BASEUNFAV(Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 2009) has 68 
subjects (17 groups). 
 
BREAKING WINDOWS: 
What happens if we provide subjects with additional information that conveys a 
negative pre-play impression? As can be seen in Figure 2, this experimental 
manipulation has a substantial effect on contributions. After “breaking the window” 
with an “experimental hammer”, behavior changes radically. Whereas in BASEUNFAV 
subjects choose full contribution in 60% (411/680) of all cases, in UNFAV they only 
do so in 20% (120/600) of all cases. Also at the opposite end of the contribution scale 
the effect is evident. In BASEUNFAV subjects only in 8.5% (58/680) of all cases 
contribute less than 5 tokens. With the treatment manipulation, this fraction grows to 
almost 32% (191/600). Overall, the mean contribution drops significantly from 16.45 
in BASEUNFAV down to 10.71 in UNFAV (Mann Whitney ranksum test, N = 32, 
p=0.0024, two-sided). Hence, our “experimental hammer” indeed creates 
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Zimbardo’s sledgehammer generated Bronx-like behavior in Palo Alto. Moreover, the 
effect is long-lasting: the initial manipulation of expectations still leads to 
considerably lower cooperation even after ten periods of interaction, i.e. after 9 
possible opportunities to revise expectations.  
 
 
Figure 2: Mean Contribution over time in BASEUNFAV and UNFAV 
Notes: With 95% Confidence intervals around the period means. Group clustered standard errors. BASEUNFAV 
(Beckenkamp, Engel et al. 2009) has 68 subjects (17 groups). UNFAV has 60 subjects (15 groups). 
 
FIXING WINDOWS: 
From a policy perspective, the opposite situation is even more interesting. Is the mere 
fact that one “repairs windows” enough to foster cooperation? To test this hypothesis, 
in treatment FAV we provide participants with favorable first impressions. Inspecting 
Figure 3, it is plain that repairing windows is less powerful than breaking them. 
Descriptively, once participants have seen graphs from groups that have cooperated 
successfully, they contribute more. Average contributions increase from 8.7 in 
BASEFAV to 12 in FAV. This increase of almost 40% is remarkable, though it falls 
short of being statistically significant (ranksum test, p=.1567, two-sided). Still, the 


























While cooperation is sustained in FAV, contribution rates quickly decline in 
BASEFAV. Consequently, from the second period on, mean contributions in BASEFAV 
are outside the 95% confidence interval of mean contributions in FAV after 
participants have seen graphs from cooperative groups. Contributions rise sharply for 
the first three periods. They then stay more or less stable until period six. There is a 
slight decay for the final periods. Compare this to the data from treatment BASEFAV. 
Contributions never rise. They decay from the fourth period on. This difference of 
trends is significant (Mann Whitney over means of first differences, N = 28, p = 
.0243). Our data thus suggests that fixing windows pays. The beneficial effect only 
takes longer to unfold. 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean Contribution over time in BASEFAV and FAV 
Notes: With 95% Confidence intervals around the period means. Group clustered standard errors. 
BASEFAV(Nikiforakis 2008) has 48 subjects (12 groups). FAV has 64 subjects (16 groups). 
 
INITIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT: 
How does this very simple and light-handed mechanism of providing subjects with 



























cooperation rate? If we take a closer look at our data, the answer to this question 
seems to be twofold.  
 
 
Figure 4: Initial contributions vs. future group development 
Notes: Every entry in the graph represents one specific 4-person group. There are 12 groups in BASEFAV, 17 in 
BASEUNFAV, 16 in FAV and 17 in UNFAV. “Later periods” refers to the mean contribution in periods 2 to 10. 
The 45 degree line depicts all points in which the average contribution in period 1 is identical to the average 
contribution in later periods. 
 
First, we find that in all treatments contribution behavior in period 1 significantly 
predetermines cooperativeness in later rounds. This can best be seen when we look at 
the development in individual groups. Figure 4 compares the average contribution to 
the public good in period 1 with the average contribution in periods 2 to 10. There is 
a clear correlation between initial and future cooperation. The correlation is strong 
and significant, over all treatments (Spearman’s rho=.6981, N = 60, p<.001) as well 
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Figure 5: Initial contributions to the public good 
Notes:BASEFAV has 48 subjects, BASEUNFAV 68, FAV 64, and UNFAV 60. 
 
Second, we observe that our experimental manipulation has a substantial effect on 
initial contributions to the public good (cp. Figure 5). In BASEUNFAV, 40% of 
subjects go for full contribution in the first period. Yet if they receive the unfavorable 
information in treatment UNFAV, only 16% do so. The mean contribution in the first 
period drops by almost 30%, from 13.64 in BASEUNFAV down to 9.78 in UNFAV; the 
difference being significant (ranksum test, p=.0007, two-sided). Our favorable 
manipulation does not have the same power. Our data suggest that “fixing windows” 
in an uncooperative environment is not as straightforward as breaking them in an 
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contribution in the first period only very slightly, from 10.35 in BASEFAV to 10.48 in 
FAV. This difference is not significant.  
 
Taken together, these two findings provide a possible explanation for the overall 
difference in cooperation that we observe between treatments. Contributions are path-
dependent, i.e., they depend on contributions in the first period. These first 
contributions, in turn, are apparently manipulable by our very simple mechanism 
(though the strength of this manipulation seems to be asymmetric). Thus, if people 
are provided with unfavorable information, i.e., if they observe “broken windows”, 
they start with low cooperation rates and also stay at low cooperation rates in the long 
run; favorable information at least makes it easier to sustain cooperation in the long 
run. This suggests that subjects seem to form an initial expectation about how others 
are likely to behave and base their decision on this expectation. The initial 
expectations then appear as some kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: The mere pre-game 
expectation of an uncooperative environment leads to an irrevocable loss of 
cooperation throughout the game (and vice versa). 
 
PRE-GAME EXPECTATIONS:  
To shed more light on the role of expectations, we subsequently ran additional 
experiments in 2010 at the Econ Lab of the University of Jena, Germany. In these 
experiments, subjects received exactly the same instructions and had to answer the 
same control questions as in the games above. However, instead of actually playing 
the game they were then told that these experiments had been conducted before. Their 
task was to guess how much those previous participants contributed on average to the 
common project in the first period (rounded to the next integer). Moreover, subjects 
had to state how confident they were in this expectation (on a Likert scale ranging 





Altogether, 96 subjects participated in these experiments. In the first treatment, 
subjects received the instructions from the baselines. In the second treatment, they 
received the instructions of treatment FAV. Finally in the third treatment they received 
the instructions of treatment UNFAV. 
                                               
8 In the belief elicitation stage, subjects had to guess a whole number between 0 and 20. If the guess 
was exactly correct, they received 4 Euros. If the guess was wrong, they received 0 Euros. The 




Fig. 6 –Beliefs and Confidence 
Notes:Base has 48 subjects, FAV and UNFAV have 24 subjects respectively. The bars denote the share of subjects 
in a given treatment expressing a certain belief. The dashed lines represent linear prediction plots for the subjects’ 
self-reported Confidence (with 95% confidence intervals). Confidence is measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (“I am very unsure”) to 7 (“I am very sure”). 
 
As Fig. 6 shows, the information manipulation has a strong effect on beliefs. In Base, 
subjects expect the first period’s contribution to be 10.27 on average. The belief drops 
to 8.04 in UNFAV, i.e. if they know that participants received the unfavorable 
information sheet. The difference is significant (ranksum test, p=0.0472, two-sided). 
By contrast, the average belief increases from 10.27 to 12.96 in FAV. Again, the 
difference is significant (ranksum test, p=0.0054, two-sided). 
 
Mean confidence does not vary significantly across treatments. Interestingly however, 
as can be seen in Fig. 6, in each treatment confidence is negatively correlated with 
beliefs. Subjects with a relatively pessimistic view of other’s cooperativeness are 
considerably more confident than those with optimistic beliefs. This pattern is 
significant and very robust
9
 and might give us an indication for why actual 
contributions react strongly to negative selective information, but only cautiously to 
positive selective information. The less confident optimistic beliefs might be more 
prone to external manipulation than the more confident pessimistic beliefs. 
 
                                               
9Log-Level OLS regression of ln(confidence) on belief. A 1-point increase in beliefs corresponds on 
average to a 2 % decrease in confidence (p=0.004). This result is robust to adding treatment dummies, 
changing the functional form to Level-Level or Log-Log, or running a Tobit. 
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Taken together, the additional experiments provide further evidence for the above 
interpretation of our results from the repeated public-good game. If people face a 
cooperation problem and observe “broken windows”, they strongly expect that others 
are not likely to cooperate, so they themselves also do not cooperate. By contrast, if 
“windows are fixed”, they believe that others might cooperate, but at the same time 
acknowledge the cooperation dilemma. Thus, they are not very confident in their 
expectation. This translates into only intermediate rates of cooperation – though this 
seemingly suffices to at least sustain cooperation over time.  
V. Discussion 
In this paper, we have explored whether cooperative behavior reacts to selective pre-
play information about other, unrelated groups. To this end, we have used an 
experimental framework that captures cooperation situations which are sufficiently 
rich, so that several potentially conflicting behavioral norms might emerge. We find 
that the aggregate level of cooperativeness is dramatically reduced by giving subjects 
examples of uncooperative behavior. The opposite intervention was less powerful, 
but still effective. If participants in an otherwise uncooperative environment saw 
examples of successful groups, cooperation rates were stabilized, while they quickly 
decayed otherwise. A likely reason for these findings is that cooperation is path-
dependent, i.e., long-run behavior is strongly correlated with initial contribution rates 
– which, in turn, are a reaction to the pre-play information given to the subjects. The 
latter might be due to a change in subjects’ expectations about others’ behavior, as 
was suggested by our additional experiments.  
 
Our findings have a number of important implications. First, they clearly point to the 
relevance of pre-game communication – a factor which has only lately started to 
receive significant attention in the literature. While the existing literature usually 
focuses on self-chosen cheap talk messages (for an overview, see Crawford 1998), we 
demonstrate that also exogenously selected, one-way information about other players 
can alter how players act in subsequent games. In particular the findings of our 
second series of experiments might be of interest to this literature. They suggest a 
possible channel through which the observed effects of cheap talk are mediated, 
namely through the alteration of subjects’ pre-game expectations. 
 
Second, and closely related, is our finding that there seems to be a strong asymmetry 
in the strength of the reaction to the mechanism. By giving subjects examples of 
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uncooperative behavior, the aggregate level of cooperativeness is immediately 
reduced. By contrast, optimistic foreign experiences need time to unfold their 
beneficial effect. Bad impressions carry more weight than good ones, so that creating 
bad behavior is seemingly easier than producing good one – a finding which is also 
mirrored in previous work on the prevalence of “bad” vs. “good” (cf. Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky et al. 2001). Thus, one might expect that also other mechanisms which 
build on the manipulation of beliefs perform differently, depending on the content of 
the experience as well as on the specific environment in which they occur. 
 
Taken together, our results underline the power and importance of information and 
experience in shaping cooperative behavior. The bottom line is that observation 
matters. Interestingly, people do not only learn from what they experience 
themselves. They also seem to learn “vicariously”, by observing others, or by seeing 
the results (Bandura 1977). The effect is even present when participants are told that 
the information they are receiving is selective. This connects our study with the 
growing literature on social learning (for a recent meta-study see Weizsäcker 2010). 
Our subjects’ behavior critically depends on pre-game expectations, which we show 
to be easy to deteriorate in a complex setting – simply by providing subjects the 
opportunity of vicarious learning.  
 
This suggests that, in appropriate circumstances, impression management might 
indeed be a feasible tool to avert, or at least to mitigate, the danger of social 
dilemmas. Of course this is a paternalistic intervention. But note that conditional 
cooperators need not even be deceived for the intervention to be successful. All that is 
required is that they expect the manipulation to matter for a sufficient fraction of the 
remaining members of their group, be that because they are deceived, or because they 
are skeptical themselves, but willing to give cooperation a try since the intervention 
gives all of them one and the same informational starting point. 
 
For policy makers these findings represent both a chance and a peril. If they do not 
manage to repair broken windows quickly, both literally and metaphorically 
speaking, chances are a vicious cycle starts. By contrast, if they can induce some to 
lead others by their socially beneficial example, this strategy may well work. In 
particular, policy makers would want to prevent (perhaps wrong) pessimistic beliefs 
from spreading. In any case, we show that home-grown expectations must not be 
disregarded in order to attain socially desirable outcomes. Consequently in situations 
where the success of a law depends on the willingness of individual citizens to 
 
95 
cooperate – for instance in areas like waste separation and sustainable water use – 
government might want to consider a PR campaign in order to create a general 
atmosphere of cooperativeness within the population.  
 
Managing first impressions might certainly be less effective if the large majority of 
addressees know better. The intervention requires a sufficient degree of uncertainty. 
Yet in political reality, quite a few public goods are characterized by deep conceptual 
and factual uncertainty. Problems like climate change are heavily contested among 
scientists and not well understood by many. Addressees have to trust expertise. If in 
the eyes of addressees the underlying social problem is opaque, they are also likely to 
be uncertain how others will react to it. Most importantly, addressees face behavioral 
uncertainty whenever they newly enter a community. They do not know local mores, 
nor do they know how determined the group is when it comes to enforcing them.  
 
The results in this paper should, of course, not be taken as arguments against the 
importance of elaborated, incentives-altering mechanisms in general. For instance, 
the effectiveness of our very simple mechanism seems to be asymmetric, since it has 
a hard time to increase cooperation in an otherwise uncooperative environment. Still, 
our findings suggest that minimal interventions can have a strong behavioral effect. 
Future research could try to explore the interaction between such simple and other, 
more complex and intrusive mechanisms. Besides, it might also be informative to 
study in more detail if certain player “types” (like selfish actors, conditional 
cooperators, or altruists) are affected differently by mechanisms in the spirit of the 
one presented here. It is even conceivable that such interventions change the 
preferences of certain players. Another important, though challenging, next step 
would certainly be to move into the field and to investigate the effectiveness of means 
to foster cooperation in a more natural setup. Extending on our work allows for 
studying these and other interesting aspects in the future.  
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Appendix 1: Instructions Baseline 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore important 
that you take your time to understand the instructions. 
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are for your private information. Please do not 
communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions 
please ask us. 
 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Pounds, but of Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Your 
entire earnings will be calculated in ECUs. At the end of the experiment the total amount of ECUs you 
have earned will be converted to Pounds at the rate of 1 ECU = 4 p and will be immediately paid to 
you in cash. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment the participants will be randomly divided into groups of four. You 
will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The composition of each group will remain the 






 stage:  
 
At the beginning of each of the 10 periods each participant will receive 20 ECUs. In the following, we 
shall refer to this amount as the “endowment”. In the 1st stage, your task is to decide how to use your 
endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 ECUs you want to contribute to a project (from 0 
to 20) and how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are  
explained in detail below. 
 
Once all the players have decided their contribution to the project you will be informed about, the 
group’s total contribution, your income from the project and your payoff in this period. Your payoff in 
each period is calculated using the following simple formula. Again, if you have any difficulties do not 
hesitate to ask us. 
 





= Endowment of 
ECUs  
 
– Your contribution to 
the Project 
+ 0.4*Total contribution to 
the Project 
 
This formula shows that your 1st stage income consists of two parts: 
1) The ECUs which you have kept for yourself (endowment – contribution)  
2) The income from the project, which equals to the 40% of the group’s total contribution. 
 
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way. This means that 
each group member receives the same income from the project. Suppose the sum of the contributions 
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of all group members are 60 ECUs. In this case, each member of the group receives an income from 
the project of: 0.4*60=24 ECUs. If the total contribution to the project is 9 points, then each member 
of the group receives an income of: 0.4*9=3.6 ECUs from the project.  
 
You always have the option of keeping the ECUs for yourself or contributing them to the project. Each 
ECU that you keep raises your end of period income by 1 ECU. Supposing you contributed this point 
to the project instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by 1 ECUs. Your income 
from the project would thus rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECUs. However, the income of the other group 
members would also rise by 0.4 ECUs each, so that the total income of the group from the project 
would be 1.6 points. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of the other 
group members. On the other hand you also earn an income for each point contributed by the other 
members to the project. In particular, for each point contributed by any member you earn 0.4 ECUs. 
 
In addition to the 20 ECUs per period, each participant receives a one-off lump sum payment of 25 
ECUs at the beginning of this part. This one-off payment can be used to pay for eventual losses during 
the experiment. However, you can always evade losses with certainty through your own decisions. 
Note that this lump sum payment will not be used to calculate the income from the period. It will only 






At the 2nd stage you will be informed how much each group member contributed individually to the 
project at the 1st stage. At this stage you can reduce or leave equal the income of each member of 
your group by distributing points. The other group members can also reduce your income if they wish 
to. 
 
If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change his or her income. However if 
you give a member 1 point you reduce his or her income by 10 percent. If you give a member 2 points 
you reduce his or her income by 20 percent, etc. The amount of points you distribute to each member 
determines, therefore, how much you reduce their income from the 1st stage. If one player receives in 
total 4 points his income will be reduced by 40% and if he receives 10 or more his income from the 1st 
stage will be reduced by 100%. 
 
If you distribute points you have costs in ECUs, which depend on the amount of points you distribute. 
You can distribute between 0 and 10 points to each group member. The more points you give to any 
group member, the higher your costs. Your total costs are equal to the sum of the costs of distributing 
points to each of the other three group members. The following table illustrates the relation 
between distributed points to each group member and the cost of doing so in ECUs. 
 
 
Points 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost of points per 
person 
0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
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Example: Supposing you give 2 points to player 1 this costs you 2 ECUs; if you also give 8 points to 
player 3 this costs you a further 20 ECUs; and if you give 0 points to the last group member this has no 
additional cost for you. In this case, your total costs of distributing points would be 22 ECUs (2+20+0) 
and not 30 ECUs.  
 
The following equation summarizes the previous information. Your total income from the two stages is 
calculated as follows: 
 




= Income from the 
1st stage 
 
* [(10 – received 
points)/10] 
– Costs of distributed 
points 
 
Please note that your income in ECUs at the end of the 2nd and the 3rd stage can be negative, if the 
costs of your points distributed exceeds your (possibly reduced) income from the 1st stage. You can 
however evade such losses with certainty through your own decisions. Should your income 
become zero or negative at the end of the 2nd stage you will not be able to continue to the 3rdstage. If 
your income becomes zero or negative at the end of the 3rd stage you can simply use your 25 ECUs 





 stage:  
 
In the 3rd and final stage, after being informed of the points that the other group members assigned to 
you, you will be given one last opportunity of assigning points back to the other participants, thus 
reducing their income. We shall call these points “counter-points”. You will only be able to assign 
counter-points to participants who assigned points to you during the 2
nd
 stage  
 
The costs of assigning points, as well as the income reduction caused by each point remain the same as 




Example: if you distribute 2 points in the 2ndstage to player 1 you have a cost of 2 ECUs If in the 3rd 
stage you decide to distribute 3 counter-points to player 1, a further 7 ECUs are added to your cost. 
 
Your income after the 3rd stage (= period income) is therefore calculated as follows: 
 




= Income from the 
2nd stage 
 
* [(10 – received counter-
points)/10] 
– Cost of distributed 
counter-points 
 
If you have any further questions please raise your hand and one of the supervisors 
Costs for assigning counter-points to one specific group member in the 3rd stage 
Points that you already 
assigned to one specific group 
member in the 2nd stage 
Counter-points you assign to that same group member in the 3rd 
stage 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30 
1 0 1 3 5 8 11 15 19 24 29  
2 0 2 4 7 10 14 18 23 28   
3 0 2 5 8 12 16 21 26    
4 0 3 6 10 14 19 24     
5 0 3 7 11 16 21      
6 0 4 8 13 18       
7 0 4 9 14        
8 0 5 10         
9 0 5          
10 0           
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Appendix 2: Control Questionnaire 
 
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. Nobody (including you) contributes any 
ECUs to the project. What is:  
a. Your income at the end of the first stage?  ………  
b. The income of the other group members?……… 
 
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 20 ECUs to the project. All 
other group members contribute 20 ECUs each to the project. What is:  
a. Your income at the end of the first stage?  ………  
b. The income of the other group members?……… 
 
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. The other three group members contribute 
together a total of 30 ECUs to the project. What is: 
a. Your income at the end of the first stage if you contribute 0 ECUs to the project? ……….  
b. Your income at the end of the first stage if you contribute 15 ECUs to the project? ……….  
 
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 8 ECUs to the project. What 
is:  
a. Your income at the end of the first stage if the other group members together contribute a 
further total of 7 ECUs to the project?............... 
b. Your income at the end of the first stage if the other group members together contribute a 
further total of 22 ECUs to the project?............... 
 
5. At the second stage you distribute the following points to your three other group members: 9, 5, 0. 
What are the total costs of your distributed points?…. 
 
6. What are your costs if you distribute 0 points? ……   
 
7. By how many percent will your income from the first stage be reduced when you receive from the 
other group members a total of:  
a. 0 points? …  
b. 4 points? ...  
c. 15 points? …   
 
8. At the second stage you distribute the following points to your three other group members: 2, 2, 0. 
In the third stage you distribute the following points to your three other group members: 1, 1, 1. 
What are the total costs of your distributed points?…. 
 
9. By how many per cent is your second stage income reduced, if you have received the sum of 3 
counter-points from the other group members in stage 3? 
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Appendix 3: Additional Sheet FAV Treatment 
 
Additional information for today’s experiment 
 
This experiment has already been run at two laboratories in Bonn (Germany) and London (UK). The 




In these selected graphs you see how much the 4 group members contributed on average to the group 
project. In the selected groups 1 and 2 the contributions are high right from the beginning. In the 
selected groups 3 and 4, average contribution starts somewhat lower but rises over the course of the 
experiment. 
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a) In the first round of the two previous experiments, 58% to 74% of the contributions were 
between 10 and 20. 
b) In the last round, up to 53% of the contributions were equal to 20. 
c) Players, whose income was reduced in stage 2, only used counter-points in stage 3 in 29% to 
41% of all possible cases. 
 
All these graphs and numbers are meant to give you some orientation concerning the type of situation 




Appendix 4: Additional Sheet UNFAV Treatment 
 
Additional information for today’s experiment 
 
This experiment has already been run at two laboratories in Bonn (Germany) and London (UK). The 




In these selected graphs you see how much the 4 group members contributed on average to the group 
project. In the selected groups 1 and 2 the contributions are rather low and display a decrease over the 
course of the experiment. In the selected groups 3 and 4, average contributions are low right from the 
beginning 
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a) In the first round of the two previous experiments, 37% to 55% of the contributions were 
between 0 and 10. 
b) In the last round, up to 52% of the contributions were equal to 0. 
c) Players, whose income was reduced in stage 2, only used counter-points in stage 3 to reduce 
the income of those who had given them points in stage 2. Every time they used counter-
points they reduced the income of those who had given them points in stage 2 by 18% to 
25%. 
 
All these graphs and numbers are meant to give you some orientation concerning the type of situation 





Appendix 5: Belief Elicitation 
As noted in the main text, subjects in the belief elicitation had to read the same instructions and answer 
the same control questions as the participants in the contribution treatments. However, once ztree 
started subjects were told the following on their screens: 
 
You have just read the instructions and answered the control questions. This game has already been 
played in other laboratories. The participants of those experiments read the same instructions as you 
and answered the same control questions. You are not going to play this game today. Instead, your task 
is to answer the following question: 
 
What do you think, how much did those previous participants contribute on average in the first round 




We have rounded the average down to the next whole number, i.e. the correct answer is a whole 
number between 0 and 20. If you guess is exactly correct, you will receive 4 Euros. If your guess is 
wrong, you will receive 0 Euros. 
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Appendix 6: Additional Data Analysis 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Punishment and Counter-punishment across 
Treatments 
    
BASEFAV BASEUNFAV FAV UNFAV 
(1) Punishment 0.65 0.35 0.92 0.51 
(2) Counter-punishment 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.23 
(3) Counter-punishment (conditional) 0.72 0.78 0.59 1.06 
Notes: All figures are means of (counter-)punishment points given per period and subject. (3) is conditional on 
subjects being able to allocate counter-punishment. Subjects could only allocate counter-punishment in stage 3 
if they had been punished in stage 2. 
 
Parametric Analysis 
We have participants interacting over 10 announced periods in fixed groups of four. 
Moreover all our data is right-censored since many participants contribute their entire 
endowment of 20. Most of our data is also left-censored in that a substantial fraction 
has kept the entire endowment. The ideal functional form would therefore be a mixed 
Tobit model. Unfortunately, such a model is not available. Random effects Tobit 
would ignore that observations within groups are not independent. A linear mixed 
model would ignore that observations are censored. We therefore estimate Tobit 
models, with lower level 0 and upper level 20, and correct standard errors via 
bootstrapping, with resampling at the level of entire groups. All models work with 50 
repetitions, which is known to be sufficient for correcting standard errors. 
 
In the comparison between BASEUNFAV and UNFAV, a non-parametric bootstrap 
(resampling pairs of dependent and independent variables) yields significant effects. 
We therefore do not report results from a (semi-)parametric bootstrap resampling 
residuals (for background see Cameron and Trivedi 2005:360 f.), nor from „wild“ 
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bootstrapping, which randomly assigns error terms using the procedure developed by 
(Wu 1986; Mammen 1993), using the parameters proposed by (Cameron and Trivedi 
2005:377); unsurprisingly, showing significance becomes even easier if one relies on 
these methods. By contrast, these more advanced methods make a difference in the 
comparison between BASEFAV and FAV, which is why we report all three estimates. 
Since we only use bootstrapping for correcting standard errors for the dependence of 
observations, parametric bootstrapping is justified. 
 
In the comparison of BASEUNFAV with UNFAV, in all models we find a strong and 
highly significant negative effect of the belief manipulation. There is no time trend, 
and no interaction between time and treatment. By contrast, punishment has a highly 
significant negative main effect: those who have been punished in the previous period 
still contribute less than the group average in the subsequent period. This holds 
irrespective of the belief manipulation, as shown by the insignificance of the 
interaction effect. 
 
Table A2: Comparing BASEUNFAV with UNFAV 
Dependent variable: Contribution 





















































Note: Tobit, with lower level 0 and upper level 20. Models correct for the dependence of observations per 
individual and within groups by bootstrapping, with random draws of entire groups. A non-parametric 
bootstrap is administered, i.e. pairs of dependent and their independent variables are randomly selected. p-
values in parenthesis. N = 1152. 95 left censored, 494 right censored observations. 
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In the comparison of BASEFAV with FAV we get a different picture. We have a 
positive main effect of the belief manipulation in all models. But it is significant only 
with wild bootstrapping (models 1, 2, 4), and weakly significant with model 4 (which 
controls for lagged received punishment).  There is, however, a significant interaction 
between the treatment and the time trend in model 3. It also is present in wild 
bootstrapping in models 5 and 6 at conventional significance levels, and it is weakly 
significant with alternative bootstrapping methodologies. This indicates that the belief 
manipulation stops contributions from quickly eroding. In models 4 and 5, we also 
find the negative effect of lagged received punishment, as in the comparison of 




Table A3: Comparing Basefav with fav 
Dependent variable: Contribution 



































































































Note: Tobit with lower level 0 and upper level 20. Models correct for the dependence of observations per 
individual and within groups by bootstrapping, with random draws of entire groups. We compare three different 
bootstrapping techniques, with p-values in parenthesis and in the following order: non-parametric; parametric 










Follow the crowd or my conscience? 










In a modified dictator game, I test experimentally the robustness of social preferences to (1) 
information about others’ behavior and (2) self-reflection about the morally right behavior. I 
find that whereas information has virtually no effect, self-reflection changes social 
preferences substantially. Information does have, however, a strong effect on people’s moral 
judgments. Interestingly, since people differ with respect to their normative goals (social 
welfare vs. equality), self-reflection leads to more heterogeneity of preferences as subjects’ 
home-grown normative concerns are reinforced. The results can be well explained within the 





Keywords: Social Norms, Morality, Conformity, Identity, Social Preferences, 
Information, Dictator Game, Experiment 
 





I love competing. Whenever I play basketball with my brother, it is a really hard 
fight. None of us wants to lose. So we play tough defense, hustle for every ball and 
do not shy away from fouling each other. How does it come then that when I play 
basketball with my little nephew, I do not defend, do not hustle and do not foul? 
Well, I am not supposed to do so. I am supposed to let him win. In their recent book, 
Akerlof & Kranton (2010) reason that the crucial difference between two such 
situations are norms. Playing against my brother, I am subject to a different set of 
norms than playing against my little nephew. As a consequence my identity changes; 
I do not perceive myself as a competitor but rather as a playfellow. This in turn 
changes my preferences. While I very much enjoy winning against my brother, I 
would actually feel bad if I won against my little nephew. 
 
The concept of identity utility proposed by Akerlof & Kranton (2000 and 2010) 
captures exactly such preference changes due to contextual shifts of the relevant 
norms. This contrasts sharply with the predominant notion in modern economics that 
preferences are inherent characteristics of the individual. Notably, the literature on 
social preferences (Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Bolton & Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni & 
Miller 2002, Charness & Rabin 2002) acknowledges that different people might have 
different preferences for distributive justice but it does not allow the same people to 
vary their preferences from one situation to another as a result of a change in the 
relevant norms. 
 
In most everyday situations we know which norm applies and adapt our behavior 
automatically and unconsciously. But often, we face new situations and do not know 
what the right behavior is. We find guidance in norms. There are two distinct sources 
from which to deduce a norm. Externally, by watching how others behave 
(“conformity”), and internally, by reflecting what oneself would judge as ideal 
behavior (“morality”). Conformity requires information about others’ behavior. 
Morality requires self-reflection about one’s own moral standards.  
 
While the idea of self-reflection is rather strange to modern economics, it is not new 
to the discipline. In fact, it can be traced back to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (Smith 1790), who in turn was inspired by the religious concept of 
conscience. In the context of simple dictator games Bicchieri & Xiao (2009) and 
Krupka & Weber (2009) show that both information and self-reflection may influence 
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giving behavior. This paper is the first to study the effect of information and self-
reflection on the broader spectrum of social preferences.  
 
The experimental paradigm used is a modified dictator game (MDG). The MDG asks 
participants for their preferences in a 2x2 world: you are either richer or poorer than 
the other player; you can either create income for the other player or destroy it. A 
MDG in a university lab is clearly not an everyday situation. It thus seems plausible 
to assume that participants have doubts about the normatively appropriate behavior, 
which is exactly where normative guidance becomes relevant. In the experimental 
treatments, subjects are guided externally, by giving them information about 
representative behavior of previous participants (“Info treatment”), and internally, by 
asking them to make a moral judgment prior to their incentivized choice (“Reflect 
treatment”). 
 
Previous studies with similar games (see most recently Iriberri & Rey 2011) show 
that most people who deviate from material selfishness are guided by either social 
welfare or equality concerns. The results of this experimental study suggest that self-
reflection pushes preferences further away from selfishness and towards one of those 
two norms. When they are richer than the other player, subjects in the Reflect 
treatment create considerably more income for the other player than in the Baseline. 
Strikingly, when deciders are poorer than recipients, self-reflection makes preferences 
more heterogeneous. While subjects concerned with social welfare create more, 
equality seeking players destroy more. On the other hand, information has virtually 
no effect on revealed social preferences. It does however have a strong effect on 
participants’ moral judgments.  
 
The next section introduces the experimental design. Subsequently, I discuss the 
related theoretical and experimental literature and derive behavioral predictions. 
Section four presents the experimental results. Section five concludes the paper. 
II. Experimental Design 
The Baseline is a modified dictator game (MDG) similar to the one of Iriberri & Rey 
(2011). It is meant to elicit social preferences according to the social utility function 
by Charness & Rabin (2002). Utility according to Charness & Rabin is a weighted 
average of my own payoff and the payoff of another person. The weight for the other 
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person’s income is called ρ when my payoff is larger than hers and σ when my payoff 
is smaller: 
            (         if               (1) 
            (         if               (2) 
 
This utility function distinguishes four behavioral types. Selfish players, who are only 
interested in their own material payoff, have      . Social welfare maximizers 
are characterized by both positive   and positive  . Equality maximizers, who like 
the payoff difference between themselves and other people to be small, are described 
by a positive   and negative  . Finally, players who strive to increase the payoff 
difference between themselves and other persons, so-called competitive types, are 
characterized by negative   and negative  .  
 
More generally, I prefer an allocation B to an allocation A if    
     
 . Assume I 
am richer than the other person.
1
 Inserting (1) and rearranging one obtains: 
    
      
   ((   
      
   (      
         
      (3) 
 
which can be rewritten as: 
       (                 (4) 
 
Fixing         the parameter space reduces to the four situations depicted in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Parameter Space of the MDG 
                       
             
  
         
     
  
         
   
             
  
         
     
  
         
   
 
                                               
1 If I am poorer than the other person,   is replaced by  . 
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The MDG devotes one decision panel to each of these four situations. This is 
illustrated in Table 2. In the two panels on the left, the decider’s payoff is always 
higher than the recipient’s (          ) whereas in the two right-hand panels it is 
the other way around (          ). In the two upper panels the decider can create 
income for the recipient (            ) at a fixed cost of 10 tokens whereas in 
the two lower panels she can destroy (          ) the recipient’s income at fixed 
cost of 10. There are nine decision tasks per panel. In each task the decider has to 
choose between Option A and Option B, specifying two different payoff allocations 
for the decider and the corresponding recipient. Option A is the same for every task 
within a given panel. Option B creates or destroys income of the recipient. Take for 
example task 1 of the Ahead-Create panel. If the decider chooses Option A she 
receives 170 tokens and the recipient 70 tokens and if she chooses Option B she gets 
160 and the recipient 82.  
 
In every panel the relative price of creating/destroying decreases with every task. In 
task 1, the decider has to give up 10 tokens to create/destroy 12 tokens whereas in 
task 9 for the same cost the decider creates/destroys 84 tokens. Consequently, 
choosing Option B in task 1 and Option A in task 2 of the same panel would violate 
the General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (Afriat 1967, Varian 1982). In the MDG, 
a GARP-consistent decider should have at most one switch from Option A to Option 
B per panel, and no switch from B to A. In addition, consistency requires players not 
to both create and destroy when they are ahead (or behind). If these consistency 
requirements are met, the   and   of a given decider are defined by the point at which 
she switches from Option A to Option B.  
 
For example, a player who chooses Option A in the first 3 tasks of the Ahead-Create 
panel and Option B in the remaining 6 tasks, would have            . The same 
player might then for instance choose always Option A in the Ahead-Destroy panel 
and in the Behind-Create panel but then switch to Option B in task 7 of the Behind-
Destroy panel. This would yield              . The type classification is 
straightforward: Selfish players will never choose Option B since this is costly. Social 
Welfare Maximizers will create income for the recipient both when ahead and when 
behind as long as the relative price of creating is low enough. Equality maximizers 
will also create when ahead but destroy when behind. Competitive types will destroy 
recipients’ income no matter whether they are ahead or behind. 
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 =170,       
 =70    






Task    
        
                   
        
                
1 160 82 -10 12 0.45 100 132 -10 12 0.45 
2 160 84 -10 14 0.42 100 134 -10 14 0.42 
3 160 88 -10 18 0.36 100 138 -10 18 0.36 
4 160 94 -10 24 0.29 100 144 -10 24 0.29 
5 160 102 -10 32 0.24 100 152 -10 32 0.24 
6 160 112 -10 42 0.19 100 162 -10 42 0.19 
7 160 124 -10 54 0.16 100 174 -10 54 0.16 
8 160 138 -10 68 0.13 100 188 -10 68 0.13 
9 160 154 -10 84 0.11 100 204 -10 84 0.11 
     
 =140,       
 =130    








Task    
        
                   
        
                
1 130 118 -10 -12 -5.00 80 168 -10 -12 -5.00 
2 130 116 -10 -14 -2.50 80 166 -10 -14 -2.50 
3 130 112 -10 -18 -1.25 80 162 -10 -18 -1.25 
4 130 106 -10 -24 -0.71 80 156 -10 -24 -0.71 
5 130 98 -10 -32 -0.45 80 148 -10 -32 -0.45 
6 130 88 -10 -42 -0.31 80 138 -10 -42 -0.31 
7 130 76 -10 -54 -0.23 80 126 -10 -54 -0.23 
8 130 62 -10 -68 -0.17 80 112 -10 -68 -0.17 
9 130 46 -10 -84 -0.14 80 96 -10 -84 -0.14 
Note: To ensure that stakes are comparable across panels, every panel has approximately the same average pie 






(     
          
 )  
 
 
(     
          
 ))    . Ahead-Create has 127 tokens, Ahead-Destroy 
123, Behind-Create 122, and Behind-Destroy 123. 
 
In the Baseline, after reading the experimental instructions (see Appendix A), one 
half of the subjects is randomly allotted the role of decider and the other half the role 
of recipient. On their computer screens, subjects are informed about their role in the 
experiment. Every decider is then shown on the computer screen, successively, the 
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four decision panels in which she has to choose her preferred allocation (Option A or 
Option B) for each of the MDG’s 36 tasks, thereby determining their own payoffs 
and the payoffs of the corresponding recipients. 
 
The Info treatment provides subjects with opportunity to consider external normative 
guidance. After reading the instructions, subjects are informed that the game has been 
run before with more than 100 deciders. When playing the MDG they see on their 





The Reflect treatment nudges subjects to look for internal normative guidance. After 
reading the instructions but before allotting the roles of decider and recipient, subjects 
are asked for their moral judgments. Specifically, they have to state for each of the 36 
tasks the will be seeing in the MDG: “Which of the two Options (A or B) do you find 
morally right?” The instructions on the computer screen make it clear that the 
answers to this question are not payoff relevant and will not be revealed to other 
participants. Hereafter, subjects are allotted their roles and play the payoff-relevant 
MDG. When playing the MDG they see on their screens for each of the 36 tasks their 
own moral judgments. 
 
The experiment was conducted at the EconLab in Bonn, Germany with a total of 544 
participants (272 deciders). There were 304 participants (152 deciders) in the 
Baseline, 144 (72) in the Info treatment, and 96 (48) in the Reflect treatment. Subjects 
were recruited randomly per email from a pool of more than 5000 people, using the 
software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was computerized in ztree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the experiment after the 
computer had randomly selected one payoff-relevant task out of each of the four 
decision panels. The exchange rate was 100 tokens = € 1. The experiment lasted on 
average 20 minutes and participants earned on average € 6 (ca. US$ 8). 
III. Related Literature and Behavioral Predictions 
Iriberri & Rey (2010 and 2011) present a similar MDG to elicit social preferences. 
The two main differences are that, first, Iriberri & Rey have deciders choose between 
three options (selfish vs. create vs. destroy) while in this experiment they only choose 
                                               
2 See Appendix C for the exact percentages in every decision task. 
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between two (selfish vs. create/destroy) and, second, Iriberri & Rey present the tasks 
randomly whereas I sort them into four panels and within every panel by the relative 
price of creating/destroying. The present design aims for subjects’ to make choices 
that are deliberate and conscious and not due to confusion or cognitive overload. As a 
consequence, it should thus be easier for subjects to choose their answers consistent 
with the GARP. A problem with the data of Iriberri & Rey is that less than half of the 
subjects’ preferences can be elicited directly from the data since answers are not 
consistent. As a consequence, Iriberri & Rey have to rely heavily on maximum 
likelihood estimation, and in many instances subjects’ social preferences cannot be 
clearly determined. 
 
Just as Iriberri & Rey, I measure people’s social preferences according to the model 
of Charness & Rabin (2002). There are some reasons to prefer Charness & Rabin 
over other models of social preferences discussed in the literature. The model of 
Charness & Rabin is functionally equivalent to Fehr & Schmidt (1999) but Charness 
& Rabin place fewer restrictions on the range of plausible parameter values than Fehr 
& Schmidt.
3
 As a result Charness & Rabin can also accommodate social welfare 
maximizing and competitive types besides the selfish and equality maximizing (i.e. 
inequality averse) types of Fehr & Schmidt. Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) propose a 
slightly different conceptualization of equality concerns, which focuses on relative 
payoff differences instead of absolute differences like Fehr & Schmidt and Charness 
& Rabin. But just as Fehr & Schmidt their model does not allow for social welfare 
concerns. 
 
Andreoni & Miller (2002) introduce a more general functional form for social 
preferences. Their constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function not only allows 
    and         to be perfect substitutes, as both Fehr & Schmidt and Charness & 
Rabin assume, but also Leontief, Cobb-Douglas and many other.
4
 However, the 
increase in generality comes along with an additional free parameter (i.e. the 
elasticity of substitution) that needs to be estimated empirically and might vary 
                                               
3 One can simply rewrite (1) as          (            and (2) as           (       
     and replace      and     . Whereas Fehr & Schmidt assume       , Charness & 
Rabin allow   to be negative (competitive types). Similarly, while Fehr & Schmidt assume     , 
Charness & Rabin allow   to be positive (social welfare maximizers). 
4 Using the same terminology as above, social utility according to Andreoni & Miller can be written 
as:     (       
  (        
  
 
 ⁄ . For     the expression simplifies to Charness & Rabin. 
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substantially across individuals. To fit Andreoni & Miller with a similar MDG we 
would need numerous additional decision tasks. 
 
An alternative and very promising way to elicit people’s social preferences is 
proposed by Fisman et al. (2007). They use a graphical interface to confront subjects 
with 50 different allocation problems in which deciders have to choose a point on a 
two-dimensional graph that represents a budget set. On the one hand the Fisman et al. 
(2007) approach is clearly superior to both Iriberri & Rey and this paper’s. When a 
subject chooses Option A over B (over C) we can deduce that she prefers A over one 
(two) other possible allocations. But when a subject chooses a specific point on a 
two-dimensional budget set we can deduce that she prefers that specific allocation to 
all other feasible allocations in the given budget set. However, for the purpose of this 
paper it is critical that the experimental paradigm allows conveying aggregate 
information about others’ behavior. In this study’s game, subjects are shown 
percentages, which are easily understood. In the graphical interface of Fisman et al. 
similar information would be much harder to convey. 
 
This study is the first to connect the literature on social preferences with the recent 
literature on social norms and morality (see for instance Krupka & Weber 2009, 
Bicchieri & Xiao 2009, Dal Bo & Dal Bo 2009). Both those strands of the literature 
are interested in explaining why people deviate from selfishness. But the two 
approaches are rather different. The literature on social preferences describes people’s 
concern for others as an individual trait. There might be substantial heterogeneity 
between individuals; some people care for social welfare, some people care for 
equality, some do not care for others at all. But at least people know what matters to 
them. In a non-strategic environment like the MDG, players’ preferences are 
supposed to be robust to different contexts and states of mind.
5
 Consequently, 
according to this literature neither information nor self-reflection should have any 
effect on the revealed social preferences of the deciders. 
 
Prediction 1: Social preferences are individual traits. Neither information nor self-
reflection will have an effect on people’s choices in the MDG. 
 
                                               
5 Charness & Rabin (2001) do think, however, that preferences might change in a strategic 
environment due to negative or positive reciprocity. 
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In a public good game Dal Bo & Dal Bo (2009) provide participants with messages 
that define moral behavior. They find that if subjects are told that full contribution is 
moral their cooperation rates increase but still fall over time. Whereas Dal Bo & Dal 
Bo tell subjects what is supposed to be moral, Engel and Kurschilgen (2012) ask 
subjects for their own normative standards and show that this can indeed sustain 
cooperation in a public good game at very high levels. Also in a public good game, 
Engel, Kube and Kurschilgen (2011) show that information radically changes 
behavior when the information is anti-social but barely when it is pro-social. While 
those experiments show that social behavior changes, they cannot show that social 
preferences change since strategic considerations and beliefs are paramount in public 
good games.  
 
The dictator game eliminates strategic concerns. In the framework of a standard 
dictator game, Bicchieri & Xiao (2009) manipulate dictators’ empirical expectations 
by telling them what the majority of participants did in previous studies and their 
normative expectations by telling them what the majority thought should be done. 
They find empirical expectations to have a much stronger effect than normative 
expectations. In contrast to this study, however, the information subjects receive in 
Bicchieri & Xiao is not representative but selective. Krupka & Weber (2009) test the 
effect of focusing and information on choices in a binary dictator game. In the 
focusing treatments they have subjects think about what others would do 
(“descriptive focus”), or think about what other others said one should do (“injuctive 
focus”). In the informational treatment, subjects observe the choices of four previous 
players. Their results show that both focusing and information increases pro-social 
behavior. 
 
Once one leaves the conceptualization of social preferences as stable individual traits 
and accepts the idea that different contexts may entail different norms which in turn 
may change preferences, it can be useful to think of individuals as having a dual self. 
On the one hand, people are egoists who maximize their own material wealth. On the 
other hand, the very same people care intrinsically for abiding with norms. As the 
relevant norms vary from one context to the other, so does the self-perception of the 
individual. In one situation I might perceive myself as a player who legitimately 
maximizes her own profit whereas in another situation the very same behavior would 
cause me moral remorse. An early advocate of this idea is Adam Smith (1790) who 
claims that humans have both “passive feelings” that are “selfish” and “active 
principles” that are “noble” and “generous”. He further reasons that if we act 
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according to those noble principles we “attain […] satisfaction” not only from “praise 
but [from] praise-worthiness” (Smith 1790: III.ii.32). To experience that satisfaction 
“we must become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct”.  
 
Akerlof & Kranton (2000 and 2010) introduce the concept of identity utility to 
capture such contextual changes of preferences. We can think of the following simple 
utility function: 
   (     (   ̃        (5) 
 
where   represents the actual behavior of an individual and  ̃ is the norm. Utility 
increases with material payoffs  (   and decreases with every deviation from the 
norm  (   ̃ . How much a norm deviation hurts depends on the weight  , which can 
be interpreted as the importance of a norm. According to this model, a person would 
only deviate from material selfishness if she believes there is a certain norm  ̃ that 
does not coincide with profit maximization. In this case, the utility maximizing 
behavior represents a compromise between profit maximization and norm 
compliance. Consequently, information and self-reflection might have an effect on 
behavior if they change either the norm  ̃ or its importance  . 
 
However, Akerlof & Kranton lack some precision as to what exactly constitutes a 
norm. Their informal conceptualizations of a norm allude to two distinct sources: The 
first source is external. People watch how others behave and deduce the norm from 
what most people do. I call this a norm of conformity. On the other hand, the source 
of a norm can also be internal. People look at their own moral standards and deduce 
the norm from what they personally believe to be morally right. I call this a norm of 
morality. Conformity requires information about others’ behavior. Morality requires 
self-reflection about one’s own moral standards. This is the rationale for the two 
experimental treatments. 
 
In the Info treatment, deciders are informed about the choices of previous deciders. 
Specifically, they see that the absolute majority of previous participants chose Option 
A in each of the 36 decision tasks.
6
 Consequently if information reinforces 
conformity, choices in Info should be both more selfish and more homogenous than 
in the Baseline.  
 
                                               
6 Only the size of the majority varies from 53% to 99%. See Appendix C. 
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Prediction 2: Social preferences are subject to conformity. Information will make 
choices in the MDG more selfish and more homogeneous. 
 
In the Reflect treatment, subjects are asked to state their moral judgments. Using 
those as proxies for  ̃ and following Akerlof & Kranton, actual choices should be 
between the selfish optimum and deciders’ moral judgments. The larger   the closer 
  will be to  ̃. Consequently if self-reflection enhances morality, choices in the 
Reflect treatment should be closer to  ̃ and thus further away from the selfish 
optimum than in the Baseline. Previous experiments on social preferences suggest 
that most people who deviate from material selfishness are guided by either equality 
or social welfare concerns (see for instance Iriberri & Rey 2010, Charness & Rabin 
2001, Fisman et al. 2007). When deciders are richer than recipients these two 
concerns trigger the same behavior. This implies that if self-reflection reinforces 
morality, when deciders are ahead we should expect more creating in Reflect 
compared to the Baseline. However when deciders are poorer than recipients, the 
concern for equality postulates exactly the opposite than the concern for social 
welfare. Consequently if self-reflection reinforces morality, when deciders are behind 
we should expect social welfare maximizers to create more and equality maximizers 
to destroy more in Reflect compared to the Baseline. This would lead to more 
heterogeneity of choices in Reflect than in the Baseline. 
 
Prediction 3: Social preferences are subject to morality. Self-reflection will make 
choices in the MDG less selfish and more heterogeneous. 
IV. Results 
In the MDG, every deviation from the payoff maximizing Option A implies a cost of 
10 tokens for the decider. On average
7
, deciders in the baseline paid 37 tokens to 
deviate from material selfishness, compared to 32 tokens in Info (Mann-Whitney 
ranksum test, N=183 p=0.4330, two-sided), and 71 tokens in Reflect (ranksum test, 
N=159, p=0.0053, two-sided). Information has a totally different effect than self-
reflection. The former seems to barely influence preferences whereas the latter pushes 
                                               
7 As mentioned before, I am interested in choices that are deliberate and conscious and not due to 
confusion or cognitive overload. Therefore, throughout the results section, I only consider deciders 
who choose consistent with GARP: 79% in the Baseline, 88% in Info, and 81% in Reflect. However, 
all main results also hold if one includes the inconsistent deciders. 
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behavior significantly away from material selfishness. As shown in the cumulative 
distribution of Figure 1, in the Baseline 50% of deciders are not willing to pay a 
single token but prefer to just maximize their material payoffs. This number increases 
slightly to 56% (ranksum test, N=183, p=0.4760, two-sided) for deciders who were 
informed about behavior in the baseline, and drops considerably to 33% (ranksum 
test, N=159, p=0.0705, two-sided) for deciders who had previously been asked about 
their moral judgment. On the other side of the distribution, only 4% of the Baseline 
deciders were willing to give away the maximum possible amount of 180 tokens. 
This number even drops slightly to 2% in Info (ranksum test, N=183, p=0.3532, two-
sided) and jumps to 15% in Reflect (ranksum test, N=159, p=0.0168, two-sided).  
 
Result 1: Self-reflection makes deciders deviate substantially more from the selfish 
optimum. Information has no effect. 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean Choices across Treatments  
Note: Cumulative distribution function, displaying the share of individuals willing to pay (up to) a certain price to 
deviate from material selfishness. Every deviation from the selfish optimum implied forgone payoffs of 10 tokens. 
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In which situations are deciders willing to give up own payoffs? When they are richer 
than the recipients, many deciders forego higher own payoffs in order to increase the 
income of the recipient. In the Baseline, 40% of deciders do so. This number 
decreases slightly to 35% in Info (ranksum test, N=183, p=0.5029, two-sided) and 
jumps to 64% in Reflect (ranksum test, N=159, p=0.0089, two-sided). When deciders 
are poorer than recipients, 32% of the Baseline deciders choose to spend money, 
compared to 35% (ranksum test, N=183, p=0.7420, two-sided) in Info and 54% in 
Reflect (ranksum test, N=159, p=0.0172, two-sided). Interestingly however, self-
reflection not only makes more people spend money on creating income but also on 
destroying income: 10% of deciders destroy recipients’ income in Reflect, compared 
to only 4% (ranksum test, N=159, p=0.1541, two-sided) in the Baseline and 0% in 
Info (ranksum test, N=102, p=0.0099, two-sided). People who create when ahead and 
destroy when behind believe in the norm of equality whereas people who create both 
when ahead and when behind have social welfare as their normative goal. 
Apparently, self-reflection reinforces of one’s privately held norms, no matter 
whether the specific norm is equality or social welfare maximization. When these 
norms are in conflict to one another, as it is the case when the deciders are behind, 
self-reflection not only leads to a stronger deviation from material selfishness but also 
to more heterogeneity of behavior (variance ratio test, N=159, p=0.0190). 
 
Result 2: Self-reflection makes preferences more heterogeneous as it reinforces 
deciders’ home-grown normative concerns, be it social welfare or equality. 
Information has no effect. 
 
In fact, deciders’ moral judgments are even more extreme than their actual behavior. 
As predicted by the concept of identity utility, behavior in the Reflect treatment is a 
compromise between one’s moral judgment and payoff maximization. Figure 2 
illustrates this. Every dot represents the choice behavior of one individual decider. 
They are sorted by their cutoff   and   (see Table 2). A positive/negative   ( ) 
represents creating/destroying when ahead (behind). Hence, social welfare 
maximizers are located in the northeast quadrant, equality maximizers in the 
southeast quadrant, and payoff maximizers in the origin. Identity utility predicts that 
independent of the content of the norm, actual behavior will be closer to selfish 
payoff maximization than one’s normative ideal. The data clearly support this. Of the 
21 deciders who by their judgments in Panel A of Figure 2 can be identified as social 
welfare maximizers (   ,    ), 13 move closer to the origin once money is at 




Figure 2: Individual Judgments and Choices in Reflect Treatment  
Note: Every dot denotes an individual decider. The circles around the dots indicate that more than one decider had 
the same choice pattern. The larger the circles, the more deciders. The scales of the axes follow the logic of Table 
2, i.e. that destroying 84 and creating 84 are equivalent deviations from payoff maximization. They are thus 
plotted at the same distance from the origin. They are then labeled by their cutoff   and  , i.e. -5.00 for destroying 
and 0.45 for creating. 
 
In total, the actual price deciders pay for complying with the norm is significantly 
smaller than the price they judge to be morally right (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
N=21, p=0.0010, two-sided). Also the eight inequality averse deciders (   ,    ) 
have moral judgments that are more extreme than their actual choices (signed-rank 
test, N=8, p=0.0287, two-sided). This case is especially interesting since those people 
appear to judge it morally right to destroy even more of the other person’s income 
than what they actually do once it is costly. Finally, the seven people who comply 
with both welfare maximization and inequality aversion as they have     and 
    also move closer to the origin in their choices (signed-rank test, N=7, 
p=0.0311, two-sided). In contrast, the three individuals who believe payoff 
maximization to be morally right (   ,    ) stick to this when money is at stake. 
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Of the 13 deciders who act like payoff maximizers in the MDG, five individuals 
believe in social welfare maximization, three in equality, and two in both.  
 
Result 3: Revealed preferences in the Reflect treatment represent a compromise 
between deciders’ moral judgments and the selfish optimum, independent of whether 
people are concerned with social welfare or equality. 
 
So far, this study has shown that social preferences are very robust to information 
about the behavior of other people but change substantially when people are induced 
to make a moral judgment prior to their choice. The experimental data contradicts 
Predictions 1 and 2 and supports Prediction 3, which suggests that morality has a 
much stronger effect on social preferences than conformity.  
 
However, in reality information might be available before making a moral judgment 
or between my judgment and my choice. How robust are people’s moral judgments to 
information? How much do actual choices deviate from moral judgments once 
information kicks in? To test these questions, I run two additional treatments.  
 
The Info+Reflect treatment combines the two elements of Info and Reflect. After 
reading the instructions, subjects are informed that the game has been run before with 
more than 100 deciders. They are then asked to make their moral judgments while 
seeing on their screens for each of the 36 tasks which percentage of deciders in the 
Baseline preferred Option A. When playing the MDG they are reminded on their 
screens for each of the 36 tasks of both their own moral judgments and which 
percentage of deciders in the Baseline preferred Option A. 96 new participants (48 
deciders) took part in this treatment.  
 
In the Reflect+Info treatment the order of the two elements is reversed. First, subjects 
are asked to state what they believe to be “morally right”, just as in the Reflect 
treatment. Thereupon they are informed that the game has been run before with more 
than 100 deciders. When playing the MDG they are reminded on their screens for 
each of the 36 tasks of both their own moral judgments and which percentage of 
deciders in the Baseline preferred Option A. 96 new participants (48 deciders) took 




Figure 3: Mean Judgments and Choices across Treatments  
Note: Cumulative distribution function, displaying the share of individuals willing to pay (up to) a certain price to 
deviate from material selfishness. Every deviation from the selfish optimum implied forgone payoffs of 10 tokens. 
 
Panel A of Figure 3 shows the first main result from the additional treatments
8
. If 
subjects are informed about others’ behavior beforehand, their moral judgments 
change substantially. In Info+Reflect the average decider believes one should only 
spend 95 tokens to comply with one’s norm, compared to 129 tokens in Reflect+Info 
(ranksum test, N=89, p=0.0484, two-sided) and 130 tokens in Reflect (ranksum test, 
N=83, p=0.0301, two-sided). Strikingly however, the difference in moral judgments 
does not translate into actual choices. As shown in Panel B of Figure 3, the 
                                               
8 Also with the additional treatments, we restrict the analysis to the GARP consistent deciders, 92% in 
the Info+Reflect treatment and 94% in Reflect+Info. However, the main results also hold if we include 
the non-consistent, too. 
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willingness to spend money in the MDG is virtually identical in the two treatments. 
The average price paid is 60 tokens in Info+Reflect and 62 tokens in Reflect+Info 
(ranksum test, N=89, p=0.9900, two-sided). In fact, neither Info+Reflect (ranksum 
test, N=83, p=0.5548, two-sided) nor Reflect+Info (ranksum test, N=84, p=0.5694, 
two-sided) are significantly different from Reflect. In contrast, both Info+Reflect 
(ranksum test, N=164, p=0.0125, two-sided) and Reflect+Info (ranksum test, N=165, 
p=0.0217, two-sided) are significantly different from the Baseline. 
 
Result 4: Combined with self-reflection, information has a strong effect on people’s 
moral judgments but no effect on their actual choices.  
 
In the framework of Akerlof & Kranton (2000 and 2010), the distance between a 
decider’s moral judgment and her actual behavior indicates how much value she 
attaches to norm compliance. The moral judgments that were stated by the informed 
deciders appear to be more robust than those of the uninformed deciders in the sense 
that subjects deviate less from them when they play the payoff-relevant MDG. The 
comparison of the treatments Reflect, Reflect+Info, and Info+Reflect suggests that a 
deviation from one’s normative ideal causes more disutility if the norm was grounded 
on information. As a consequence, people deviate less. This in turn happens to cancel 
out the effect of a lower normative standard in the first place. 
 
Result 5: Deciders deviate less from their moral judgments when those were 
grounded on information. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has tested experimentally the effect of information and self-reflection on 
people’s social preferences in a modified dictator game (MDG). According to the 
literature on social preferences, these are stable traits of individuals that should not be 
altered by either information or self-reflection. In fact, this study finds that 
information has no effect at all on people’s preferences. In contrast, self-reflection 
changes preferences substantially. Whilst information has no effect on people’s 
choices, it does influence their moral judgments. Moreover, deciders whose moral 
judgments were stated knowing how other people behaved deviate much less from 
their judgments in the MDG. This suggests that people feel more strongly bound to 




The fact that information has virtually no effect on subjects’ choices makes the strong 
effect of self-reflection even more striking. The way the information is presented in 
the Info treatment, subjects see that in every single decision task the absolute majority 
of previous participants chose Option A. Still, this apparently does not induce people 
to follow the crowd. In contrast, in the Reflect treatment subjects know at the moment 
they are stating their moral judgments that with 50% probability they will be deciders 
in the MDG. Hence, they could easily state more selfish moral judgments. But they 
do not. At the moment they play the MDG deciders know their role. So they could 
easily neglect what they stated behind the veil of role uncertainty. But they do not. 
Deciders obviously feel bound by their previous statement. And still, they do not 
follow their moral judgment blindly but recognize the trade-off between norm 
compliance and their material self-interests. 
 
These results are very much in line with the idea of identity utility proposed by 
Akerlof & Kranton (2000). Moreover, they yield interesting new insights to the 
relationship between social preferences and the Akerlof & Kranton model. First, the 
source of the norm matters. Deciders’ social preferences in this experiment were 
extremely robust to conformity but highly susceptible to morality. Second, the 
importance of morality holds independent of the specific normative concern of the 
individual deciders. This leads to preferences becoming more heterogeneous as self-
reflection reinforces people’s home-grown normative concerns. Some people believe 
in social welfare, others in equality. When deciders are poorer than recipients these 
two normative goals clash. Self-reflection makes social welfare maximizers create 
more and equality maximizers destroy more. And their moral judgments are even 
further apart than their actions. This might have interesting implications in strategic 
settings. A follow up study could investigate whether self-reflection increases the 
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Welcome to our experiment! 
 
If you read the following explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a substantial sum of money, 
depending on the decisions you make. It is therefore crucial that you read these explanations carefully.  
 
During the experiment there shall be absolutely no communication between participants. Any violation 
of this rule means you will be excluded from the experiment and from any payments. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. We will then come over to you. 
 
During the experiment we will not calculate in euro, but instead in tokens. Your total income is 
therefore initially calculated in tokens. The total number of tokens you accumulate in the course of the 
experiment will be transferred into Euro at the end, at a rate of 
 
100 tokens = 1 Euro. 
 








In the experiment, there are two roles: decider and recipient. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly allotted one of the two roles. One half of the 
participants will be deciders, the other half will be recipients. During the entire experiment, you will 
remain in the same role.  
 
On your computer screen you will be shown 4 tables, one after the other. Every table consists of 9 























Your decision (A or B):   
 
In every decision task the decider has to choose between Option A and Option B. The two options 
define how many tokens the decider gets and how many the recipient gets.  
 
In this example the decider gets 12 tokens and the recipient 5 tokens if the decider chooses Option A. 
If the decider chooses Option B, the decider gets 10 tokens and the recipient 7 tokens.  
 
In every decision task the computer will randomly match every decider with a different recipient. 
Thus the decider-recipient pairs change in every decision task. 
 
The decider will never know the identity of the recipient. 
The recipient will never know the identity of the decider. 
 
At the end of every table please press the “OK” button on the lower right hand side of your screen. 







At the end of experiment the computer will randomly pick one decision task out of every table. The 
computer thus picks in total 4 decision tasks, one from every table. The corresponding token amounts 
from those 4 decision tasks will be added and changed into Euros. 
 
If you are decider, your payoffs only depend on your own choices and on the random draw at the end 
of the experiment. 
 
If you are recipient, your payoffs only depend on the choices of the corresponding decider and the 




Appendix B: Additional screen in Info treatment 
This Experiment has been run before with more than 100 Deciders. 
In the column on the right hand side of your screen you can see how the Deciders in those previous 
Experiments decided. Specifically, you will be shown which percentage of Deciders chose Option A or 
Option B in the corresponding Choice Task. 
 






Ahead Ahead Behind Behind
Create Destroy Create Destroy
1 89% chose A 95% chose A 91% chose A 95% chose A
2 89% chose A 95% chose A 92% chose A 91% chose A
3 87% chose A 97% chose A 89% chose A 95% chose A
4 83% chose A 98% chose A 88% chose A 90% chose A
5 76% chose A 99% chose A 84% chose A 90% chose A
6 68% chose A 97% chose A 76% chose A 89% chose A
7 64% chose A 97% chose A 74% chose A 91% chose A
8 58% chose A 97% chose A 68% chose A 90% chose A
9 53% chose A 97% chose A 67% chose A 89% chose A
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Appendix D: Additional screen in Reflect treatment 
Before the computer randomly determines who will be Decider and who will be Recipient, we would 
like to know your opinion. 
We would like to know from you: 
Which of the two Options (A or B) do you find morally right? 
The answers to these questions will be kept anonymous. No other participant will get to know them at 










This dissertation has examined how norms guide our behavior in the face of 
uncertainty. Norms can have many origins: institutionally imposed by a legislator, 
behavioral patterns within a social group, but also moral conceptions inherent to the 
individual. Equally, there are also many potential sources of uncertainty: nature, other 
people’s behavior, and even one’s own preferences. I have tackled several sub-
questions of this overarching research agenda in four separate Chapters. 
 
The first Chapter has compared two institutional arrangements for the market of 
copyrights. This market is characterized by the highly skewed distribution of earnings 
and their unpredictability. In the first institutional setting, the copyright must be 
traded behind the veil of uncertainty for a fixed fee. In the unlikely, but possible event 
of high success in the market, the licence fee is nonetheless binding for the two 
parties. The second setting introduces renegotiation in the shadow of legal 
intervention. In case the work turns out a bestseller, the artist may appeal to a third 
party who is entitled to adjust the fee. This situation corresponds to a provision from 
German copyright law, the so-called “bestseller paragraph”. In such a market, 
conflicting fairness norms between buyers and sellers are amongst the biggest 
obstacles to trade. Yet even when the parties have reached an agreement in the first 
place (“ex ante”), substantial discontent may arise as soon as the true value of the 
commodity is revealed (“ex post”).  
 
The experimental results suggest that, in the presence of the provision, copyrights 
trade at lower prices. Second, they trade more often as the acceptance level of sellers 
is reduced more than the willingness to pay of buyers. Higher acceptance is a strong 
indicator of enhanced ex-ante fairness. Moreover, the provision reduces perceived ex-
post unfairness for buyers. Rather surprisingly, though, there is not a similar effect for 
sellers. In the provision treatment, a third party, the so-called umpire, was asked to 
determine her “appropriate purchase price” in case the commodity had a high value. 
Even though the experimental design was rather prone to highlight ex-ante equality, 
ex-post equality turns out the umpires’ single distinct fairness norm.  
 
The Chapter has used the movie industry as the primary example because there is 
precise data on this market. Yet, given the neutral frame of the experimental design, 
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the insights should also be relevant to other copyright markets, characterised by 
comparable unpredictability of earnings, like exhibitions and music. Other markets 
with highly skewed earnings, like venture capital, might also be affected by a similar 
fairness problem. Future work might want to introduce different allocations of market 
power and test whether under such less favourable conditions the welfare enhancing 
effect of the provision is substantially reduced. In addition, one could make the 
sellers’ production of the copyright endogenous, to study the dynamic effects of 
different institutional arrangements. Another extension could allow the buyers’ effort 
to influence the probability of success. One might also want to study to which degree 
reputation is a substitute for legal intervention. 
 
Chapter 2 has studied the effect of customary law on cooperation. The experimental 
results from a standard linear public goods game suggest that customary law helps 
participants overcome a social dilemma. If there are no sanctions, the effect basically 
coincides with the behavioural effect of what public international law calls comity. In 
essence, customary law governs behaviour since normative expectations and 
behaviour coevolve. Whether the rule invokes the authority of the law is at best 
irrelevant, if not detrimental. Yet the authority of the law becomes instrumental as 
soon as there are sanctions. If combined with comity, sanctions crowd out some of 
the beneficial effect. If the rule originates in law, however, the authority of the law 
and the threat of sanctions reinforce each other.  
 
An obvious next step for studying the coevolution of behaviour and normative 
expectations would be to qualitatively explore normativity in international relations. 
In one respect, the character of states as corporate actors makes this even easier than 
with individuals. While the formation of the individual will occurs in her forum 
internum, the formation of the corporate will is open to public scrutiny. Through 
freedom of information legislation, even internal government deliberation is made 
accessible. It seems plausible that normativity in international relations is not 
fundamentally different from normativity in personal relations. 
 
Chapter 3 has explored whether cooperative behavior reacts to selective pre-play 
information about other, unrelated groups. It uses an experimental framework that is 
sufficiently rich, so that several potentially conflicting behavioral norms might 
emerge. The data show that the aggregate level of cooperativeness is dramatically 
reduced by giving subjects examples of uncooperative behavior. The opposite 
intervention is less powerful, but still effective. If participants in an otherwise 
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uncooperative environment see examples of successful groups, cooperation rates are 
stabilized, while they quickly decayed otherwise. A likely reason for these findings is 
that cooperation is path-dependent, i.e., long-run behavior is strongly correlated with 
initial contribution rates – which, in turn, are a reaction to the pre-play information 
given to the subjects. The latter might be due to a change in subjects’ expectations 
about others’ behavior. 
 
These findings have a number of important implications. First, they clearly point to 
the relevance of pre-game communication – a factor which has only lately started to 
receive significant attention in the literature. While the existing literature usually 
focuses on self-chosen cheap talk messages, this Chapter has demonstrated that also 
exogenously selected, one-way information about other players can alter how players 
act in subsequent games. In particular the findings of the second series of experiments 
might be of interest to this literature. They suggest a possible channel through which 
the observed effects of cheap talk are mediated, namely through the alteration of 
subjects’ pre-game expectations. 
 
Second, and closely related, is the finding that there seems to be a strong asymmetry 
in the strength of the reaction to the mechanism. By giving subjects examples of 
uncooperative behavior, the aggregate level of cooperativeness is immediately 
reduced. By contrast, cooperative examples need time to unfold their beneficial 
effect. Bad impressions carry more weight than good ones, so that creating bad 
behavior is seemingly easier than producing good behavior. Thus, one might expect 
that also other mechanisms which build on the manipulation of beliefs perform 
differently, depending on the content of the experience as well as on the specific 
environment in which they occur. 
 
Taken together, the results of Chapter 3 underline the power and importance of 
information and experience in shaping cooperative behavior. The bottom line is that 
observation matters. Interestingly, people do not only learn from what they 
experience themselves. They also seem to learn “vicariously”, by observing others, or 
by seeing the results. The effect is even present when participants are told that the 
information they are receiving is selective. Subjects’ behavior critically depends on 
pre-game expectations, which is shown to be easy to deteriorate in a complex setting 
– simply by providing subjects the opportunity of vicarious learning.  
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Managing first impressions might certainly be less effective if the large majority of 
addressees know better. The intervention requires a sufficient degree of uncertainty. 
Yet in political reality, quite a few public goods are characterized by deep conceptual 
and factual uncertainty. Problems like climate change are heavily contested among 
scientists and not well understood by many. Addressees have to trust expertise. If in 
the eyes of addressees the underlying social problem is opaque, they are also likely to 
be uncertain how others will react to it. Most importantly, addressees face behavioral 
uncertainty whenever they newly enter a community. They do not know local norms, 
nor do they know how determined the group is when it comes to enforcing them.  
 
Future research could try to explore the interaction between such simple and other, 
more complex and intrusive mechanisms. Another important, though challenging, 
next step would certainly be to move into the field and to investigate the effectiveness 
of means to foster cooperation in a more natural setup.  
 
The last Chapter of this dissertation has combined elements of Chapter 2, where 
subjects are asked for their own normative standards, and Chapter 3, where subjects 
are briefed about the behavior of previous participants. While those experiments 
show that social behavior changes, they cannot show that preferences change since 
strategic considerations and beliefs are paramount in public good games. Moreover, 
whilst Chapters 2 and 3 have looked at aggregate behavior of all experimental 
participants, the last Chapter has introduced an additional layer of analysis by 
distinguishing between different player “types”.  
 
Chapter 4 has studied the effect of information and self-reflection on people’s social 
preferences in a modified dictator game (MDG). According to the literature on social 
preferences, these are stable traits of individuals that should not be altered by either 
information or self-reflection. This Chapter suggests that information has indeed no 
effect at all on people’s preferences. In contrast, self-reflection changes preferences 
substantially. Whilst information has no effect on people’s choices, it does influence 
their moral judgments. Moreover, deciders whose moral judgments were stated 
knowing how other people behaved deviate much less from their judgments in the 
MDG. This suggests that people feel more strongly bound to judgments when those 
are well-informed. 
 
The fact that information has virtually no effect on subjects’ choices makes the strong 
effect of self-reflection even more striking. The way the information is presented in 
 
145 
the Info treatment, subjects see that in every single decision task the absolute majority 
of previous participants chose Option A. Still, this apparently does not induce people 
to follow the crowd. In contrast, in the Reflect treatment subjects know at the moment 
they are stating their moral judgments that with 50% probability they will be deciders 
in the MDG. Hence, they could easily state more selfish moral judgments. But they 
do not. At the moment they play the MDG deciders know their role. So they could 
easily neglect what they stated behind the veil of role uncertainty. But they do not. 
Deciders obviously feel bound by their previous statement. And still, they do not 
follow their moral judgment blindly but recognize the trade-off between norm 
compliance and their material self-interests. 
 
These results are very much in line with the idea of identity utility. Moreover, they 
yield interesting new insights to the relationship between identity and social 
preferences. First, the source of the norm matters. Deciders’ social preferences in this 
experiment were extremely robust to conformity but highly susceptible to morality. 
Second, the importance of morality holds independent of the specific normative 
concern of the individual deciders. This leads to preferences becoming more 
heterogeneous as self-reflection reinforces people’s home-grown normative concerns. 
Some people believe in social welfare, others in equality. When deciders are poorer 
than recipients these two normative goals clash. Self-reflection makes social welfare 
maximizers create more and equality maximizers destroy more. And their moral 
judgments are even further apart than their actions. This might have interesting 
implications in strategic settings. A follow up study could investigate whether self-
reflection increases the likelihood of conflict in situations where people have 









Das Leben steckt voller Ungewissheiten. Bei den meisten Entscheidungen, die wir zu 
treffen haben, kennen wir die genauen Folgen unseres Handelns nicht. Wenn wir vor 
einer roten Ampel stehen, wissen wir zum Beispiel häufig nicht, wie gefährlich die 
entsprechende Kreuzung ist oder ob die Polizei einen versteckten Blitzer aufgestellt 
haben könnte. Wenn wir uns entschließen, ein Haus zu kaufen, wissen wir nicht, ob 
wir uns mit unseren Nachbarn verstehen werden und wie sich der Wert des Hauses 
über die Jahre entwickeln wird, falls wir es wieder verkaufen wollen. Wenn wir 
überlegen, einer Hilfsorganisation Geld zu spenden, können wir nie ganz sicher sein, 
dass das Geld bei den Betroffenen ankommt und ob die Hilfsmaßnahmen tatsächlich 
die Lebensbedingungen der Menschen verbessern. 
 
In dieser ungewissen Welt helfen uns Normen dabei, Entscheidungen zu treffen, 
indem Sie uns Orientierung geben. Normen können unterschiedlichen Ursprungs 
sein. Sie können Gesetze sein, typische Verhaltensmuster einer sozialen Gruppe oder 
persönliche moralische Grundsätze. Wir überfahren keine roten Ampeln, weil das 
gegen das Gesetz verstößt; völlig unabhängig von der speziellen Situation an einer 
bestimmten Kreuzung. Wir bauen ein Haus, weil die meisten unserer Freunde und 
Kollegen Häuser besitzen. Und wir spenden, weil wir glauben, dass irgendetwas 
getan werden muss. 
 
In vier eigenständigen Kapiteln erforsche ich, wie Normen unser Verhalten 
beeinflussen. Dabei wende ich experimentalökonomische Methoden auf 
Fragestellungen an, die sich an der Schnittstelle zur Rechtswissenschaft (insb. Kapitel 
1 und 2), Soziologie (insb. Kapitel 3) und Sozialpsychologie (insb. Kapitel 4) 
befinden. 
 
Das erste Kapitel untersucht den Markt für Urheberrechte. Stellen Sie sich folgende 
Situation vor: Ein Autor hat ein Drehbuch geschrieben und ein Produzent möchte das 
Recht erwerben, daraus einen Film zu machen. Zum Zeitpunkt, da beide Parteien sich 
einigen müssen, weiß keine der beiden, wieviel der Film einspielen wird. Erfolg an 
der Kinokasse ist sehr ungleich verteilt: Wenige Filme erzielen einen enormen 
Gewinn, während die große Mehrzahl kaum die Produktionskosten einzupielen 
vermag. Es gibt keine zuverlässigen Methoden, Kassenerfolg vorherzusagen. In so 
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einer Situation ist es für beide Parteien schwierig, ihren Reservationspreis 
festzulegen, geschweige denn, sich auf ein für beide Seiten akzeptables Geschäft zu 
einigen. Der deutsche Gesetzgeber glaubt, dass diese Situation einen regulatorischen 
Eingriff erfordert. Das ist im sogenannten „Bestsellerparagraphen“ des Urheberrechts 
festgelegt. Dieser besagt, dass der Urheber das Recht hat, im Nachhinein eine 
Änderung des Vertrags zu verlangen, sollte die ursprüngliche Vereinbarung „in einem 
auffälligen Missverhältnis zu den Erträgen [...] aus der Nutzung des Werkes stehen“ 
(§32a I 1 UrhG).  
 
Zusammen mit Christoph Engel entwerfe ich ein Experiment, das die wichtigsten 
Eigenschaften des Marktes für Urheberrechte enthält. Eine Experimentalbedingung 
stellt den Markt ohne und eine andere mit dem Bestsellerparagraphen dar. Unter 
standardökonomischen Annahmen ändert die Vorschrift nichts am Gleichgewicht. 
Unter verhaltensökonomischen Annahmen jedoch führt die Vorschrift zu niedrigeren 
Preisen. Sie hat aber keinen Effekt auf die Anzahl der geschlossenen Verträge. Die 
Ergebnisse des Experiments suggerieren, dass die Vorschrift in der Tat zu niedrigeren 
Preisen führt und sich die Probanden fairer behandelt fühlen. Sowohl ex ante, als 
auch ex post. 
 
Während sich das erste Kapitel mit kodifiziertem Recht befasst, beschäftigt sich das 
zweite Kapitel mit Gewohnheitsrecht. In den meisten Ländern der Welt ist 
Gewohnheitsrecht eine anerkannte Rechtsquelle. Es entsteht durch das Verhalten und 
den Willen derjenigen, die sich diesem Recht unterwerfen. Klassische Beispiele sind 
internationales Recht, die lex mercatoria, Handelsbräuche und Verhaltensregeln. Die 
typischen Bereiche des Gewohnheitsrechts zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass hohe 
Ungewissheit darüber herrscht, wie sich die anderen Akteure verhalten werden, und, 
ob eine bestimmte Praxis bereits hinreichend etabliert ist, um Bindungswirkung zu 
entfalten. 
 
Zusammen mit Christoph Engel untersuche ich die Wirkung von Gewohnheitsrecht in 
einem experimentellen Gemeinwohlspiel. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Normen 
wirken, indem sie den beteiligten Akteuren Orientierung bieten. Die meisten Akteure 
halten sich die meiste Zeit an die Normen, die in ihrem Kontext gültig sind. Und sie 
erwarten, dass sich die anderen auch daran halten. Die Experimentalbedingung mit 





Kapitel 3 verlässt den Bereich der Rechtsnormen und wendet sich sozialen Normen 
zu. Soziale Normen sind essenziell, wenn Menschen kooperieren müssen, um einen 
größeren sozialen Nutzen zu erzielen. Hinter vielen alltäglichen Situationen, wie zum 
Beispiel Umweltschutz, Landesverteidigung oder politischem Engagement, verbergen 
sich Kooperationsprobleme. In all diesen Fällen sehen sich die Akteure einem 
sozialen Dilemma ausgesetzt. Als Gemeinschaft geht es ihnen am besten, wenn jeder 
Einzelne seinen fairen Beitrag leistet. Aber individuell ist jeder in Versuchung, auf 
den Anstrengungen der anderen Trittbrett zu fahren und selbst nichts beizutragen. 
Frühere experimentelle Studien haben gezeigt, dass die meisten Gruppen es nicht 
schaffen, über einen längeren Zeitraum zu kooperieren. 
 
Zusammen mit Christoph Engel und Sebastian Kube untersuche ich, welchen Effekt 
es hat, wenn man den Gruppen, bevor sie interagieren, Verhaltensbeispiele früherer 
Gruppen zeigt. In einer Experimentalbedingung erhalten die Teilnehmer Beispiele 
besonders kooperativer, in einer anderen, besonders unkooperativer Gruppen. Wir 
suggerieren somit den Teilnehmern eine mögliche (kooperative oder unkooperative) 
Verhaltensnorm. Das experimentelle Paradigma ist ein Gemeinwohlspiel mit Strafe 
und Revanche. Es ist hinreichend komplex, so dass sehr unterschiedliche 
Verhaltensnormen plausibel erscheinen.  
 
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Beispiele einen sehr starken Effekt auf das 
Kooperationsverhalten der Gruppen haben. Zudem weisen sie auf eine interessante 
Asymmetrie hin. Die Teilnehmer reagieren wesentlich stärker auf die negativen als 
auf die positiven Beispiele. Eine zusätzliche Datenerhebung legt nahe, dass dies zur 
Ursache haben kann, dass optimistische Erwartungen über das Verhalten der 
Mitmenschen fragiler sind als pessimistische. 
 
In den meisten Situationen des Alltags wissen wir, welche Norm relevant ist, und 
passen unser Verhalten automatisch und unbewusst an. Häufig jedoch finden wir 
neue Situationen vor und sind uns nicht sicher, wie wir uns richtigerweise verhalten 
sollen. Normen helfen uns, Orientierung zu finden. Man kann zwei Quellen 
unterscheiden, aus denen wir normative Orientierung beziehen. Extern, indem wir 
beobachten, wie sich andere Leute verhalten („Konformität“). Intern, indem wir uns 
fragen, was wir selbst als moralisch richtig beurteilen würden („Moralität“). 
Konformität benötigt Informationen über das Verhalten der anderen. Moralität bedarf 
der Selbstreflexion über die eigenen moralischen Grundsätze. Kapitel 4 untersucht 
den Effekt von Information und Selbstreflexion auf soziale Präferenzen. 
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Das Konzept der Selbstreflexion lässt sich auf Adam Smiths „Theory of Moral 
Sentiments“ zurückführen, der sich wiederum am religiösen Konzept des Gewissens 
orientierte. Das jüngere ökonomische Konzept des Identitätsnutzens erklärt die 
Veränderung von Präferenzen mittels einer Verschiebung der relevanten Normen; sei 
es unbewusst oder durch bewusste Selbstreflexion. Dies kontrastiert stark mit der 
heute weit verbreiteten Ansicht, dass Präferenzen stabile Merkmale eines 
Individuums sind. Die Literatur zu sozialen Präferenzen, zum Beispiel, akzeptiert 
zwar, dass unterschiedliche Menschen verschiedene Vorstellungen von 
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit haben, nicht jedoch, dass dieselben Personen von einer 
Situation zur anderen ihre Vorstellungen ändern. 
 
Die Experimentalergebnisse legen nahe, dass Informationen keinen Einfluss auf 
soziale Präferenzen haben. Im Gegensatz dazu hat Selbsreflexion einen starken 
Effekt. Informationen über das Verhalten der anderen haben jedoch einen Effekt auf 
die Moralvorstellungen der Teilnehmer. Die Teilnehmer haben sehr heterogene 
Vorstellungen von Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. Während einige für 
Einkommensgleichheit eintreten, bevorzugen andere die Maximierung des 
Gemeinwohls. Selbstreflexion verstärkt das Gewicht der persönlichen 
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